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In this thesis, I examine three corporate governance related issues, namely, the 
determinants of corporate governance, the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance, and the impact of corporate governance on stock returns. 
Exploring the determinants of firm-level governance, I find that an improvement 
in investment opportunities, an increase in external financing needs, R&D reporting 
availability, and an increase in free cash flow, are positively related to an 
improvement in corporate governance. 
My findings reveal an interesting relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance, namely, that it is the change in corporate governance rather than 
the level of corporate governance that determines performance. In investigating 
possible reasons for the underlying relationship between governance and performance, 
I find that both free cash flow and cost of equity capital help to explain the positive 
association between Tobin’s Q and improvements in corporate governance. 
Specifically, I find that improvements in corporate governance prevent managers from 
stockpiling large reserves and as such reduce some of the adverse effects of excess 
cash holdings on firm value. Furthermore, I find that improvements in corporate 
governance reduce the firms’ cost of equity and I also observe a positive relationship 
between governance change and a firm’s future operating performance. 
Whether the positive relation between a firm’s performance and governance 
change is understood by the market is another important issue that I address in this 
thesis. My results show that post-investment returns are positively related to 
governance change rather than the level of governance. An investment strategy that 
VI 
buys governance-improving firms and shorts governance-deteriorating firms is found 
to earn an average monthly return of 72 basis points, or about 8.6% per year. Tests to 
establish whether the abnormal returns accruing to the improvement portfolio is due 
to mispricing or risk are inconclusive. 
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Corporate governance practices in the U.K. have attracted increased attention 
since the 1990s, with influential reports issued by the Cadbury Committee (1992), 
Greenbury Committee (1995), Hampel Committee (1998), Turnbull Committee (2003) 
and Sir Derek Higgs (2003). These reports have resulted in various corporate 
governance codes and recommendations, including the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance, June 1998, July 2003 and June 2006 versions (hereafter referred to as the 
U.K. Code). In the last decade, U.K. regulators and companies have made significant 
efforts to improve the level of corporate governance. 
However, limited empirical research has been conducted to examine the 
association between corporate governance and firm performance in the U.K. market. 
Most of the studies have been conducted on U.S. firms. This research examines 
corporate governance in the U.K. for several reasons. First, corporate governance 
characteristics of U.K. firms are more diversified. Compared to the U.S., the corporate 
governance environment in the U.K. is less regulated. Compliance with the U.K. 
corporate governance code is voluntary and U.K. firms are free to choose the 
governance policy according to their own circumstances. Therefore, the corporate 
governance characteristics are more diversified among U.K. firms compared to U.S. 
companies. This research provides an opportunity for the comparison of the 
effectiveness of different governance mechanisms. 
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Secondly, there were unprecedented institutional changes in U.K. governance in 
1990s as a consequence of the publication of the aforementioned governance reports. 
By drawing a sample of U.K. firms and comparing their performance before and after 
the governance changes during that period, there is an opportunity to develop 
complementary tests based on changes in governance in addition to cross-sectional 
analysis. These change models are less susceptible to problems of spurious correlation 
because the U.K. Code is exogenously imposed on all firms, not endogenously driven 
by firm specific characteristics. 
1.2 Motivation of Thesis 
In addition to the reasons described above, there are several motivations for 
conducting this research. While the U.K. Code puts forward a comprehensive set of 
governance-related recommendations, earlier studies on the U.K. corporate 
governance have only examined the impact of specific code recommendations on firm 
performance [Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) on director affiliation and ownership, 
chairman affiliation, and committee composition and Weir et al. (2002) on board 
independence, CEO duality, audit committee, director shareholdings, leverage, and 
external shareholding]. However, as pointed out by Bowen et al. (2004), ignoring the 
interaction between individual governance instruments can lead to spurious 
inferences. 
To examine the effectiveness of overall governance standards, I use the approach 
of scorecard developed by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) to assess the corporate 
governance of U.K.-listed companies. It provides a comprehensive measure of the 
extent to which a company has adopted recommended best practices in corporate 
governance, as revealed in their corporate governance disclosures. 
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The approach used is similar to that adopted to study U.S. companies (Gompers et 
al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2005; Larcker et al., 2005; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Gillan 
et al., 2006), 14 emerging markets (Klapper and Love, 2004), companies in  27 
countries (Durnev and Kim, 2005), S&P Supercomposite 1,500 companies and other 
large, publicly-traded firms (Gillan et al., 2003; 2006), EMU (European Monetary 
Union) and U.K. companies (Bauer et al., 2004), and U.K companies (Shabbir and 
Padgett, 2005). 
Akin to these studies, this research also uses the score as a broad measurement of 
corporate governance. Corporate governance measures used in the earlier studies are 
constructed from two sources: (1) constructed by some rating agencies (CLSA index 
or S&P index) and (2) constructed by the authors using a set of observable indicators. 
Studies show that both CLSA and S&P indices are fairly weak predictors of firm 
value. This could be because that the CLSA index is a subjective measurement and 
the S&P index is limited to disclosure. In addition, both indices are abandoned by 
their sponsors, precluding us to conduct time series analysis. Self-constructed indices 
are not subject to these constraints, but generally include a small number of 
governance indicators only. For example, the index in Padgett and Shabbir (2005) 
includes only 12 governance items. The scores used in this research are 
self-constructed indices, broader in scope (including 136 items) and more dynamic 
(four years) when compared to the scores used in previous studies. 
Previous studies provide weak evidence in support of the existence and reasons 
for a link between governance structure and performance, which may be due to the 
weaknesses in the research methodology which are described above. Many of earlier 
studies on corporate governance have examined subsets of governance mechanisms, 
usually using only one or two governance variables. These variables are insufficient to 
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represent the governance standard and hence show little relevance to the performance. 
More recent studies employ a broader measurement of corporate governance through 
a composite rating. However, these studies are based on governance ratings for one or 
two years only, and assume they remained constant for a number of years. This 
assumption may not hold. Firms can choose and modify the structure of their 
governance systems to suit their circumstances. Denis and Sarin (1999) suggest that 
ownership and board structures adjust frequently to economic shocks, leading 
observed ownership and board structures to be considerably less stable than 
commonly believed. Therefore there could be systematic biases in previous studies of 
static examination of governance structure that assume constant ownership and board 
structure over time. 
In this research, I propose to examine not only the level but also the changes in 
governance variables. The governance structure shall also be examined over a longer 
period for the firms in the sample. Klapper and Love (2004) find that governance 
mechanisms may be affected by firm-specific environments. However, they are not 
able to analyze the causality between governance mechanisms and firm performance 
because their governance data has no time variation. My study extends beyond 
previous studies by analyzing a number of corporate governance mechanisms based 
on time-varying, firm-specific data. 
Some researchers (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988 and 1998; Gillan et al., 2003; 
Lehn et al., 2004; Cremers and Nair, 2005) explain the weak link between governance 
level and firm performance using the contracting efficiency theory. They argue that a 
high agency cost firm will have a higher level of governance compared to a low 
agency cost firm to control the agency problem. However, firms with higher 
governance standards do not necessarily have better performance. 
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The objective of the release of the first combined code in the 1990s was to raise 
standards of governance. Firms were expected to have improved performance by 
strengthening their internal governance structure. However, according to the 
contracting efficiency theory, we would expect that most firms had a certain level of 
governance based on their environments before the release of the codes. Firms would 
decide not to comply with higher level of standards if the costs of implementing these 
standards were higher than the expected benefits. Given this cost-benefit tradeoff, it is 
unclear as to whether improved governance as reflected by higher compliance is 
associated with improvement in firm performance. This study investigates the 
desirability of governance rules on corporations by testing costs/benefits to firms with 
compliance or non-compliance. 
Previous study found some endogeneity between corporate governance and firm 
performance. For example, Vafeas (1999) finds that boards’ meeting frequency is 
negatively related to firm valuation but increased frequency of board meetings is 
positively related to future operating performance. It suggests that the positive 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is more pronounced 
when corporate governance changes. Therefore any cross-sectional regression of 
performance on board composition will be biased because changes in corporate 
governance may result merely from past performance. An important improvement of 
my methods over previous studies is the use of panel data and the analysis on change 
in corporate governance instead of the level of corporate governance, which reduces 
the endogeneity problem. 
A few studies have examined the impact of change of governance on firm 
performance. Some researchers (Nesbitt, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2001; Carleton et al., 
1998; Caton et al., 2001; English et al., 2001; Anson et al., 2003) study how activist 
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funds reap high stock returns by purchasing shares of low governance firms and 
improving their governance structures. In particular, Becht et al. (2006) analyze 
targeted, high-intensity shareholder activism over the period 1998-2004 by the 
Hermes U.K. Focus Fund (HUKFF). They observe that HUKFF buys into 
poorly-governed companies and pushes for changes, which include corporate 
restructurings, changes to the boards of firms, and restrictions on corporate policies. 
They report significantly positive returns around the announcements of desired board 
changes, increased payouts, and major restructurings. 
The case of HUKFF suggests that institutions-initiated governance improvement 
can lead to improved firm performance. My study extends the Becht et al.’s (2006) 
work to the area of voluntary improvement in corporate governance. It is interesting 
to inquire whether the market also rewards the firm which voluntarily improves its 
corporate governance. If the market responds positively to the voluntary 
improvements, it suggests that firms can improve their performance by raising the 
governance standards. If the market does not reward governance improvement, it 
simply suggests that the high stock returns attained by activist funds are more 
dependent on the institution’s skills in picking the right firm. 
This study extends the work of Becht et al. (2006) in two other ways. First, Becht 
et al. (2006) examine market perceived benefits instead of realized benefits of 
engagement. Second, they focus on short-term market reaction. As suggested by 
Gompers et al. (2003), a “long-run event study” is a better approach to examine the 
wealth effect of a governance provisions index. In this study, I investigate whether 
change in governance results in realized change in firm performance and whether 
investors can obtain abnormal returns over a long period. 
I study whether there are higher stock returns for those firms that voluntarily 
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improve governance to comply with the combined code. My analysis adds to the 
research of Grinstein and Chhaochharia (2005) who study the announcement effect of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley law (SOX) and the amendments to the stock-exchange regulations 
on firm value. They find that non-complying firms are valued higher because the 
market expects them to improve corporate governance in the future. Their study does 
not analyze whether firm performance improves when real improvement in corporate 
governance occurs. My thesis examines actual improvements in shareholder wealth in 
the long run following the actual changes in the corporate governance. 
This is an important research question for two reasons. First, knowing the 
economic consequences of the real improvement in corporate governance has 
important policy implications, because its effectiveness had been taken for granted 
when the U.K. Code was established. Empirically, we need to test whether firms 
making efforts to comply with the U.K. Code are rewarded by the capital market. 
Second, the best way to detect positive results of the U.K. Code is to assess the 
long-term performance effects of changes in the degree of Code compliance. 
My thesis also looks into the reason behind the positive relationship between 
corporate governance and stock returns. Agency problems may affect the value of 
companies through two distinct channels: (1) the expected cash flows accruing to 
investors and (2) the cost of capital. 
First, firms with stronger governance would be more likely to have better 
management of cash and thereby increasing firm value. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggest that better-governed firms are more likely to invest in profitable projects, 
resulting in higher future cash flows. La Porta et al. (2002), Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
(2002), as well as Durnev and Kim (2005) argue that good governance prevents 
expropriation by managers or controlling shareholders. Jensen (1986) puts forth the 
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theory that good governance reduces the resources under the control of managers, and 
thus indirectly reduces the chance of expropriation by managers. 
Second, good governance decreases the cost of capital either through the reduction 
of shareholders’ monitoring and auditing costs (Lombardo and Pagano, 2000b; 
Garmaise and Liu, 2005) or through the reduction of information asymmetry (Easley 
and O’Hara, 2002; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2004). 
It is important to understand the mechanisms through which corporate governance 
affects a firm’s valuation. However, these two effects of governance are usually 
investigated separately. As a result, empirical studies provide little evidence on the 
sources of the increases in firm value. In particular, it is unclear whether the benefits 
stem from higher expectations about future cash flows, from a lower cost of capital, or 
from both sources simultaneously. This thesis examines both dimensions 
simultaneously. Hence, it adds to the literature on the relative magnitude of the cash 
flow and cost of capital effects of corporate governance. 
A large number of studies have been conducted on either the association between 
corporate governance and stock returns or the association between corporate 
governance and operating performance. To my knowledge, no prior studies have 
examined the link between corporate governance and stock returns through operating 
performance. My thesis broadens this line of research by investigating whether stock 
returns can be explained by operating performance. 
1.3 Objective of Thesis 
This study highlights the importance of analyzing and improving the existing 
corporate governance practices in the U.K. It questions whether corporate governance 
change adds value to a firm. 
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To operate successfully, a firm needs a competent corporate governance structure. 
Over time, if a firm finds its existing corporate governance mechanisms insufficient to 
guarantee good performance, it will develop an intention to improve it. Accordingly, 
the primary objective of this thesis is to explicitly illustrate that improvement in 
corporate governance leads to improvement in firm performance. Specifically, this 
study aims to address four issues: 
(1) what are the factors that lead to the change in corporate governance; 
(2) whether change in corporate governance has any effect on firm value; 
(3) what effect does change in governance have on shareholder returns; and 
(4) what are the sources of the correlation between change in governance and firm 
value. 
The framework of this study is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Framework of the thesis 
 
1.4 Potential Contributions of Thesis 
This thesis tries to provide a comprehensive analysis on governance mechanisms, 
Factors which Affect 
Corporate Governance Corporate Governance 
Firm Value Operating Performance Stock Returns 
Cost of Capital Free Cash Flow Mispricing Risk 
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including composite governance ratings and ownership and firm leverage. In 
particular, this thesis contributes to the line of research that examines the relation 
between corporate governance and firm value in a number of ways. 
Firstly, this study takes a more holistic approach towards corporate governance 
developments, asking whether improvement in governance is associated with 
improvement in firm performance. The corporate governance developments in the 
U.K. offer a unique laboratory to address these empirical issues. My study extends the 
scope of corporate governance and firm  performance literature beyond previous 
studies by analyzing a number of corporate governance mechanisms based on 
time-varying, firm-specific data. 
Secondly, this study examines the factors that lead to change in governance score 
(rather than a specific governance item) which provides a richer understanding of the 
dynamics of corporate governance structures. 
Thirdly, given the costs/benefits tradeoff in complying with raised standards of 
governance, it is unclear whether improved governance as reflected by higher 
compliance is associated with improvement in firm performance. This research 
contributes to the line of literature that examines the desirability of governance rules 
on corporations. 
Fourthly, this study explicitly evaluates exogenous changes in governance 
structure and alleviates the potential endogeneity problem. Furthermore, I use fixed 
effects estimator and simultaneous equation system to mitigate concerns about 
endogeneity. 
Fifthly, my study extends the research on effects of institutions-initiated 
improvement in governance to voluntary improvement in governance. Most of the 
previous studies focus on market perceived benefits of change in governance. My 
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approach is to study the actual improvements in shareholder wealth in the long run. 
Finally, this thesis contributes to and merges distinct and different streams of 
research on the sources of the correlation between change in governance and firm 
value. It examines the relative magnitude of the cash flow and cost of capital effects 
of corporate governance. In particular, unlike previous research, this thesis directly 
examines the link between operating performance and stock returns. 
1.5 Organization of Thesis 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews literature 
concerning firm-level corporate governance. Chapter 3 presents the research 
hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the sample and data used. Chapter 5 explores the 
determinants of corporate governance and its relationship with firm performance. 
Chapter 6 investigates further the relationship between corporate governance and 
stock returns. Chapter 7 concludes with the empirical findings and presents potential 




Chapter 2 surveys the literature. I take the agency theory perspective of corporate 
governance, discussing agency costs, agency conflicts and corporate governance 
mechanisms employed to mitigate agency conflicts. I especially focus on the 
theoretical work of investor protection. I begin with literature regarding governance 
determinants. After that, I review the literature on corporate governance and firm 
performance. In prior literature, there are generally two channels through which 
corporate governance may affect performance. One is free cash flow and the other is 
cost of capital.  
2.1 Models of Corporate Governance 
Hawley and Williams (1996) identify four models of corporate control: (1) The 
Simple Finance Model; (2) The Stewardship Model; (3) The Stakeholder Model; and 
(4) The Political Model. The Stewardship Model assumes that managers are 
trustworthy. The main roles of outsiders are to provide access to valued resources and 
information and to facilitate inter-firm commitment. In the Stakeholder Model defined 
by Clarkson (1994), the purpose of the firm is to create wealth or value for its 
stakeholders by converting their stakes into goods and services. In the Political Model, 
the allocation of corporate power, privileges and profits among owners, managers and 
other stakeholders is determined by how governments favor their various 
constituencies. The ability of corporate stakeholders to influence allocations between 
themselves at the micro level is subject to the macro framework, which is 
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interactively subjected to the influence of the corporate sector. In fact, The Simple 
Finance Model represents a subset of The Political Model. 
The dominant theoretical lens for examining corporate governance is the agency 
theory under The Simple Finance Model. Corporate governance, as defined by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), is “…the ways in which the suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investments” (p.737). I 
limit the research scope of my thesis to The Simple Finance Model under the agency 
theory assumption. 
2.2 Agency Theory 
2.2.1 Introduction to Agency Theory 
Agency theory originates from the paper of Berle and Means (1932) on the 
separation between ownership and control in large corporations. One of the most 
widely-cited papers on agency theory is published by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the firm can be viewed as a nexus or 
network of contracts, implicit and explicit, among various parties or stakeholders, 
such as shareholders, bondholders, employees, and society at large. Figure 2, taken 
from John and Senbet (1998), provides a visual representation of the network of 
contracts. 
The interests of stakeholders are not always aligned. Agency problems occur 
when the interests of agents are not aligned with those of principals. Depending on the 
parties involved in conflicts, agency problems can be categorized as: managerial 
agency or managerialism (between stockholders and management); debt agency 
(between stockholders and bondholders); social agency (between private and public 
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sectors); and political agency (between agents of the public sector and the rest of 
society or taxpayers). 
Figure 2: The firm (corporation): a network of contracts 
 
Source: John and Senbet (1998) 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), shareholders are the residual claimants 
after other parties, and thus shareholders’ rights are the weakest. Corporate 
governance is therefore mainly designed to protect and promote the interests of 
shareholders. My research will focus on the agency-principal problems between 
managers and stockholders. 
2.2.2 Agency Costs 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) show how investors in publicly-traded corporations 
incur costs in monitoring and bonding managers to best serve shareholders. They 
define agency costs as being the sum of the cost of monitoring management (the 
agent); bonding the agent to the principal; and residual losses. As with any other costs, 
agency costs will be captured by financial markets and reflected in a company’s share 
prices. 
Corporate governance can be viewed as a set of mechanisms to reduce agency 
costs in order to assure suppliers of finance of the return on their investments. The 
objective of corporate governance is to encourage the management to make the same 
decisions that owners would have made themselves, such as investment in positive net 
present value (NPV) projects. 
2.2.3 Sources of Agency Conflicts 
With separation of ownership and control, the actual operations of the firm are 
conducted by managers whose interests are not fully aligned with its owners. There 
are four basic sources of conflicts: (1) moral hazard; (2) earnings retention; (3) time 
horizon; and (4) risk aversion. 
 
Moral Hazard 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that a manager’s incentive to consume private 
perquisites increases as his ownership in the company declines. Moral hazard is also 
represented by the lack of effort in management. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue 
that managers prefer making investment best suited to their own personal skills, to 
increase both their own value to the firm and the cost of replacing them. In addition, 
Grenadier and Wang (2005) show that moral hazard together with adverse selection 
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results in investment inefficiency. Furthermore, Jensen (1986) points out that free cash 
flow1 worsens the moral hazard problem. 
When a moral hazard or information asymmetry exists, the static contracting 
models in Almazan and Suarez (2003) and Hermalin (2005) suggest that replacement 
of the manager of the lower-quality project is efficient. On the other hand, the real 
options model in Hori and Osano (2006) indicates otherwise. 
Some researchers suggest using incentives packages to reduce moral hazard 
problem. For instance, Margiotta and Miller (2000) find that moderate additional 
compensation to managers could reduce large losses from ignoring moral hazard, and 
thus improve managerial performance. Choe and Yin (2004) suggest that both 




If free cash flow is paid out as dividends, managers are less likely to invest in 
projects with negative values. Brennan (1995) expresses the concern that a managerial 
desire for corporate power may cause losses of large shareholders. For example, 
managers may focus on increasing firm size rather than improving firm value, since 
management compensation is usually tied to firm size rather than shareholder returns 
(Jensen and Maruphy, 1990). 
Jensen (1986, 1993) argues that managers prefer earnings retention and may 
invest for diversification purposes. Earnings retention also reduces the likelihood of 
monitoring by the external capital market (Easterbrook, 1984).2 
                                                 
1 They define free cash flow as cash flow generated by the firm in excess of the amount required to 
fund all available positive NPV projects. 
2 Retained earnings serving as a means of internal finance for firms reduce the need of borrowing from 




With respect to the timing of cash flows, shareholders concern themselves with 
future cash flows over a long-time horizon. In contrast, managers may be concerned 
with cash flows within their employment terms only, leading to bias in favor of 
short-term high performance projects, at the expense of long-term positive NPV 
projects (e.g. Stein, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Nagarajan et al., 1995; Holden 
and Subrahmanyam, 1996). 
Consistent with the above, Dechow and Sloan (1991) find that investment in R&D 
and fixed capital is reduced in the CEOs’ final year. Florou and Conyon (2004) 
demonstrate that discretionary reductions in capital expenditure during the CEO’s 
final year are mitigated in firms either with a strong presence of executive directors or 
with higher stock compensation of outside board members. Holden and Lundstrum 
(2005) show that corporate investment in long-term projects increases around the 
introduction of trade on a long-term stock option. 
 
Managerial Risk Aversion 
Since their human capital is tied to the firm, managers cannot diversify their 
investments at a low cost. Therefore, according to Jensen (1986), managers may 
prefer diversifying higher-risk investments. Jensen (1986) suggests debt as a 
mechanism to reduce agency conflicts. However, Brennan (1995) finds that 
risk-averse managers would prefer equity financing over debt to reduce the risk of 
bankruptcy and default. 
2.3 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
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According to Denis (2001), corporate governance encompasses the set of 
institutional and market mechanisms that induce self-interested managers to maximize 
the value of the residual cash flows of the firm on behalf of their shareholders. I 
highlight seven main ways to mitigate agency problems elaborated in McColgan 
(2001). These are corporate boards, corporate financial policy, blockholders and 
institutional investors, managerial remuneration, managerial ownership, the 
managerial labor market and the market for corporate control. The first five 
mechanisms can be categorized as internal control mechanisms while the latter two 
are external control mechanisms. 
To be effective, a governance mechanism must narrow the gap between the 
interests of manager and investors, and have a significant and positive impact on 
corporate performance and value (Denis, 2001). In theory, when a governance 
mechanism motivates managers to take actions that are more in line with 
shareholders’ interests, it should have a positive influence on firm performance or 
firm value. However, due to the endogeneity between corporate governance and firm 
performance, it may be difficult to find such evidence in empirical research. For 
example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) find that poor performance leads to changes 
in board composition, so any cross-sectional regression of performance on board 
composition will be biased because of changes in board composition result merely 
from past performance. That is why I am more interested in the change in corporate 
governance than the level of corporate governance. An important improvement of my 
methods over previous studies is the use of panel data, which allows me to control for 
possible biases due to the endogeneity between corporate governance and firm value. 
Besides using panel data with fixed effects, I also employ simultaneous equation 
system, lead value of Tobin’s Q, as well as direct change in corporate governance and 
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change in firm value to control for these potentially spurious relations between 
corporate governance and performance. 
2.3.1 Corporate Boards 
The classical assumption under the agency theory is that directors are good 
stewards of the shareholders and will monitor the managers on behalf of investors. 
According to Warther (1998), as well as Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994), due to 
incentive compensation and reputation concerns, the interests of directors are aligned 
with those of shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983b) suggest that effective boards 
should be largely comprised of independent directors to ensure better governance. 
According to Jensen (1993), increased board size may be detrimental to firm value 
because when boards become too big, director free-riding increases within the board 
and the board becomes more symbolic and less a part of the management process. 
Self-serving managers would want to increase a board’s size beyond its 
value-maximizing level. The agency model therefore predicts an inverse relationship 
between board size and performance. 
Besides board composition, some researchers analyze the role of directors and the 
monitoring process. Weisbach (1998) documents that outside directors are more 
effective monitors than inside directors because of the concern with their reputation. 
However, both Warther (1998) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) agree that 
outsiders are not effective in disciplining CEO/management unless the evidence of 
mismanagement is strong enough. In addition, Mace (1986) argues that the CEO tends 
to dominate the director-nomination process, and to decline appointing independent 
directors. Since top executives may have different beliefs from those of the CEO, 
Landier et al. (2006) argue that disagreement among top executives is a key feature of 
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good corporate governance. Adams (2002) focuses on the conflict between the 
monitoring and the advisory functions of the board. As a result, the board may choose 
to pre-commit to reduce its monitoring of a manager in order to encourage the 
manager to share his information. Bhagat and Black (2002) discuss how results from 
previous studies of board size and performance are not robust to different measures of 
value. They conclude that different board types are useful in different scenarios. Thus, 
insider-dominated boards may be more efficient for unobservable tasks. 
2.3.2 Corporate Financial Policy 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) survey the literature on the role of debt in reducing the 
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that a higher debt leads to less equity, and thus enables higher levels of insider 
ownership. Jensen (1986) suggests that debt is a better bonding mechanism than 
dividend payment to make managers pay out future cash flows, especially in 
situations where companies have few internal growth prospects. 
Debt improves firm value because it improves the liquidation decision by making 
default more likely (Harris and Raviv, 1991) and the external capital market forces 
managers to take value-maximizing strategies (Easterbrook, 1984). However, usage of 
debt also results in higher levels of debt-related agency costs and bankruptcy costs. 
For instance, both Stulz (1990) and Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that debt might 
lead to under-investment due to the costs of raising new finance. 
2.3.3 Blockholders and Institutional Investors 
The most direct way to align the cash flow and control rights of outside investors 
is through concentrated shareholdings. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
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blockholders play a crucial role in successful corporate governance systems because 
they have more skills, time, and interest to monitor effectively. The benefits of large 
shareholders include reducing the free-riding problem in takeovers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986) and increasing the takeover premium by competing with other large 
bidders (Burkart, 1995). 
There are also some agency costs associated with blockholdings. First, minority 
shareholders suffer if large owners use the firm’s resources to benefit themselves at 
the expense of the minority (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Second, tighter control from 
large shareholders is less effective in inducing managers to show initiative, due to 
managers’ fear of interference from investors (Acemoglu, 1995; Myers, 1996; Burkart 
et al., 1997). Several empirical researchers, including Bethel et al. (1998) and Mehran 
(1995), call for a distinction between different types of block investors because 
different groups of blockholders have different objectives, and thus can be expected to 
exert different disciplinary effects on managers. I distinguish between blockholders 
and institutional investors. But due to unavailability of data, I am not able to further 
divide block investors into subgroups such as active blocks, financial blocks and 
strategic blocks. 
2.3.4 Managerial Remuneration 
As suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), higher levels of financial incentives 
should ultimately lead to higher firm performance. Recent surveys by Murphy (1999) 
and Core et al. (2003) provide extensive summaries of the issues and the existing 
evidence on executive compensation and ownership. In addition, Holderness (2003) 
surveys the literature on broader ownership structure, including, but not limited to, 
managerial ownership. 
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Baker et al. (1988) develop a model in which the level of pay determines where 
managers work, but in which the structure of the compensation contract determines 
how hard they work. Jensen and Murphy (1990) show that executive salary is an 
ineffective mechanism for maximizing firm value, since equilibrium in managerial 
labor markets will prevent large salary cuts for poorly-performing managers. Together 
with Healy (1995), Jensen and Murphy further argue that paying executives on the 
basis of accounting variables may result in direct earnings management and undue 
firm size enlargement. 
Brennan (1995) argues that monetary incentives are not sufficient to ensure 
complete coherence between the goals of managers and shareholders. Indeed, Baker 
et al. (1988) concede that when making decisions, managers at certain points yield to 
behavioral notions of fairness and loyalty rather than to financial incentives alone. 
2.3.5 Managerial Ownership 
According to agency theory, the interests of owners and managers are better 
aligned when managers become owners as well. Increased managerial ownership 
reduces managerial perquisite consumption and, in turn, increases investment. Based 
on this convergence-of-interest hypothesis, Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict a 
positive relationship between insider holdings and a firm’s performance. 
Insider ownership may also reduce market value. This occurs when managers gain 
so much power within the firm that they are able to pursue their own interests at the 
expense of outside shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983). Stulz (1988) models 
management entrenchment at high ownership levels through the failure of external 
discipline; for example, a hostile bidder must pay a higher takeover premium for the 
target firm, with the larger fraction being held by its entrenched management. 
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Reviews of the evidence on inside ownership are presented in Murphy (1999) and 
Core et al. (2003), as well as in Holderness (2003). 
2.3.6 The Managerial Labor Market 
Fama (1980) argues that the managerial labor market should discipline poorly 
performing management through compensation schemes. The basis of their salary 
should be the firm’s prior performance relative to counterparties. Celentani and 
Loveira (2004) suggest that executive compensation depends not only on firm’s own 
performance but also on industry performance. However, Singh (2006) finds that a 
strong link between pay and reported performance leads to a weak link between pay 
and actual performance and low managerial effort. 
Several theoretical models predict an inverse relationship between 
pay-for-performance sensitivity and shareholder rights. For instance Cyert et al. (2002) 
suggest that, in equilibrium, internal governance by the board and external takeover 
threats by a large shareholder act as substitutes in awarding equity-based 
compensation to managers. Talley and Johnsen (2004) demonstrate that incentive pay 
and governance are likely to be substitutes with one another. In contrast, Almazan and 
Suarez (2003) consider weak boards and larger severance pay as substitutes for 
incentive compensation, and thus their presence resulting in an overall reduction in 
the cost of managerial compensation. The Hermalin (2005) model predicts that more 
diligent monitoring induces the CEO to work harder which in turn leads to higher pay, 
as the CEO must be compensated for his increased effort. 
The labor market may penalize managers for poor performance. The Laux (2006) 
model predicts that greater board independence is associated with higher CEO 
turnover. However, greater board independence may strengthen the CEO’s ability to 
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capture rents, because the CEO is less willing to share critical information with the 
independent board. Fisman et al. (2005) also suggest that CEO entrenchment has the 
benefit of providing true information of firm performance. 
2.3.7 The Market for Corporate Control 
To the extent that legal and internal control mechanisms fail to align the interests 
of managers and investors in maximizing firm value, parties outside the firm may see 
a profit opportunity. Jensen (1986) argues that takeovers occur in response to 
breakdowns of internal control systems in firms with substantial free cash flows. The 
market for corporate control can therefore serve to transfer the control of the firm’s 
assets to more efficient managers. 
A thorough review of the role of the takeover market in corporate governance and 
empirical evidence can be found in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Holmstrom and 
Kaplan (2001). The first formal model of a tender offer game is developed by 
Grossman and Hart (1980). In their paper, they suggest several ways of reducing the 
free rider problem to improve the efficiency of the hostile takeover mechanism. 
Subsequent studies analyze different variants of the takeover game, with 
non-atomistic share ownership (e.g. Kovenock, 1984; Bagnoli and Lipman, 1988), 
with multiple bidders (e.g. Fishman, 1988; Burkart, 1995; Bulow et al., 1999), with 
multiple rounds of bidding (e.g. Dewatripont, 1993), with arbitrageurs (e.g. Cornelli 
and Li, 1998), as well as asymmetric information (e.g. Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990; 
Yilmaz, 2000), etc. 
2.4 Theoretical Work on Investor Protection 
A number of studies have explicitly modeled the extraction of private benefits 
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from the firm by controlling shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and 
Raviv, 1988; Hart, 1995; Burkart et al., 1997, 1998; Friedman et al., 2003). Some 
studies have modeled the legal framework underlining such expropriation (La Porta et 
al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2000).  
Among others, Zingales (1995), La Porta et al. (1999), Bebchuk (1999), and 
Wolfenzon (1999) attempt to explain theoretically why control is concentrated and 
pyramid organizations are common in countries with poor shareholder protection. 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) argue that control structures with multiple large 
shareholders may be efficient in environments with poor shareholder protection. 
Previous studies have shown that by increasing their ownership of cash flow rights, 
controlling shareholders make the extraction of private benefits more costly because 
they pay for more of these private benefits out of the shares they own (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Bebchuk, 1999). As a consequence, it 
becomes optimal for controlling shareholders to consume fewer such benefits. Firms 
can also make extraction of private benefits more costly through better governance. 
For instance, by increasing a firm’s transparency, controlling shareholders make it 
easier for outsiders to measure their consumption of private benefits and to take action 
to reduce it. 
Some of the models based on the protection of the legal rights of investors can be 
employed to study the corporate governance practice within a single country, if we 
assume that firms in the same country are subject to different levels of investor 
protection, as firms may voluntarily choose their governance practice under the 
corporate governance code. Himmelberg et al. (2002) emphasize that investor 
protection has an important cross-firm dimension in addition to the cross-country 
dimension. Assets which are difficult to steal provide a built-in degree of investor 
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protection, whereas intangible assets are easier to expropriate. They regard such 
cross-firm differences in environment as cross-firm investor protection. I argue that 
different corporate governance practices are also good measures of cross-firm investor 
protection. In my thesis, I am interested in theories modeling investor protection 
which are useful at both country and firm levels. 
2.4.1 Predicting Corporate Governance Choices of Firms 
Better governance reduces a firm’s cost of capital only to the extent that investors 
expect the firm to be governed well after the funds have been raised. It is, therefore, 
important for the firm to find ways to commit itself credibly to higher quality 
governance. However, mechanisms to do so may be unavailable or prohibitively 
expensive in countries with poor investor protection and poor economic development. 
Within a single country, firms with different contracting environments may have 
different needs and costs for governance practices (Himmelberg et al., 1999). Figure 3 
illustrates the factors that affect corporate governance choices. 
Figure 3: Determinants of corporate governance 
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Durnev and Kim (2005) present a model in which the fund-raising needs of the 
firm are important drivers of good corporate governance. The model identifies three 
predictors of better corporate governance: (1) better investment opportunities; (2) 
higher concentration of ownership; and (3) greater need for external finance. Their 
empirical results show a positive relationship between a firm’s governance choices 
and growth opportunities; the need for external financing; and the concentration of 
cash flow rights. The positive relationships are shown to be stronger in countries with 
weaker legal frameworks.  
Doidge et al. (2004) test a model of how country characteristics, such as legal 
protection for minority investors as well as the level of economic and financial 
development, influence a firm’s costs and benefits in implementing measures to 
improve its own governance and transparency. In contrast to Durnev and Kim (2005), 
Doidge et al. (2004) argue that firm-level governance and country-level governance 
complement each other. The model of Himmelberg et al. (2002) predicts 
endogenously low levels of insider ownership for high-investor protection firms and 
that investor-protection applies to both country-level and firm-level dimensions. 
2.4.2 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
How corporate governance affects the performance of firms is illustrated in Figure 
4. There are two main channels: by reducing the waste of capital and the cost of 
capital. 
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Figure 4: Two channels through which corporate governance may affect firm performance 
Firm Performance 
Reduce Cost of Monitoring by 
Investors (Agency Cost) 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Lombardo and Pagano (2000b), 
Habib (2005) 






Reduce Systematic Risk 
Lombardo and Pagano 
(2000b), 
Himmelberg et al. (2002),
Garmaise and Liu (2005) 
Reduce Waste of Capital 






Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
Less Diversion of Cash 
Flow La Porta et al. (2002),  
Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
(2002), Durnev and Kim 





The left part of Figure 4 illustrates how good governance reduces the waste of 
capital and improves firm performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the 
value-decreasing activities as managers’ perquisites consumptions, stealing of 
corporate resources and inefficient investment. Corporate governance plays an 
important role in enhancing firm value by reducing such activities. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) show that better-governed firms are more likely to invest in profitable 
projects, resulting in more efficient operations and higher expected future cash flows. 
Other theoretical papers offer different but sometimes overlapping explanations. 
La Porta et al. (2002), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) and Durnev and Kim (2005) 
suggest that investors are willing to pay more for shares if they recognize that more of 
a firm’s profits will be returned to investors as opposed to being expropriated by the 
controlling entrepreneur. John et al. (2005) show that good corporate governance 
reduces the optimal level of perks, and thus makes managers willing to invest in risky 
but profitable projects. Jensen (1986) argues that good corporate governance also 
reduces the resources under managers’ control, resulting in less free cash flow 
problem. I interpret the reducing of free cash flow as an indirect way of reducing the 
waste of capital, because managers now have limited discretionary resources to 
appropriate. 
The theory predicts that better-governed firms deliver higher shareholder value. 
Many recent empirical works employ firm value (usually proxied by Tobin’s Q or 
market-to-book value), operating performance (usually proxied by ROA), or stock 
returns as the measure of firm performance. These findings are generally consistent 
with the prediction of a positive association between corporate governance and firm 
performance. 
The first empirical research on the relationship between governance index and 
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firm value is from Gompers et al. (2003). They construct an investment strategy by 
buying well-governed firms and selling poorly-governed firms. This trading strategy 
yields 8.5 percent abnormal returns per year. They also report higher firm value, 
higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and fewer corporate 
acquisitions for firms with stronger shareholder rights. Brown and Caylor (2006) 
report higher valuation, higher profitability and higher dividends payments for 
better-governed firms. Klapper and Love (2004) find higher ROA and Q for 
better-governed firms in emerging markets. Black (2001) finds that better-governed 
firms have higher market value in Russian. 
In Drobetz et al. (2003a), the investment strategy that buys better-governed firms 
and sells poorly-governed firms yields abnormal returns of around 12% on an annual 
basis during the sample period in Germany. Drobetz et al. (2003b) document a 
positive relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation for German 
firms. They find that the dividends yield is positively associated with corporate 
governance; therefore, they suggest that good governance reduces the cost of capital. 
Black et al. (2006a) find that corporate governance is an important and possibly 
causal factor in the market valuation of Korean public companies. Drobetz et al. 
(2004) also report a positive relationship between corporate governance and Tobin’s Q 
using a model of simultaneous equations. Although Core et al. (2006) find that firms 
with weak shareholder rights exhibit significant stock market underperformance, they 
provide evidence in suggesting that weak governance does not cause poor stock 
returns. 
Some other studies report mixed results on the association between corporate 
governance and firm valuation. Bauer et al. (2004) analyze the relationship between 
corporate governance and stock returns, firm value, and operating performance for 
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European firms. They find that corporate governance is positively associated with 
stock returns and firm valuation. However, they document an unexpected negative 
relationship between corporate governance and operating performance. Bebchuk et al. 
(2005) identify six entrenching provisions that are negatively correlated with firm 
valuation and stock returns. However, they find a surprising positive correlation 
between Tobin’s Q and the 18 provisions not included in the entrenchment index. 
Larcker et al. (2005) find that 14 governance constructs are related to future operating 
performance. However, many of the signs on the governance constructs are 
unexpected when Tobin’s Q and future excess returns are used as dependent variables. 
Manry and Stangeland (2003) report that management compensation is positively 
associated with both operating performance and firm value while shareholder rights 
are significantly related to operating performance only. Cremers and Nair (2005) find 
that internal governance and external governance are complements using both stock 
returns and accounting performance measurements. They provide risk effect as an 
explanation. Bowen et al. (2004) report an association between poor governance and 
managers’ accounting discretion, but cannot detect a negative relationship between 
accounting discretion and firm performance. 
The right part of Figure 4 illustrates three ways for good governance to reduce a 
firm’s cost of capital and, in turn, to improve its performance. First, corporate 
governance lowers the cost of equity capital by reducing the monitoring cost of 
outside investors. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), investors have to incur 
monitoring costs to deal with agency problems, and rational investors require higher 
rates of returns for bearing such agency costs. 
Second, corporate governance may affect a firm’s systematic risk. In 
fully-integrated world capital markets without transaction or agency costs of external 
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finance, the traditional CAPM predicts that expected returns on equity only depend on 
the level of covariance risk with the world market portfolio, and there is no 
explanatory power for country-level and/or firm level corporate governance factors. 
Lombardo and Pagano (2000b) extend the classic CAPM to include agency costs 
as the compensation for an additional risk against expected insider expropriation. 
Such risk makes earnings more volatile than warranted by technology and demand 
conditions. Due to the free-rider problem, such risk cannot be fully diversified. As a 
consequence, investors need to be compensated for agency costs. Lombardo and 
Pagano (2000b) show that in a perfectly integrated equity market, the reduction of 
expected returns on equity for better-governed firms results from less monitoring by 
shareholders as well as from lower auditing costs. 
Himmelberg et al. (2002) investigate the impact of agency problems on cost of 
capital by introducing insider risk aversion as the offsetting cost of insider ownership 
in their model. The tradeoff between risk and incentives distorts the incentive of 
insiders to invest in risky projects. The cost of capital should include a risk premium 
reflecting insiders’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk. In addition, Himmelberg et al. 
(2002) assume that the severity of agency costs depends on a parameter representing 
investor protection. In equilibrium, the marginal cost of capital is a weighted average 
of terms reflecting both idiosyncratic and beta risks, and in which weaker investor 
protection increases the weight on idiosyncratic risk. 
Garmaise and Liu (2005) suggest that when managers have access to information 
but shareholders retain control, dishonest managers can report false, distorted 
investment information, thereby reducing a firm’s cash flows. When managers have 
both information and control, they follow a policy of consistent overinvestment. This 
further reduces firm value, especially in the worst states of the world. They derive a 
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prediction that weak corporate governance together with managerial dishonesty 
increases the market risk, implying that the effects of corporate governance are 
captured by beta. They add that if the CAPM is not the true asset pricing model, the 
systematic risk arising from poor corporate governance might also predict higher 
expected returns beyond those captured by beta. 
Finally, corporate governance reduces the cost of capital by reducing information 
asymmetry. Analytical research suggests that an increase in information should 
reduce the cost of capital through reduced transaction costs and/or reduced estimation 
risks. Habib (2005) surveys empirical literature on information risk and the cost of 
capital. He summarizes empirical literature that looks at information risk from the 
perspectives of (1) disclosure quality; (2) earnings quality; and (3) corporate 
governance. 
Habib (2005) argues that the separation of ownership and control creates 
information asymmetry problems between investors and managers. Information 
asymmetry arises because investors cannot directly observe managers’ efforts, and 
this creates moral hazard problems. If investors fail to perceive the true economic 
value of a firm or its quality of management, information asymmetry will create 
adverse selection problems. Moral hazard and adverse selection problems expose 
shareholders to higher agency risks, and rational investors demand a premium for 
bearing this risk. Better governance structure reduces a firm’s cost of equity capital by 





In this chapter, I develop my hypotheses on the following aspects: (1) what factors 
affect changes in governance system; (2) how changes in corporate governance affect 
a firm’s valuation; (3) whether there are abnormal returns from a zero investment 
portfolio by buying governance-improving firms and selling governance-deteriorating 
firms; and (4) whether improvement in corporate governance can lead to reduced cost 
of capital, higher future cash flow, or both. 
3.1 Predicting Corporate Governance Choices of Firms 
The ability to adapt governance structures to changes in external environments is 
found to be crucial to the survival of firms (Kole and Lehn, 1999; Morck and Steier, 
2005). The absence of such adaptability increases the likelihood of firm extinction 
(Gray, 1996; Grosfeld and Hashi, 2003). 
Denis and Sarin (1999) find that a substantial fraction of firms in their study 
exhibit large changes in ownership and board structure over time. Their findings 
suggest that the determination of corporate governance is more dynamic than 
previously understood. Other papers examine changes in corporate governance in the 
U.K. following the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992). Examples include 
Conyon (1994), Conyon and Peck (1998), Dahya et al. (2002), Dedman (2003), 
Rayton and Cheng (2004), the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) survey (2006), and 
Hillier and McColgan (2006). Theses studies find that the structure of U.K. corporate 
boards has changed considerably over time in order to implement the 
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recommendations of the Cadbury Report as well as subsequent governance reports. 
Governance structure could also evolve in response to structural change in a firm’s 
business environment. Agency problems vary across firms and change over time. 
Hence the costs and benefits of different governance mechanisms also vary depending 
on firms’ operational and monitoring characteristics (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988, 
1998; Gillan et al., 2003; Lehn et al., 2004; Cremers and Nair, 2005). Factors such as 
firm size, firm age, and the diversity of operations determine firms’ operational 
characteristics, while growth prospects, stock price volatility, and leverage affect 
firms’ monitoring needs (Lehn et al., 2003; Boone et al., 2006).  
Himmelberg et al. (1999) report that managerial ownership is determined by key 
variables in the contracting environment. Klapper and Love (2004) extend the 
research of Himmelberg et al. (1999) by examining broad governance using an index. 
They suggest that asymmetric information and a contracting environment are 
important determinants of corporate governance. 
Some studies demonstrate how governance evolves in response to changes in firm 
characteristics by examining changes in a particular governance mechanism such as 
ownership, board size and board composition. For example Denis and Sarin (1999) 
suggest that changes in ownership and board structure are caused by changes in 
firm-specific characteristics. Specifically, they argue that changes in a firm’s growth 
opportunities, firm size, leverage, the status of a founder/manager, identity of top 
executive, past performance, information asymmetries and restructuring are plausible 
forces that drive changes in ownership and control. 
Boone et al. (2006) find that increases in firm size and complexity will lead to 
increases in board size and non-executive director representation in the board and 
sub-committees, due to the need for additional experts in the new fields. Similarly, 
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Lehn et al. (2004) also find changes in board size and independence are significantly 
associated with changes in firm size and growth opportunities. 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) and Vafeas (1999) find that firms adjust board size in 
response to past poor performance. Past poor performance could be due to agency 
problems. The board size is adjusted in order to control the agency problem and to 
improve cash flow. However, they also reckon that the increase in board size could 
represent the mature of young, previously high-risk firms with more outside directors 
sitting on the board. Hillier and McColgan (2006) find that changes in 
ownership-specific characteristics are strong predictors of changes in board 
dependence and separating the roles of the chairman and CEO. 
These studies provide some theoretical framework as well as empirical evidence 
on determinants of changes in governance mechanisms. However, most of them 
examine individual governance instruments, ignoring the interaction between the 
different instruments in the governance structure. 
Firms nowadays actually adopt multiple governance mechanisms in order to 
comply with the increasing requirements in comprehensive governance-related 
recommendations all over the world. It is necessary to use a comprehensive 
measurement of governance structure, allowing the interaction of different 
mechanisms. My thesis extends prior literature by examining the determinants of 
changes in a broad measure of corporate governance. 
I take the perspective that the changes of governance structure in U.K. firms are 
determined by the balance of costs and benefits of adopting governance standard as 
recommended in the U. K. Code. Research of Denis and Sarin (1999) and others show 
that the costs and benefits in changing the mechanism of advising and/or monitoring 
managerial behavior are determined by changes in firm characteristics (e.g. changes 
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in the variance of stock returns, firm size, leverage, the firm’s investment opportunity 
set, the age of the firm, the tenure of the CEO, past firm performance, and the 
presence of a founder in the top management team). I presume that these factors that 
determine the changes in a specific governance mechanism can also predict changes 
in the broad governance score. 
H1: Change in firm characteristics is associated with change in corporate 
governance. 
3.2 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
 Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2005) argue that “…optimal governance structure 
depends on firms’ monitoring needs and on the costs and benefits of different 
governance mechanisms. To the extent that these costs and benefits vary across firms 
and over time, optimal governance structure should also vary (Hermalin and 
Weisbach 1988, 1998, Cremers and Nair 2005, Gillan, Hartzel, and Starks 2003, Lehn, 
Patro, and Zhao 2004)” (p.2).  
The above argument identifies two dimensions of governance differences: the 
cross-sectional and time series dimensions. Along the cross-sectional dimension, 
firms may encounter different levels of agency problem due to firm characteristics. 
They thus develop various levels of corporate governance to meet their monitoring 
requirements. In other words, the level of governance is endogenously determined by 
firm characteristics. Hence, firms with higher level of governance do not necessarily 
have better performance than firms with relatively lower level of governance. 
Along the time series dimension, governance structure is likely to change in 
response to changes in conventional wisdom or legal requirements. The assumption 
for the U.K. governance reform is that the strengthening of internal governance 
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structure would reduce potential agency problems. Raising the governance level shall 
result in more efficient operation, less management expropriation, and therefore 
higher operating performance and market value. The benefits of improving corporate 
governance shall outweigh the costs of such changes. 
However, if firms had been in an equilibrium condition before the adoption of the 
Code, any disruption might bring unexpected net benefits or costs to the firm. It is 
possible that the costs involved in the implementation of the governance 
recommendations might surpass the expected benefits, especially for smaller firms. 
Alternatively, if the improvement in internal governance is simply a response to 
external pressures that push firms to comply with governance recommendations, 
rather than an efficient, endogenous response to changes in firm characteristics, then 
we should not expect to find a positive relationship between changes in corporate 
governance and firm performance. 
Previous researches on the governance-performance relationship have focused on 
cross-sectional aspect. So far, there is no study examining the relationship between 
change in corporate governance measured by a comprehensive governance score and 
firm performance. However, there is some empirical evidence of the positive effect of 
change in governance on firm performance. Jandik and Rennie (2005), for example, 
investigate the evolution of corporate governance and firm performance in the Czech 
Republic based on the case of the ammunition manufacturer Sellier & Bellot (S&B) 
between 1993 and 2003. They find that S&B’s profitability has been dramatically 
improved through the adoption of monitoring and incentive mechanisms known to 
mitigate owner-manager agency conflicts in developed countries. Similarly, Campos 
et al. (2002) investigate 11 companies that substantially improved their corporate 
governance practices and find that these companies outperform the market by at least 
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20% in the twelve month period from May 2000 through May 2001. 
In addition, some researchers report improved firm performance for events of 
governance changes such as CEO turnover, increase of board independence. For 
example, Denis and Denis (1995) show that firm performance increases after change 
of top managers. Kato and Long (2005) report improvement in firm performance after 
the replacement of the CEO in Chinese firms. These studies have been focused on the 
relationship between the change in a single governance mechanism and firm 
performance. My study here will extend previous studies by investigating whether 
change in corporate governance in a broader measure would result in improvement in 
firm performance. 
Based on the aforementioned theoretical argument and empirical findings, I 
conjecture that improvement in corporate governance, proxied by increases in 
governance score will reduce agency costs. Lower agency cost would result in higher 
market valuation. In other words, I expect a positive relationship between changes in 
governance score and firm valuation: 
H2: Improvement in corporate governance is associated with an increase in firm 
valuation. 
 
3.3 Corporate Governance and Stock Returns 
Since 1992, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) has 
targeted companies with both poor financial performance and poor corporate 
governance, and achieved successful turnaround of these companies. Nesbitt (1994, 
1995, 1997 and 2001) examines the reasons behind the turnaround and finds that it is 
because CalPERS brought in reforms of companies’ corporate governance such as 
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more independent directors and adoption of board guidelines. As a result, the targeted 
firms outperformed the market after these reforms. English et al. (2001) and Anson et 
al. (2003) confirm Nesbitt’s findings by documenting both short-term and long-term 
positive stock returns from the announcement of CalPERS’s target list in the Wall 
Street Journal. They find that the share prices rise upon the announcement because the 
market expects improvement in the performance of targeted firm as a result of 
governance reforms. 
Caton et al. (2001) evaluate 108 companies included in the Council of 
Institutional Investors’ annual hit list. They find that institutional activism to reform 
corporate governance pays. Becht et al. (2006) study the activities of Hermes. They 
find that Hermes buys into poorly-governed companies and pushes for changes. They 
report significantly positive returns around the announcements of desired board 
changes, increased payouts, and major restructurings. The positive market reactions to 
institutional activism suggest that investors expect better corporate performance after 
the improvement in corporate governance.  
In addition to the institutions-initiated improvement, there is also empirical 
evidence to show that firm-initiated governance events can bring higher stock returns. 
For example, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) report significantly excess returns at the 
appointment of an outside director for U.S. firms. Vafeas (1999) finds positive but 
insignificant stock returns when board meetings increase. Klein (1998) observes 
significantly positive abnormal returns when firms increase inside directors on board 
committees. Mak et al. (2003) report negative stock price movements following the 
appointments of busy directors and family-related directors, but positive stock price 
movements upon the appointments of non-executive directors and directors with prior 
boardroom experience. Other researches from Friedman and Singh (1989), 
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Sundaramurthy (1996), Bizjak and Marquette (1998), and Westphal and Zajac (1998) 
also document positive market reactions to indicators of independent board control. 
These prior empirical studies all report higher stock prices following improvement 
in particular governance mechanism. Different form these prior research, I investigate 
the market response to a comprehensive governance measure, taking into account of 
the substitution/complementation effects among difference governance mechanisms. 
My study investigates the firm-initiated governance changes in response to higher 
governance standards set by the U.K. Code. The study examines whether firms which 
voluntarily improve their corporate governance to comply with the U.K. Code are 
rewarded by the market with higher stock returns. 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2005) conduct a similar study for U.S. firms. They 
find that firms that need to make more changes to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley 
law (SOX) outperform firms that need to make fewer changes. It suggests that the 
compliance with SOX law would help improve governance and control in those firms. 
Non-complying firms are valued higher because the market expects better 
performance with improved corporate governance in the future. The study captures 
investors’ perception about the positive relationship between change in governance 
and firm performance. However, it does not investigate whether shareholder wealth is 
indeed better off in the long run. 
In this study, I employ the “long-run event study” method to examine whether the 
expected benefits are realized in the future and whether the benefits last for a long 
period. Gompers et al. (2003) propose that the “long-run event study” is a better 
approach to examine the wealth impact of a governance provision index because the 
market cannot fully anticipate the agency costs associated with weak governance. 
Studying realized benefits rather than perceived benefits of change in corporate 
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governance is another contribution of this study. 
When evaluating the long-term benefits of compliance with the U.K. Code, I 
hypothesize that the positive returns come from the improvement in compliance, not 
the level of compliance. I argue that the governance level is determined by firms’ 
characteristics even before the first U.K. Code came in, and therefore these factors 
have already been reflected in current share prices. In contrast, when firms adjust their 
governance levels in response to externally imposed requirements, the market would 
respond positively to the improvement in governance. Therefore I hypothesize that 
there are abnormal returns from a zero investment portfolio by buying 
governance-improving firms and short selling governance-deteriorating firms. My 
hypothesis is: 
H3: Buying governance-improving firms and selling governance-deteriorating firms 
will generate excess returns. 
 
Theoretically, there are two explanations for the positive relationship between 
corporate governance and stock returns. It can be explained by cash flow theory. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that better-governed firms are more likely to 
invest in projects of positive value, resulting in higher expected cash flows and high 
stock returns. La Porta et al. (2002), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), and Durnev and 
Kim (2005) argue that investors are willing to pay more because they perceive that 
more of the firm’s profits will be returned to them as opposed to being appropriated 
by controlling shareholders and incumbent management. Empirical studies of Manry 
and Stangeland (2003), Bauer et al. (2004), Klapper and Love (2004), Cremers and 
Nair (2005), Larcker et al. (2005), Brown and Caylor (2006) and Core et al. (2006) 
document a positive relationship between corporate governance and operating 
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performance. Bauer et al. (2004), however, surprisingly detect a significant negative 
relationship. 
Meanwhile, Jensen (1986) contends that good corporate governance mitigates 
agency problems by reducing the resources under managers’ control as well as the 
opportunity of managerial extrapolation. One measurable proxy for the opportunity of 
managerial extrapolation is the level of excess cash holding. Empirically, there are 
studies reporting negative relationship between governance and excess cash holding. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) find that ownership structure and family holdings are 
important determinants for cash holdings of U.K. companies. Dittmar et al. (2003) 
(2003) show liquid asset holdings are higher in countries with weak investor 
protection. Pinkowitz et al. (2003) find that cash holdings are inversely related to the 
quality of institutions. 
I argue that increase in the degree of compliance with the U.K. Code would 
reduce the diversion of cash flows by managers and improve firms’ operational 
efficiency. Therefore, I hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between 
changes in corporate governance and operating performance. I also expect lower cash 
holdings in governance-improving firms. 
H4: Improvement in corporate governance is associated with improvement in 
operating performance. 
H5: Governance-improving firms hold lower amounts of cash. 
 
The positive relationship between governance and firm value can also be 
explained by the lower expected rate of investment return for better-governed firms. 
Investors might perceive well-governed firms as less risky and require a lower rate of 
return, which subsequently leads to a higher firm valuation. In Lombardo and Pagano 
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(2000b), the expected return can be explained by a risk factor related to the 
governance risk that affects the expected monitoring and auditing costs and other 
costs. Theoretical studies of Verrecchia (2001), Easley and O’Hara (2002), and Leuz 
and Verrecchia (2004) suggest that the increase in disclosure reduces information 
asymmetries and lowers firms’ cost of capital. 
Empirically, Chen et al. (2004) show that disclosure levels, firm-level corporate 
governance and country-level investor protection significantly affect the cost of equity 
capital among nine Asian countries. Ashbaugh et al. (2004a) find that the cost of 
capital for better-governed firms is on average 88 basis points lower than firms with 
weaker governance. Similarly, Hail and Leuz (2006) report a lower cost of equity 
capital for firms in countries with strong legal institutions. Huang (2004) finds similar 
results of negative relationship between cost of capital and the level of shareholder 
rights. Furthermore, he reports that change in shareholder rights is negatively 
associated with change in cost of capital. His findings provide direct evidence that the 
market responds to the changes in corporate governance by adjusting required rate of 
return. 
If investors view well-governed firms as less risky, they will perceive those firms 
that improve corporate governance as less risky than they used to be. Investors will 
reduce the required rate of return of these firms. I expect a negative relationship 
between changes in corporate governance and firms’ cost of capital. Therefore, my 
hypothesis is: 





Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In this chapter, I discuss the data and descriptive statistics. The chapter starts with 
a description of U.K. regulatory requirements, the data and the method adopted to 
construct the sample in section 4.1. In section 4.2, descriptive statistics of corporate 
governance score are described. In the last section, the measures for the dependent, 
independent and control variables that will be used in the study are described. 
4.1 Sample and Data Sources 
4.1.1 U.K. Regulatory Requirements and Corporate Governance Scorecard 
The U.K. Code is a set of recommendations of best practice to improve governance 
and promote shareholder interests. Companies listed in the U.K. are required by the 
London Stock Exchange to disclose in their annual reports either their compliance with 
the guidelines or to give reasons for non-compliance. 
My sample period covers 1999 to 2002. I choose 1999 because this is the first year 
after the adoption of the U.K. Combined Code (1998). The U.K. Code (2003) includes 
many recommendations from the Higgs and Smith Reports. The core principles of the 
Combined Code (1998) remain unchanged in the revised Code, with only a new 
addition relating to board performance evaluation. The updated Code (2006) 
incorporates a small number of changes to the Code (2003). The main changes made to 
the 2003 Combined Code include: (1) to allow the company chairman to be a 
remuneration committee member; (2) to provide shareholders a ‘vote withheld’ option 
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on proxy appointment; and (3) to recommend publication on their website the details of 
proxies lodged at a general meeting where votes are taken on a show of hands. 
Since the scorecard is based largely on the U.K. Code (1998), I will briefly discuss 
its regulatory requirements and the inputs to the governance scoring system used. The 
U.K. Code (1998) consists two sections. Section 1 contains principles and code 
provisions pertaining to companies and Section 2 contains principles and code 
provisions relating to institutional shareholders. Since adherence to Section 2 is not 
subject to the disclosure requirement and thus irrelevant to the measure of scorecard, I 
will focus on the information relating to companies in Section 1. There are 14 principles 
and 45 code provisions relevant to companies. 
These provisions cover four domains: directors, directors’ remuneration, relations 
with shareholders, and accountability and audit. The main focus of these provisions is 
the role and composition of the board of directors, the appointment of non-executive 
directors, the disclosure of directors’ remuneration, the reporting structure for auditors 
and operation of the internal control system. An extract of key provisions are included 
in Appendix 1. It can be seen that nearly all of the recommendations of the U.K. Code 
are in line with the good corporate governance practices that are commonly accepted by 
academe, industry and policy makers. For example, the U.K. Code recommends: (1) the 
separation of the roles of the Chairman and the CEO; (2) board independence; and (3) 
establishment of nomination, audit and remuneration committees. 
The scorecard was developed by Standard & Poor’s for the Singapore Corporate 
Governance Awards launched in 2003 and was based on the Singapore Code of 
Corporate Governance. The scorecard is used in my thesis for the sample of U.K. firms 
without modification because: (1) it had been developed by a highly reputable rating 
agency; (2) the Singapore Code itself is based largely on the U.K. Combined Code; and 
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(3) the same scorecard has been used for regional studies of corporate governance 
disclosures of large listed companies in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.3  
The scorecard consists of 136 items with a maximum possible score of 140 and is 
designed to ensure maximum objectivity in assessing the companies. The majority of 
the recommendations of the U.K. Code (1998) are reflected in the scorecard. Only a few 
recommendations, e.g. those related to institutional shareholders are disregarded in the 
scorecard because such recommendations are excluded from the disclosure requirement 
of the Listing Rules.  
Based on the information extracted from each company’s annual report, I tabulate 
answers to 119 questions on governance practices for each company for each year of 
the period under study, enabling construction of a time-varying corporate governance 
scorecard used in this analysis. Appendix 2 describes the construction procedure for 
the scorecard. 
Scores on 136 elements are grouped into five categories of corporate governance. 
The board category includes 43 elements, which are constructed in accordance to the 
provisions in Section A: DIRECTORS in the U.K. Code (1998). The nomination 
category (25 elements) consists of components related to the nomination matters in 
Section A: DIRECTORS in the U.K. Code (1998). The remuneration category 
contains 34 elements, which are based on the provisions in Section B: DIRECTORS’ 
REMUNERATION in the U.K. Code (1998). The audit (29 elements) and the 
communication (5 elements) categories reflect the regulations in Section D: 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND AUDIT and Section C: RELATIONS WITH 
SHAREHOLDERS in the U.K. Code (1998), respectively. For each category, a 
sub-score is computed by summing up the scores for the elements within the category. 
                                                 
3 These studies were conducted jointly by Standard & Poor’s and the Corporate Governance and 
Financial Reporting Centre (CGFRC) at the National University of Singapore in 2004. 
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The composite governance score is obtained by summing up five categories. 
4.1.2 Data Source 
The starting point of my sample is the set of firms listed in the Index Constituent 
Rankings FTSE 100 (denoted as FTSE100) and the Index Constituent Rankings FTSE 
250 (denoted as FTSE250) from the January 2001 issue of the FTSE European 
Monthly Review. It will be denoted as the Composite Index hereafter. 
The FTSE 100 (FTSE 250) Index is a capitalization-weighted index of the 
large-cap (mid-capitalized) companies traded on the London Stock Exchange. The 
FTSE 100 (FTSE 250) represents approximately 82% (14%) of the U.K. market 
capitalization. 
Financial firms are excluded as these have different financial reporting formats 
and many of the key variables needed in the analysis are not available in 
COMPUSTAT database for such firms. At least three consecutive years of annual 
reports containing the relevant corporate governance information over the period 1999 
to 2002 are available for the remaining firms. 
All financial data is obtained from the COMPUTSTAT Global 
Industrial/Commercial files over the period 1999 to 2002. The following data is 
obtained from Datastream: share prices and common shares outstanding for individual 
firms, the FTSE all share total return index, and U.K. Treasury Bill interest rates. The 
analysts’ forecasts data, actual earnings per share, and the annual report publication 
date are obtained from I/B/E/S. 
The 2-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes are from the 
COMPUSTAT (global) database. The average number of institutional shareholders 
for the 2-digit SIC industry of a firm is collected from Shareworld. The dummy 
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variable indicating if a firm trades American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) on a major 
exchange (NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ) in the U.S. is identified using the JP Morgan 
website: http://www.adr.com. For an ADR issue to become listed and trade on a major 
U.S. exchange, it must be sponsored by the underlying corporation. If unsponsored, 
the ADR issue is likely to be traded over the counter. All the sample firms with 
sponsored ADRs are coded one. The firms with unsponsored ADRs and those without 
ADRs are coded zero. The publication date of the interim six-monthly earnings is 
obtained from the website: http://www.northcote.co.uk/company_links/ alpha.asp. 
The firms’ list dates are obtained from the London Stock Exchange. The ownership 
data and board characteristics data are collected manually from annual reports. 
4.1.3 Sample Selection 
In selecting the sample for the study, the following criteria are used: 
1. The Firms should be listed in FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 from the January 2001 
issue of the FTSE European Monthly Review; 
2. Financial firms are excluded as these have different financial reporting formats 
and many of the key variables needed in the analysis are not available in 
COMPUSTAT for such firms; 
3. Firms must be registered in the U.K.; 
4. Firms are excluded if they are acquired or delisted over the period 1999 to 2002; 
and 
5. Annual reports for the firms must be available for at least three consecutive 
years containing the relevant corporate governance information over the period 
1999 to 2002. 
A total of 350 firms listed in FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 from the January 2001 
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issue of the FTSE European Monthly Review. Complete data for all the study 
variables are available for between 137 and 175 of these firms over the period 1999 to 
2002 and they comprise the sample for the study. Since some firms in the sample do 
not have annual reports available for year 1999, the sample size in 1999 is the least 
over the sample period. Table 1 summarizes the process of selecting the final sample 
of 175 firms for the study. 
Table 1: Sample size for the study period 
Description 1999 2000 2001 2002
Firms listed in FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 from the January 2001 
issue of the FTSE European Monthly Review 350 350 350 350 
Financial Firms (80) (80) (80) (80) 
Firms not registered in UK (2) (2) (2) (2) 
Firms being acquired or delisted over the period 1999 to 2002 (31) (31) (31) (31) 
Firms for which annual reports could not be found (9) (9) (9) (9) 
Firms for which annual reports could not be found for three 
consecutive years (91) (53) (53) (54) 
Final sample 137 175 175 174 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Score 
4.2.1 Description of Corporate Governance Score 
Table 2 reports the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of 
corporate governance scores for the sample years 1999-2002. The statistics for the 
changes in scores of each year are also presented. The score increased from 1999 to 
2002, from a mean (median) of 57.34 (57.00) in 1999 to a mean (median) of 67.10 
(66.22) in 2002. Overall, there was an upward trend in the corporate governance score. 
However, the corporate governance disclosures of some firms deteriorated during the 
sample period. For example, the firm with the greatest decrease in score lost 11 points 
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in 2002. Considering both the range between minimum and maximum scores and the 
standard deviation of scores, one can see a certain degree of dispersion for my sample 
across firms and years. The sample is not skewed as the mean and median are very 
close. 
Table 2: Summary statistics of corporate governance scores 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 
Mean 57.34 59.95 61.88 67.10 2.62  1.95  5.15  
Median 57.00 60.00 62.00 66.22 2.00  1.00  4.00  
St. Dev. 8.35  7.87 7.79 9.06 4.08  4.26  6.20  
Min 33.00 37.00 41.00 45.50 -10.00  -11.00  -3.00  
Max 82.00 86.00 82.00 96.00 21.00  25.00  33.00  
 
4.2.2 Industry Composition 
My sample spans many sectors of the economy. Table 3 presents the distribution 
of firms according to their industry. Detailed information about the industry 
composition of the firms is shown in Appendix 3. The Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) comprises 10 divisions. My sample does not have firms in the 
agriculture and forestry industry. Therefore, it only covers the remaining nine of the 
industry groups. 
Manufacturing is the largest sector, accounting for 41.2% of the entire sample. 
The other major divisions are transportation, communications, electric, gas, and 
sanitary services (19.0%); services (16.7%); and retail trade (10.6%). My analysis 
shows that corporate governance score does not vary much across industries, with the 
highest mean SCORE being 64.14 for the retail trade; and the lowest mean SCORE 
being 56.58 for mining. The difference is insignificant. 
Gillan et al. (2003) examine the determinants of firms’ corporate governance 
structures using a sample of S&P Supercomposite 1,500 companies, and other large, 
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publicly-traded firms from 1997 to 2000. They categorize industries according to Fama 
and French (1997). In order to make their results comparable with mine, I group some 
of industries together to recalculate their number of firm years, industrial distribution 
and average board index based on my industry classification. The corresponding 
statistics are reported in the last three columns of Table 3. 




























Mining  8  1.2% 56.58 56.50 2.11  1.50  32  0.5% 55.68  
Construction  24  3.6% 59.17 57.50 3.71  2.00  72  1.1% 48.52  





Services   
125  19.0% 62.50 62.00 3.12  2.03  855  13.6% 47.46  
Wholesale Trade  27  4.1% 61.78 59.50 1.96  1.00  376  6.0% 47.38  
Retail Trade  70  10.6% 64.14 65.00 3.27  3.00  687  11.0% 48.17  
Finance, 
Insurance, and 
Real Estate   
18  2.7% 57.57 56.85 4.26  4.00  355  5.7% 46.93  
Services  110  16.7% 61.74 61.00 3.31  2.00  959  15.3% 46.76  
Public 
Administration   5  0.8% 60.60 60.00 2.80  2.00  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
SCORE refers to the corporate governance score, while ΔSCORE refers to change of corporate governance 
score over the previous year. The statistics by industry in Gillan et al. (2003) are reproduced with my 
industry classification and reported in the last three columns. 
 
My sample has fewer firms in the division of finance, insurance and real estate than 
that of Gillan et al. (2003), since banking, insurance and real estate firms are excluded 
from my study. In general, these two samples have similar industrial distributions 
except that mine has a much higher representation from the division of transportation, 
communications, electric, gas and sanitary services. The board index in Gillan et al. 
(2003) is constructed as the average of the percentile ranks of each individual board 
characteristics. Similar to my corporate governance score, the cross-industry variation 
in board index is not substantial, either. My sample and Gillan et al.’s (2003) are 
different in relative ranking of corporate governance for different industries. For 
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example, the mining industry has a relatively poor governance structure in my sample 
but obtains the highest board index in Gillan et al. (2003). 
4.2.3 Individual Corporate Governance Sub-scores 
Besides the overall corporate governance score, I have computed sub-scores for 
each of the five categories: board, nomination, remuneration, audit and 
communication. The results reported in Table 4 are the sub-scores computed by 
simply summing up all the points for each equally-weighted element within the same 
category. 
Table 4 provides summary statistics for each category. As all elements in each 
category are equally weighted, categories having more elements are expected to 
obtain higher scores. For example, the communication category contains only five 
elements, and thus obtains the lowest mean score among these five categories. 
Although the category with the largest number of elements has more variations in 
corporate governance than other categories, its mean score is not the highest. All of 
the categories contribute to the improvement of the overall score over time. It can be 
seen that in every category the score shows an upward trend. On average, the 
corporate governance score increases every year for every category. Year 2002 
records the largest score increase for most of the categories. 
Table 5 presents a correlation matrix for the overall SCORE and for each category 
over the entire sample period. All correlations are positive and statistically significant. 
With the exception of communication, the scores for all the other categories have high 
correlations with the overall score, ranging from 0.61 to 0.77. The pairwise 
correlations among many of the categories are significant. Compared with the others, 
the communication category is less correlated with the other categories. The lowest 
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correlation (0.091) is between communication and audit. The significant correlation 
between scores of different categories indicates that firms that disclose more in one 
category tend to disclose more in other categories as well. 
Table 4: Summary statistics for individual categories 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 
Panel A: Board (43 elements) 
Mean 18.67  19.36 19.57 20.86 0.67  0.21  1.31  
Median 19.00  19.00 20.00 21.00 0.00  0.00  1.00  
St. Dev. 4.15  4.06  3.92 4.11 2.36  1.97  2.36  
Min 7.00  7.00  8.00 9.00 -8.00  -8.00  -3.00  
Max 32.00  30.00 30.00 35.00 12.00  8.00  12.00  
No. of firms 137  175  175 174  137  175  174  
Panel B: Nomination (25 elements) 
Mean 5.72  5.95  6.17 6.78 0.25  0.21  0.59  
Median 6.00  6.00  6.00 7.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  
St. Dev. 2.11  2.07  2.11 2.44 1.09  1.23  1.63  
Min 1.00  0.00  1.00 0.00 -2.00  -3.00  -5.00  
Max 13.00  13.00 16.00 16.00 6.00  8.00  9.00  
No. of firms 137  175  175 174  137  175  174  
Panel C: Remuneration (34 elements) 
Mean 20.72  20.95 21.27 22.97 0.11  0.32  1.70  
Median 21.00  21.00 21.00 23.00 0.00  0.00  1.00  
St. Dev. 2.16  2.06  2.15 2.80 1.18  1.41  2.24  
Min 15.00  15.00 16.00 17.00 -3.00  -4.00  -3.00  
Max 26.00  27.00 28.00 33.60 7.30  7.00  10.60  
No. of firms 137  175  175 174  137  175  174  
Panel D: Audit (29 elements) 
Mean 9.58  11.01 12.16 13.72 1.53  1.15  1.56  
Median 10.00  11.00 12.00 14.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  
St. Dev. 3.06  2.92  2.78 3.02 1.94  1.73  2.55  
Min 2.00  3.00  4.00 5.00 -4.00  -4.00  -2.00  
Max 18.00  18.00 18.00 21.00 8.00  8.00  11.00  
No. of firms 137  175  175 174  137  175  174  
Panel E: Communication (5 elements) 
Mean 2.65  2.69  2.71 2.77 0.07  0.03  0.06  
Median 3.00  3.00  3.00 3.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  
St. Dev. 0.57  0.56  0.56 0.58 0.38  0.31  0.32  
Min 2.00  2.00  2.00 2.00 -1.00  -1.00  -1.00  
Max 4.00  4.00  4.00 4.00 2.00  1.00  1.00  





Table 5: Correlation matrix for the overall corporate governance score and 
individual category scores 
  SCORE Board Nomination Remuneration Audit Communication
SCORE 1.00   - - - - 
Board 0.771** 1.00  - - - - 
Nomination 0.610** 0.259** 1.00  - - - 
Remuneration 0.737** 0.388** 0.390** 1.00  - - 
Audit 0.746** 0.342** 0.349** 0.473** 1.00  - 
Communication 0.300** 0.244** 0.134** 0.211** 0.091* 1.00  
Sample size is 611. ** refers to significance at the 1 percent level and * refers to significance at 
the 5 percent level.  
 
4.2.4 New Firms and Corporate Governance Score Change 
Tables 6 to 8 present statistics to address the question of whether the increase in 
SCORE is due to the entry of new firms. Table 6 shows the number of observations 
for years 2000 to year 2002, with 38 newcomers in year 2000, and zero in years 2001 
and 2002. The mean score for new firms is slightly less than that of old firms. This 
shows that the improvement in corporate governance in my sample is not driven by 
the new firms with higher governance standards. In fact, firms which have started 
adopting best corporate governance practices at an earlier date are more likely to 
further improve their corporate governance practices. 
Table 6: Number of observations in each year 
  2000 2001 2002 
No. of firms 175 175 175 
No. of firms in previous year 137 175 174 
No. of firms in both current and previous years 137 175 174 
No. of new firms 38 0 0 
Mean score of new firms 59.87  n.a. n.a. 
Mean score of firms in both current and previous years 59.98  61.88  67.10  
 
Table 7 lists the firms with the highest corporate governance scores in each year 
together with some statistics on these firms. Column 1 lists the name of the firm. 
Columns 2 and 3 report the overall score (SCORE) and score changes (ΔSCORE) for 
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each year, respectively. If the firm is also ranked among the top 10 firms in the 
previous year, I record a “Yes” in Column 4, otherwise, a “No”. If the firm is entered 
in the Composite Index for the first time during the year, I record a “Yes” in Column 
5, otherwise, a “No”. 
Table 7: List of top 10 corporate governance firms in each year 
Name SCORE ΔSCORE Top 10 in Previous Year New Firm 
Panel A: 1999         
SPIRENT 82.00  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
MARCONI CORP 79.00  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
BT GROUP 78.00  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
BBA GROUP 73.00  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
HILTON GROUP 72.00  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
SMITHS GROUP 71.00  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
AGA FOODSERVICE GROUP 71.00  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
CADBURY SCHWEPPES 69.00  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
REUTERS GROUP 69.00  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
BRITISH AIRWAYS 69.00  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
DIXONS GROUP 69.00  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
DE LA RUE 69.00  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Panel B: 2000         
SPIRENT 86.00  4.00  Yes No 
MARCONI CORP 81.00  2.00  Yes No 
BT GROUP 77.00  -1.00  Yes No 
BBA GROUP 77.00  4.00  Yes No 
KIDDE 76.00  10.00  No No 
INCHCAPE 75.00  n.a. No Yes 
DE LA RUE 73.00  4.00  Yes No 
HILTON GROUP 72.00  0.00  Yes No 
SMITHS GROUP 72.00  1.00  Yes No 
VIRIDIAN GROUP 72.00  9.00  No No 
Panel C: 2001         
KIDDE 82.00  6.00  Yes No 
YULE CATTO & CO 81.00  25.00  No No 
MARCONI CORP 80.00  -1.00  Yes No 
CRODA INTERNATIONAL 77.00  18.00  No No 
BT GROUP 76.00  -1.00  Yes No 
INCHCAPE 76.00  1.00  Yes No 
HILTON GROUP 75.00  3.00  Yes No 
BBA GROUP 75.00  -2.00  Yes No 
SPIRENT 75.00  -11.00  Yes No 
SIGNET GROUP 74.00  4.00  No No 
DE LA RUE 74.00  1.00  Yes No 
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Name SCORE ΔSCORE Top 10 in Previous Year New Firm 
SERCO GROUP 74.00  4.00  No No 
Panel D: 2002         
CORUS GROUP 96.00  33.00  No No 
KIDDE 95.00  13.00  Yes No 
SMG 92.00  31.00  No No 
WPP GROUP 88.60  26.60  No No 
SPIRENT 85.50  10.50  Yes No 
MARCONI CORP 85.00  5.00  Yes No 
CENTRICA 84.40  24.40  No No 
YULE CATTO & CO 83.00  2.00  Yes No 
SERCO GROUP 82.00  8.00  Yes No 
GKN 81.60  12.60  No No 
SCORE refers to corporate governance score, while ΔSCORE refers to change of corporate 
governance over the previous year. Top 10 in Previous Year indicates whether the firm was 
ranked among the top 10 highest scores in the previous year. New Firm indicates whether the 
firm appears in my sample the first time. 
 
Consistent with Table 6, the new entries are not a major concern for evaluating 
improvement in corporate governance. However, the change in corporate governance 
is relatively small, and thus it cannot change the relative ranking on the governance 
level over time. As a result, there is some evidence of mild stability in governance. 
More than 50% of the best-governed firms also rank among the best-governed firms 
in the previous year. Although the governance practices of firms improve or 
deteriorate, their relative rankings on the governance score do not change quickly, due 
perhaps to the relatively small magnitude of these changes. The effects of small 
changes on the absolute level value may not be marked. Although it may well be true 
that small changes are due to errors in measurement rather than real changes, it is 
important not to overlook the changes. In fact, if one focuses on the ranking of the 
changes themselves, there may be some interesting results. 
Table 8 lists the firms with the greatest score change over time. It reveals that 
firms with the greatest improvement in governance in the current year are less likely 
to be the firms with the greatest improvement in governance in the previous year. In 
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other words, firms do not tend to improve their governance practices continually. This 
may be partly due to a limit to the number of factors in the scoring system. 
Table 8: List of the top 10 score change firms in each year 














Panel A: 2000           
SPIRAX-SARCO ENGINEERING 21.00  62.00  n.a. No No 
RECKITT BENCKISER 14.50  62.50  n.a. No No 
NOVAR 13.00  50.00  n.a. No No 
ST IVES 12.00  55.00  n.a. No No 
SAINSBURY (J) 10.00  59.00  n.a. No No 
EIDOS 10.00  56.00  n.a. No No 
KIDDE  10.00  76.00  n.a. Yes No 
RENTOKIL INITIAL 9.00  59.00  n.a. No No 
SERCO GROUP 9.00  70.00  n.a. No No 
VIRIDIAN GROUP 9.00  72.00  n.a. Yes No 
GO-AHEAD GROUP 9.00  49.00  n.a. No No 
Panel B: 2001           
YULE CATTO & CO 25.00  81.00  No Yes No 
CRODA INTERNATIONAL 18.00  77.00  No Yes No 
GALEN HOLDINGS 14.00  51.00  No No No 
ATKINS (WS) 13.00  68.00  No No No 
XANSA 12.00  63.00  No No No 
MAN GROUP 11.50  71.00  No No No 
ULTRAFRAME 11.00  67.00  No No No 
TAYLOR NELSON SOFRES 10.00  65.00  No No No 
MATALAN 8.90  67.50  No No No 
CENTRICA 8.00  60.00  No No No 
BOVIS HOMES GROUP 8.00  73.00  No No No 
Panel C: 2002      
CORUS GROUP 33.00  96.00  No Yes No 
SMG 31.00  92.00  No Yes No 
WPP GROUP 26.60  88.60  No Yes No 
CENTRICA 24.40  84.40  Yes Yes No 
NATIONAL EXPRESS GROUP 23.95  72.45  No No No 
ASTRAZENECA 23.00  72.00  No No No 
EIDOS 22.00  79.00  No No No 
AMEC 21.00  65.00  No No No 
BRITISH VITA GROUP 19.00  70.00  No No No 
BODYCOTE INTERNATIONAL 16.00  76.00  No No No 
SCORE refers to the corporate governance score, while ΔSCORE refers to change of 
corporate governance in the current year. Top 10 ΔSCORE in Previous Year indicates 
whether the firm was ranked among the top 10 highest score change firms in the previous 
year. Top 10 SCORE in Current (Previous) Year indicates whether the firm was ranked 
among the top 10 of the highest scores in the current (previous) year. 
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Column 6 of Table 8 shows that none of the firms with the greatest increase in 
score are from the previous year’s top governance level group. It seems that firms that 
have already obtained a high score in one year usually do not further increase their 
governance in the next year. 
On the one hand, if a firm is ranked high in a year, it may be because the firm has 
made a great improvement in governance in that year. On the other hand, if a firm has 
made a great improvement in a year, it does not necessarily rank high in terms of 
corporate governance level. 
Corus Group has a 33-point increase in score, the highest among all the firm-years. 
Taking Corus Group as an example, I assess how a company actually has changed its 
structure over a short period of time. I find that the significant jump is preceded by 
fundamental changes in the business conditions facing the firm and followed by 
large-scale asset restructurings. 
Corus Group experienced continuing high losses for several years till finishing its 
15-month restructuring program in 2003. The sharp decline of operating profitability 
is due to decline in U.K. demand for engineering steels, oversupply of carbon steel 
products and sharp reductions in selling prices. In addition, consolidation in 
aluminum industry reduced the growth opportunity for Corus Group. In response to 
these challenges, Corus Group undertook a series of recovery plans by focusing on 
cash management, cost competitiveness and customer service improvements 
including operational changes and a new organization structure. Corus Group invested 
200 million pounds in capital expenditures for restructuring carbon steel, stainless 
steel and aluminum. In order to focus on profitable downstream activities, the Group 
(1) disposed of its stainless steel and aluminum business; (2) acquired several 
downstream carbon steel operations; (3) reduced iron and steel making capacity in flat 
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products; (4) concentrated the steelmaking in the U.K. on three sites to meet the 
continuing requirements of providing feedstock for the Group’s U.K. mills and 
downstream businesses; (5) built up partnership with Sumitomo Metals for 
technology collaboration in steel sheet for the automotive industry; and (6) reduced 
manning by 12,200, 1,800 and 1,500 in 2001, 2002 and 2003, respectively.  
It is possible that changes in governance structures are part of the process of 
restructuring. In particular, poor operating performance is the impetus of enhanced 
governance and the improvement in corporate governance in turn helps facilitate the 
restructuring process by altering the structure of decision rights within the firm. 
4.2.5 Corporate Governance Score over Time 
Tables 9 and 10 take a closer look into the entire sample firms over time in terms 
of both corporate governance level and corporate governance change. Groups are 
formed on the basis of the corporate governance score (score change) calculated at the 
end of March 2001, March 2002 and March 2003. Thirty percent of firms with the 
highest (lowest) scores are classified into “CG high 30%” (“CG low 30%”). The 
middle 40% firms are classified as “CG middle 40%”. Similarly, I define the “CG 
change high 30%”, “CG change low 30%” and “CG change middle 40%”, according 
to the governance score changes of firms. 
Table 9 contains the number and percentage of firms for each group classified 
under both governance level and governance change criteria. It is constructed by first 
grouping all the firms into three corporate governance groups, namely, CG low 30%, 
CG middle 40%, and CG high 30% groups for each year. Next, within each 
governance group, I divide the firms into three subgroups according to their 
governance score changes. After that, I count the number of firms within each 
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subgroup for each year. Finally, I compute the subtotal of each subgroup by adding up 
the numbers of the same subgroup over a three-year period. 
Table 9: Distribution of corporate governance level and change in the 
same time period 
  CG change low 30% CG change middle 40% CG change high 30% 
CG low 30%  (163) 49 89 25 
percentage 0.301  0.546  0.153  
CG middle 40% (173) 42 82 49 
percentage 0.243 0.474 0.283 
CG high 30% (153) 29 52 72 
percentage 0.190  0.340  0.471  
The values in parentheses are number of firms classified on the level of corporate governance 
basis. The first row represents the number of governance change firms in the current year 
among the indicated governance group. The second row represents the percentage of 
governance change firms in the current year among the indicated governance group. 
 
Table 9 reveals that higher disclosure rankings mainly result from the current 
year’s governance improvement. Correspondingly, firms with greater deterioration in 
corporate governance in that year are more likely to be in the bad governance group. 
Table 10: Corporate governance change in the subsequent year for CG 
low, CG middle, and CG high groups 
  CG change low 30% CG change middle 40% CG change high 30% 
CG low 30% (160) 22 80 58 
percentage 0.138  0.500  0.363  
CG middle 40% (174) 40 82 52 
percentage 0.230  0.471  0.299  
CG high 30% (155) 58 61 36 
percentage 0.374  0.394  0.232  
The values in parentheses are number of firms classified on the level of corporate governance 
basis. The first row represents the number of governance change firms in the subsequent year 
among the indicated governance group. The second row represents the percentage of 
governance change firms in the subsequent year among the indicated governance group. 
 
Table 10 shows the number and the percentage of firms which change their 
corporate governance disclosure in the following year. Firstly, firms are divided into 
bad governance, middle governance and good governance groups. Secondly, the 
changes of corporate governance in the subsequent year are ranked and divided into 
the governance deteriorating, governance middle change, and governance improving 
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groups. Finally, the number of governance change firms in the subsequent year is 
counted for each two-way classification group and the three-year summation is 
represented in Table 10. 
For instance, 36.3% of firms with lower corporate governance rankings improved 
their governance in the following year, while only 23.2% of firms with higher 
corporate governance rankings did so. These results suggest that there is more 
pressure on firms not in compliance with codes. Such results help to remove the 
governance level effect from the governance change effect, because firms with 
governance improvement are not usually the firms exhibiting high governance levels. 
4.2.6 Survivorship Problem 
The requirement of a minimum of three consecutive years of data on each firm 
may introduce a survivorship bias in my sample because poorly performing firms are 
more likely to cease to exist or were acquired by other companies. This potential bias 
might cause the results to be biased toward finding a positive relation between 
corporate governance (change in corporate governance) and firm performance if these 
poor performers are in the group with the lowest corporate governance score (smallest 
change in governance). 
Since I do not have corporate governance information of firms excluded from my 
sample, I cannot test whether these firms are actually poorly governed. Alternatively, I 
address this issue by comparing the corporate governance as well as performance 
differences between those firms that remain listed till the end of year 2006 and those 
firms that were delisted at some point beyond the sample period. The differences in 
the corporate governance score between the surviving firms and delisted firms are 
presented in Panel A, Table 11. Panels B and C of Table 11 demonstrate the 
63 
differences in the change in corporate governance and excess returns between the two 
groups, respectively. 
Table 11: Differences between surviving firms and delisted firms 
    1999 2000 2001 2002 
1999 to 2002 
average 
Panel A: Corporate Governance Score          
SCORE 57.98 60.48 62.44 67.48 62.37 Surviving Firms 
no. of obs. 113 145 145 145 145 
SCORE 54.29 57.40 59.17 65.19 59.09 Delisted Firms 
no. of obs. 24 30 30 29 30 
SCORE diff. 3.69 3.08 3.27 2.29 3.28 Surviving - Delisted 
t-value (1.981)** (1.962)* (2.107)** (1.240) (2.245)** 
Panel B: Change in Corporate Governance Score        
∆SCORE n. a.  2.43 1.97 5.05 3.16 Surviving Firms 
no. of obs. n. a.  113 145 145 145 
∆SCORE n. a.  3.54 1.83 5.64 3.64 Delisted Firms 
no. of obs. n. a.  24 29 29 30 
∆SCORE diff. n. a.  -1.11 0.14 -0.59 -0.48 Surviving - Delisted 
t-value n. a.  (-1.210) (0.162) (-0.470) (-0.814) 
Panel C: Excess Return           
Excess Return 0.176 0.084 -0.042 0.108 0.078 Surviving Firms 
no. of obs. 103 133 135 133 138 
Excess Return 0.045 0.028 -0.107 0.057 -0.010 Delisted Firms 
no. of obs. 21 26 25 22 26 
Excess Return diff. 0.131 0.056 0.065 0.051 0.088 
Surviving - Delisted 
t-value (1.139) (0.479) (0.613) (0.654) (1.409) 
Surviving firms refer to firms that remain listed till the end of year 2006, while delisted firms refer to 
firms that were delisted at some point beyond the sample period. (Surviving – Delisted) refers to the 
difference between surviving firms and delisted firms. SCORE refers to the corporate governance 
score, while ΔSCORE refers to the change of corporate governance in the current year. Excess Return 
refers to the difference between the firm’s actual return for that year and the return on the firm’s 
relevant “control” portfolio. The details of the calculation of Excess Return are presented in Section 
6.2.2. The values in parentheses are t-statistics. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** 
refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
As expected, excluded firms in general have lower corporate governance scores 
after the sample period. The score differences between these firms and those survived 
till now are around three points and are statistically significant in four out of five cases. 
The results in performance measured by excess returns suggest that surviving firms tend 
to have better performance. However, the differences are statistically insignificant. 
Results in Panel B, Table 11 indicate that there is no significant difference in the change 
in corporate governance for these firms. In sum, the results in Table 11 suggest that 
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although the potential survivorship bias cannot be ruled out for analyses in the level of 
corporate governance, it is less an issue for analyses in the change in corporate 
governance. 
Additionally, I perform a binomial proportions test to determine whether there is a 
differential survivorship rate for firms in the group with the highest corporate 
governance score (largest increase in corporate governance score) and for those firms in 
the group with the lowest corporate governance score (largest decrease in corporate 
governance score). I partition the sample firms into three groups based on current year’s 
corporate governance score. “Good governance” (“bad governance”) group includes 
20% of firms with the highest (lowest) scores. Similarly “governance improvement” 
(“governance deterioration”) group includes 20% of firms with the largest increase 
(decrease) in scores. Untabulated results indicate that 28.6% of “bad governance” firms 
drop out in the later periods versus 14.3% of “good governance” firms. This difference 
is statistically insignificant with a p-value equal to 0.145. In terms of change in 
corporate governance, results show that 18.8% of “governance deterioration” firms drop 
out in the later periods versus 25.7% of “governance improvement” firms. This 
difference is again statistically insignificant with a p-value equal to 0.495. 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
In this study, I employ a large number of variables to investigate the determinants 
of the corporate governance score and the interactions among corporate governance, 
free cash flow, and firm value. For each empirical model, I will describe the specific 
variables used in Chapters 5 and 6. In this section, I briefly introduce the variables 
employed. 
The key variables in this study are the overall corporate governance score 
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(SCORE) and the score change (ΔSCORE). The other important governance variables 
are the ownership variables, such as insider ownership (INSIDE); blockholder 
ownership (BLOCK); and institutional ownership (INST). A firm’s debt policy (D/V) 
is also an important control mechanism. In the context of the agency theory, a firm’s 
cash holdings (CASH) may affect its equilibrium governance choices and, in turn, its 
value. Hence, Tobin’s Q (Q), the following year’s Q (FUTUREQ), and the change in 
Q (ΔQ) are used as the measures of firm value in my study. The above-mentioned 
variables are the endogenous variables included in my simultaneous equation system. 
When estimating the determinants of firm-level governance, the following 
variables are included as my independent variables: firm size (FSIZE); fixed assets 
ratio (K/S); operating income ratio (Y/S); R&D spending (R&D/K) and R&D dummy 
(RDUM); capital expenditure (I/K); and external financing need (EXT_FIN). 
In order to test whether the governance score reduces a firm’s cash holdings, in 
the first stage, I regress CASH on the variables used in the literature as determinants 
of cash holdings, which include: firm size as adjusted by the Consumer Price Index 
(REALSIZE); investment opportunity (INV_OPP); the cash flow ratio (CASHFLOW); 
net working capital (WC); debt ratio (D/V); standard deviation of cash flow ratio 
(SIGMA); dividends dummy(DIV_D); regulation dummy (REG); R&D to sales ratio 
(R&D/S) and R&D dummy (RDUM); and capital expenditure (CPEX). The predicted 
value from this regression is the so-called optimal cash holdings for a firm. The 
residual, computed as the difference between CASH and predicted CASH, is used to 
proxy the free cash flow. It is denoted as EXCESSCASH. 
In the simultaneous equation system, the endogenous variables included are: firm 
size (FSIZE); ADR dummy (ADR); regulation dummy (REG); outside directorship 
(OUTDIRE); average number of years served by current board directors (TENURE); 
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total number of directors (NOD); firm risk (RISK); the R&D ratio (RDA); the 
industry R&D ratio (RDAI); the average number of institutions in the industry 
(NINSTI); operating cash flow (CR); the collateral value of assets (COLLATERAL); 
the non-debt tax shield (TAXSHIELD); the cash flow ratio (CASHFLOW); working 
capital (WC); the standard deviation of cash flow ratio (SIGMA); dividends dummy 
(DIV_D); and capital expenditure (CPEX). 
The determinants of governance changes are also estimated. The independent 
variables used include: changes in firm size (ΔFSIZE); changes in the debt ratio 
(ΔD/V); changes in the R&D ratio (ΔRDA); changes in risk (ΔRISK); a firm’s age 
(AGE); a new CEO dummy (NEWCEO); past two years’ Tobin’s Q [Q(-1); Q(-2)]; 
past two years’ industry-adjusted return on assets [ROA(-1); ROA(-2)]; and past two 
years’ excess returns [RETURN(-1); RETURN(-2)]. 
In addition to using Tobin’s Q as the valuation measure, some of the operating 
performance measures are also examined. I use the return on assets (ROA), defined as 
operating income over total assets, as my main measure of profitability. Besides 
operating income, I use four other different measures of profit: EBITDA, EBIT, 
ordinary income, and net income. The profitability variables are each of the profit 
measures with five different denominators, i.e., sales; book value of total equity; book 
value of assets; market value of total equity; and market value of assets. I also 
examine variables using sales, capital expenditure, and dividends as the different 






Table 12: Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max No. of firms 
Panel A: Endogenous Variables     
SCORE 61.801 62.000 8.996 33.000 96.000 661 
ΔSCORE 3.285 2.000 5.200 -11.000 33.000 485 
INSIDE 0.040 0.002 0.102 0.000 0.605 661 
BLOCK 0.171 0.126 0.170 0.000 0.883 658 
INST 0.185 0.160 0.140 0.000 0.686 658 
D/V 0.131 0.123 0.186 -2.271 0.880 676 
CASH 0.135 0.065 0.255 0.000 3.020 693 
Q 2.310 1.441 4.414 0.314 95.736 675 
FUTUREQ 1.898 1.384 2.209 0.298 39.783 674 
ΔQ -0.447 -0.052 2.686 -55.953 6.280 669 
Panel B: Control Variables           
FSIZE 7.211 7.237 1.365 2.606 12.094 689 
K/S 0.949 0.497 1.627 0.000 17.900 689 
Y/S 0.102 0.102 0.182 -1.814 0.999 689 
RDUM 0.420 - - 0.000 1.000 700 
R&D/K 0.061 0.000 0.279 0.000 3.453 700 
I/K 0.134 0.102 0.276 0.000 6.369 700 
EXT_FIN 1.190 0.963 2.721 -39.719 35.892 685 
EXCESSCASH 0.000 -0.007 0.121 -0.544 0.770 516 
REALSIZE 2.733 2.691 1.383 -1.125 7.384 693 
INV_OPP 1.126 1.089 0.285 0.332 4.486 681 
CASHFLOW 0.057 0.071 0.191 -2.240 1.219 693 
WC -0.019 -0.035 0.205 -1.006 0.760 693 
SIGMA 0.232 0.044 2.014 0.000 26.758 700 
DIV_D 0.916 - - 0.000 1.000 700 
CPEX 0.078 0.052 0.241 0.000 5.731 693 
ADR 0.273 - - 0.000 1.000 700 
OUTDIRE 1.872 1.700 1.033 0.111 5.340 655 
TENURE 6.169 5.622 2.624 0.746 16.383 655 
NOD 9.820 9.000 2.725 4.000 25.000 655 
RISK 0.024 0.022 0.013 0.000 0.131 700 
RDA 0.015 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.589 700 
RDAI 0.024 0.002 0.036 0.000 0.145 700 
NINSTI 125.385 106.000 98.275 0.000 758.000 696 
CR 0.236 0.132 0.306 -0.307 2.250 676 
COLLATERAL 0.177 0.102 0.198 -0.013 0.881 693 
TAXSHIELD 0.362 0.239 2.831 -25.738 53.364 693 
ΔFSIZE 0.069 0.068 0.261 -2.316 1.447 515 
ΔRDA 0.000 0.000 0.026 -0.412 0.316 525 
ΔRISK 0.001 0.000 0.011 -0.039 0.100 525 
AGE 23.783 15.643 19.080 0.236 69.886 700 
NEWCEO 0.206 - - 0.000 1.000 481 
Q(-1) 2.067 1.260 4.438 0.063 95.736 679 
Panel C: Operating Performance Measures    
ROA 0.033 0.052 0.162 -2.033 0.487 693 
OI 273.116 94.500 1330.941 -13539.000 16934.000 693 
EBIT 363.821 119.000 1416.536 -12203.000 18823.000 693 
EBITDA 604.117 176.000 1931.959 -4704.000 26272.000 693 
NI 153.087 65.223 1110.131 -16155.000 11870.000 693 
SALES 3704.075 1389.900 11941.718 13.538 178721.000 689 
CAPITALEXP 282.011 59.900 889.140 0.000 11966.000 689 
DIVIDENDS 145.308 36.900 441.573 0.000 5373.000 689 
The table includes summary statistics of all variables included in the study. The sample size 
varies between 481 and 700. Definitions of each variable are given in Appendix 4. For the 




The definition and measurement of all the variables included in this research are 
summarized in Appendix 4. Panel A defines the endogenous variables; Panel B 
defines other control variables; Panel C defines control variables for cost of equity 
capital; and Panel D defines the variables used to measure a firm’s operating 
performance. 
Table 12 shows descriptive statistics for all the variables in my analysis. The 
number of observations varies between 481 and 700. In the sample, the average firm 
has a governance score of 61.8, while the increase in score is 3.3 points annually. 
Managerial ownership is right skewed with a mean value of 4.0% and median value 
of 0.2%. The average total shareholding held by blockholders is 17.1%, which implies 
that U.K. firms have widely-dispersed shareholdings. The average institutional 
ownership is 18.5% and the median holding is 16.0%. In addition, the average debt 
ratio is 0.131. On average, these U.K. firms hold about 13.5% of their net assets as 
cash. The average value of Tobin’s Q is 2.32 and the median is 1.44, indicating that 
my sample firms, on average, invest in positive NPV projects. The future Q is lower 
than the current Q for the average firm. 
Table 13 shows the Pearson correlations among the endogenous variables and 
other variables employed in my study. Since 50 variables are used, I include only the 
correlations among the endogenous variables themselves, as well as the correlations 
between the endogenous variables and other control variables. The correlations 
among the control variables are calculated but not reported. However, I will report the 





Table 13: Pearson correlations among endogenous variables and other variables 
 SCORE ΔSCORE INSIDE BLOCK INST D/V CASH Q FUTUREQ ΔQ 
SCORE 1.000 - - - - - - - - - 
ΔSCORE 0.413** 1.000 - - - - - - - - 
INSIDE -0.227** 0.025 1.000 - - - - - - - 
BLOCK -0.183** 0.051 0.244** 1.000 - - - - - - 
INST -0.046 0.014 -0.056 0.553** 1.000 - - - - - 
D/V 0.126** -0.019 -0.115** 0.009 -8.815* 1.000 - - - - 
CASH -0.068 0.008 0.058 0.016 0.059 -0.517** 1.000 - - - 
Q -0.114** -0.055 0.064 -0.033 -0.118** -0.150** 0.361** 1.000 - - 
FUTUREQ -0.113** -0.007 0.041 -0.054 -0.129** -0.172** 0.298** 0.897** 1.000 - 
ΔQ 0.100* 0.084 -0.074 0.015 0.097* 0.110** -0.360** -0.936** -0.686** 1.000 
FSIZE 0.223** 0.035 -0.294** -0.181** -0.222** 9.908* -0.254** -0.199** -0.166** 0.193**
K/S 8.485* -0.047 -0.113** -0.067 -0.143** 0.474** -0.074 -9.258* -0.135** 0.046 
Y/S -0.072 0.026 0.004 -0.138** -0.044 0.034 -0.123** 0.107** 0.138** -0.069 
RDUM 9.339* -0.063 -0.176** -0.146** -0.031 -8.603* 0.072 0.049 0.037 -0.045 
R&D/K -0.010 0.027 -0.001 -0.114** -0.108** -0.389** 0.449** 0.175** 0.152** -0.164**
I/K -0.024 0.107* 0.041 7.895* -0.037 -0.043 0.062 0.058 0.033 -0.066 
EXT_FIN 0.054 -0.027 -0.014 -0.004 0.001 0.047 0.001 7.810* 0.056 -0.066 
EXCESSCASH 0.000 -0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.620** 0.145** 0.032 -0.210**
REALSIZE 0.200** 0.020 -0.323** -0.182** -0.275** 0.250** -0.227** -0.213** -0.198** 0.192**
INV_OPP -0.205** -0.114* 0.104** -0.017 -0.163** -0.059 0.202** 0.236** 0.177** -0.198**
CASHFLOW -8.610* -0.017 -0.004 -0.037 0.006 -0.058 0.183** 0.233** 0.200** -0.240**
WC -0.047 -0.051 0.138** -0.062 9.523* -0.059 -0.151** -0.040 -0.051 0.030 
SIGMA -0.057 0.063 -0.027 -0.007 -0.007 -9.357* 0.060 0.018 0.041 0.005 
DIV_D 0.037 -0.018 0.058 -8.484* 0.017 -0.003 -0.362** -0.186** -0.170** 0.194**
CPEX -0.004 0.112* -0.015 0.060 -0.031 0.009 0.054 0.026 0.009 -0.036 
ADR 8.173* -0.012 -0.157** -0.139** -0.201** -0.027 0.152** 0.107** 0.123** -0.074 
OUTDIRE 0.156** 0.055 -0.213** -0.135** -0.192** 8.412* -0.071 -0.028 0.013 0.056 
TENURE -0.210** 0.020 0.386** 0.051 0.039 -8.610* -0.006 0.015 0.025 -0.008 
NOD -0.004 -0.048 -0.176** -0.059 -0.181** 0.033 -0.133** -0.059 -0.021 0.078* 
RISK 0.036 -0.027 0.050 0.113** 0.020 -0.056 0.154** 9.789* 0.071 -0.114**
RDA 0.041 0.019 -0.031 -0.123** -9.750* -0.409** 0.540** 0.273** 0.268** -0.234**
RDAI 0.041 0.104* 0.024 -0.036 -0.004 -0.242** 0.169** 0.156** 0.185** -0.108**
NINSTI -0.141** 0.064 0.071 0.003 -0.155** -0.126** 0.006 8.163* 0.124** -0.036 
CR 0.006 0.120** 8.233* -0.053 -0.030 -0.022 -0.004 -0.126** -0.140** 9.735* 
COLLATERAL 0.026 0.006 0.065 0.014 -0.033 0.032 -0.118** -0.004 0.011 0.016 
TAXSHIELD 0.067 0.079 -0.040 0.032 0.020 0.074 -0.131** -0.051 -0.049 0.046 
ΔFSIZE -0.155** -0.104* 0.084 -0.019 -0.114** 0.004 -0.057 0.169** 0.135** -0.151**
ΔRDA 0.050 -0.038 0.020 0.025 0.022 -0.075 0.149** -0.066 -9.783* 0.019 
ΔRISK -0.023 -0.041 0.032 0.051 -0.007 0.046 0.049 0.058 0.017 -0.084 
AGE 0.126** -0.088 -0.147** -8.653* 0.048 -0.003 -0.141** -0.104** -0.064 0.129**
NEWCEO 0.046 -0.001 -0.028 -0.010 -0.039 -0.006 0.103* -0.001 -0.063 -0.054 
Q(-1) -0.049 -0.039 0.047 -0.022 -0.072 -0.127** 0.264** 0.396** 0.363** -0.350**
ROA -8.775* -0.014 0.002 -0.071 0.017 -7.848* 0.009 0.131** 0.122** -0.127**
OI 0.012 0.028 -0.058 -0.010 -0.027 -8.183* -0.023 0.009 0.031 0.009 
EBIT 0.033 0.024 -0.073 -0.015 -0.046 -0.053 -0.033 -0.002 0.019 0.017 
EBITDA 8.170* 0.033 -9.467* -0.018 -0.070 -0.020 -0.049 -0.023 -0.014 0.027 
NI -0.031 0.013 -0.039 -0.020 -0.012 -0.082* -0.014 0.024 0.051 0.000 
SALES 9.106* 0.057 -8.587* 0.013 -0.026 -0.015 -0.062 -0.038 -0.036 0.033 
CAPITALEXP 0.106** 0.050 -0.100* 0.013 -8.948* 0.058 -0.070 -0.052 -0.063 0.036 
DIVIDENDS 0.048 0.048 -0.108** -0.040 -0.076 -0.043 -0.054 -0.004 0.036 0.029 
The sample size varies between 481 and 700. Definitions of each variable are given in Appendix 4. ** refers 
to significance at the 1 percent level and * refers to significance at the 5 percent level.  
 
The variable definitions are in Appendix 4. All variables are measured from 1999 
to 2002. The first two columns of the table show the correlations between each 
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variable and the overall corporate governance score and the changes in the score, 
respectively. The overall score is negatively correlated with both Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
However, a simple correlation between the overall corporate governance score and 
firm value may be masking a more complex functional form for this relationship, a 
possibility that will be examined later in multivariate tests. The negative relationship 
between the corporate governance score and shareholding variables suggest a 
substitution effect among different governance mechanisms. This correlation analysis 
shows that without controlling for other variables, the firms that disclose more are the 
larger and mature firms with higher debt ratios, and more tangible assets. They are 
also more likely to issue ADRs in the major U.S. stock exchanges and have capable 
outsiders (as measured by the number of directorships) serving the board. In addition, 
firms associated with higher governance scores are those with higher levels of 
EBITDA, higher capital expenditures, fewer investment opportunities, lower cash 
flow ratios, shorter CEO tenure, decrease in firm size, and which also have fewer 
average number of institutional owners for their respective 2-digit SIC industries. 
Although the level of governance is significantly correlated with many other 
variables, it is not the case with the governance change variable. While governance 
change is positively associated with I/K, CPEX, RDAI and CR, and negatively 
associated with INV_OPP and ΔFSIZE, it is not related to other variables. 
Q is positively correlated with the past and future Q but negatively associated with 
change in Q. It also positively correlated with ROA, cash holdings, operating income 
ratio, R&D intensity, financing needs, cash flow ratio, ADR issuing, institutional 
ownership for firms in the industry, and change in firm size. Q is negatively correlated 
with firm size and age, and the proportion of fixed assets. This is consistent with 
growth firms that are generally smaller and younger, and whose intangibles are more 
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highly evaluated. The impact of corporate governance variables as measured by score 
and ownership on Q is mixed. Further investigation will be carried out in multiple 
regressions at a later stage. 
Multicollinearity is not a serious problem here. Most of the correlations are less 
than 0.5. Since there is only a slight difference between some variables, they are 
expected to be highly correlated, and these include firm size and real size 
[log(assets)/CPI], different measures of R&D intensity, future Q and Q, different cash 
flow measures, risk and change in risk, and different measures of operating 
performance. This is not a major issue for my regression analysis because I do not use 
similar variables together in the same regression. However, the correlation between 
institutional shareholdings and blockholdings, and between FSIZE and NOD, may be 




Determinants of Corporate Governance and Their 
Relationships with Firm Value 
In this chapter, I will examine two research questions. In Section 5.1, I examine 
the determinants of corporate governance. In Section 5.2, I investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm value. 
5.1 Determinants of Corporate Governance 
5.1.1 OLS Estimates of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Gillan et al. (2003) argue that corporate governance structures are endogenously 
chosen as a response to the costs and benefits associated with the mechanisms. They 
examine the impact of both industry and firm-specific factors on four corporate 
governance indices: one each for board characteristics, corporate charter provisions, 
state of incorporation, and an overall index. They find that an industry’s investment 
opportunities, product uniqueness, competitive environment, information environment, 
and leverage are significantly associated with its corporate governance. In addition, they 
find that firm factors such as a firm’s age help to explain the variation of board structure 
and charter provision indices. 
Instead of focusing on the role of industry in governance, I am more interested in 
the relationship between firm-specific factors and corporate governance. Based on 
Himmelberg et al. (1999), I explore the determinants of firm-level governance by 
controlling for the firm-specific contracting environment. Himmelberg et al. (1999) 
argue that managerial ownership is endogenously determined by both observed and 
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unobserved changes in the firm’s contracting environment. In my study, I also adopt 
the factors used in Himmelberg et al. (1999) as determinants of corporate governance 
in addition to other relevant variables. 
I use a panel with firm fixed effects to do the analysis. The estimates from the firm 
fixed effects model depend only on the variation in the corporate governance scores 
and firm values over time for each individual firm, and do not account for variation 
across firms. This allows me to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, as the use 
of fixed effects regressions estimates the impact of within- and between- variations on 
governance choices and firm value. Fixed effects, therefore, enable me to investigate 
the changes of governance in specific firms over time, and furthermore allow me to 
test whether it is the absolute corporate governance score or the improvement in 
corporate governance score over time that has greater influence on firm value. 
Although my research focuses on the composite governance score rather than 
managerial ownership as is the case for Himmelberg et al. (1999), I adopt a similar set 
of independent variables chosen by Himmelberg et al. (1999) to proxy firm attributes 
except that I: 
(1) exclude the ratio of advertising expenditures to Property, Plant and Equipment, 
because COMPUSTAT does not report data on advertising expenditure for U.K. 
companies; 
(2) exclude the managerial risk aversion measure since this does not have any 
bearing on my study. Himmelberg et al. (1999) are interested in its influence on 
optimal managerial ownership. However, governance score in my study does not 
comprise the managerial ownership dimension, and thus is not related to the 
managerial risk aversion measure; and 
(3) include Durnev and Kim’s (2005) measure of the need for equity finance as an 
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independent variable. Durney and Kim find that this measure also predicts the 
corporate governance quality. 
While the corporate governance scorecard is comprehensive, it does not, however, 
incorporate corporate ownership into its computations. To complement the 
governance scorecard, I include ownership in the regression models to account for the 
interdependence among various governance mechanisms, as well as their impact on 
firm value. I regress SCORE against a vector of independent variables with and 
without ownership variables. Three specifications are given in equations (1) to (3) 
below and are estimated with firm fixed effects:4 
























 (3)  
where i and t represent the firm and time subscripts, respectively; iα (i = 1…N) is the 
firm effect, treated as a fixed parameter to be estimated (N is the number of firms); 
SCORE is the corporate governance score obtained from the corporate governance 
disclosure scorecard; INSIDE is the percentage of beneficial shares held by executive 
directors and non-executive directors; BLOCK represents the percentage of shares 
held by shareholders who have more than 5% of shares of the firm; INST is the 
percentage of shares held by institutions; FSIZE is the natural logarithm of sales; K/S 
is the Property, Plant and Equipment over sales; Y/S is the operating income/sales; 
                                                 
4 I also estimate the equations (1), (2) and (3) using a pooled data model without fixed effects, and 
report the results in Appendix 5. The estimates obtained from pooled data depend only on the variation 
in average corporate governance scores and performance levels across firms, and do not account for 
variation over time for individual firms. 
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RDUM is a dummy variable equal to one if R&D data is available and zero otherwise; 
R&D/K is the R&D expenditure to Property, Plant and Equipment; I/K is the capital 
expenditure/Property, and Plant and Equipment; EXT_FIN is the difference between 
the firm’s actual growth rate and its sustainable growth rate. I estimate a firm’s actual 
growth rate as the geometric average of annual growth rate in total assets for the 
current and previous years, and the sustainable growth rate as the geometric average 
of ROE/(1-ROE) over the same period. ROE is defined as net income over book value 
of equity. 
The empirical analysis of determinants of corporate governance is summarized in 
Table 14. Columns (1) presents the estimation results in which the corporate 
governance determinants comprise only ownership variables. It shows that only 
BLOCK is negative and significant. 
In Columns (2), I replace the ownership variables with firm characteristics as the 
explanatory variables. The estimate for firm size is insignificant. I use the ratio of 
operating income to sales as a measure of a firm’s free cash flow. This ratio is 
positive but not significant. Himmelberg et al. (1999) also find it to be positive and 
not significant. The coefficient of the ratio of capital expenditures to the capital stock 
is significantly positive as expected, suggesting that a higher level of governance is 
required for firms with greater opportunities for discretionary projects. To fine-tune 
the proxies for the scope of discretionary spending, I use the ratio of R&D spending to 
capital as a measure of “soft capital”, following Himmelberg et al. (1999). I use the 
dummy variable (RDUM) to indicate the availability of R&D. Generally, R&D 
spending by firms is associated with an improvement in corporate governance. R&D 
intensity seems to have a negative effect on the corporate governance score. This 
result is consistent with the negative finding of Himmelberg et al. (1999), but 
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contradicts both his and my hypothesis regarding the positive relationship between 
R&D intensity and corporate governance measures. Based on Durnev and Kim (2005), 
my measure EXT_FIN is a proxy for projected need for external financing, and not an 
outcome-based measure. It is positive as expected, indicating that higher financing 
needs result in a higher governance score. 
Table 14: Determinants of corporate governance: 
OLS regressions of SCORE on ownership and/or 
firm characteristics variables (fixed effects) 
Variable Ownership only Characteristics only Combined 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 58.006*** 76.449*** 83.457*** 
 (97.397) (4.274) (5.313) 
INSIDE -6.072 - -8.421* 
 (-1.447) - (-1.832) 
BLOCK -6.599** - -6.440** 
 (-2.108) - (-2.269) 
INST 3.188 - 2.783 
 (0.648) - (0.618) 
FSIZE - -4.102 -5.748 
 - (-0.825) (-1.302) 
FSIZE2 - 0.183 0.289 
 - (0.535) (0.942) 
K/S - -0.164 0.052 
 - (-0.124) (0.038) 
(K/S)2 - -0.051 -0.069 
 - (-0.500) (-0.625) 
Y/S - 0.646 0.435 
 - (0.569) (0.400) 
RDUM - 2.144 2.288* 
 - (1.590) (1.718) 
R&D/K - -12.407* -13.278* 
 - (-1.852) (-1.951) 
I/K - 1.900*** 1.921*** 
 - (8.948) (9.367) 
EXT_FIN - 0.064* 0.058 
 - (1.685) (1.458) 
no. of obs 658 645 645 
Adj. R2 0.7670 0.7699 0.7718 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each 
variable are given in Appendix 4. Year dummies and firm fixed 
effects are included for all regressions, but not reported. * refers to 
significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 
5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent 
level. 
 
My model specification in the last column of Table 14 includes ownership in 
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combination with firm characteristics (the combined model) to address the issue in a 
contracting environment framework. Broadly speaking, previously observed 
correlations between SCORE and ownership [model (1)] and those between SCORE 
and firm characteristics [model (2)] still hold when they are combined together 
[model (3)]. 
5.1.2 OLS Estimates of the Determinants of Change in Corporate Governance 
The fixed effects model is one approach to investigate the factors associated with 
governance choices. Another approach involves regressing corporate governance 
change (ΔSCORE) on firm characteristics change explicitly. Based on Denis and 
Sarin (1999), I control for the changes in firm size (ΔFSIZE), debt ratio (ΔD/V), R&D 
spending (ΔRDA), firm risk (ΔRISK), age of firm (AGE), and new CEO dummy 
(NEWCEO), which are defined as follows: ΔFSIZE: FSIZEt – FSIZEt-1; ΔD/V: D/Vt 
– D/Vt-1; ΔRDA: RDAt – RDAt-1; ΔRISK: RISKt – RISKt-1; AGE: the number of 
years that the firm has been incorporated; NEWCEO is equal to one if the firm 
changes its CEO within the year, and zero otherwise. In line with Vafeas (1999), I 
also link ΔSCORE to lagged performance variables. I expect to find an inverse 
association between past performance and current score changes, signifying that 
corporate governance becomes more strict in the presence of problems. I include three 
sets of past performance (two lags) as additional factors. The firm’s past value [Q(-1); 
Q(-2)] is the Tobin’s Q value in the past two years. Operating performance [ROA(-1); 
ROA(-2)] is the industry adjusted return on assets in the past two years. Excess stock 
return [RETURN(-1); RETURN(-2)] is the annual stock return net of the return for 
the median firm in the corresponding equity capitalization quintile in the past two 
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Table 15: Determinants of change in corporate governance: OLS 
regressions of ∆SCORE on ownership and/or firm characteristics 
variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CONSTANT -11.200*** -9.005*** -8.737*** -8.520*** -10.722*** -10.425*** -10.165*** 
 (-4.567) (-3.522) (-3.495) (-3.369) (-3.924) (-3.874) (-3.624) 
SCORE .2344*** .242*** .244*** .235*** .269*** .270*** .263*** 
 (6.322) (5.813) (5.907) (5.755) (6.075) (6.153) (5.882) 
INSIDE 5.631***    5.084*** 5.315*** 4.651** 
 (2.967)    (2.475) (2.562) (2.311) 
BLOCK 3.388**    3.765** 3.573** 3.960** 
 (2.450)    (2.302) (2.140) (2.308) 
INST -3.101*    -2.462 -2.312 -2.721 
 (-1.736)    (-1.277) (-1.187) (-1.383) 
∆FSIZE  -1.363* -1.170 -1.343* -1.474* -1.260 -1.570** 
  (-1.785) (-1.507) (-1.779) (-1.884) (-1.584) (-2.082) 
∆D/V  -1.609 -1.205 -1.582 -1.549 -1.198 -1.129 
  (-1.472) (-1.057) (-1.368) (-1.431) (-1.067) (-1.003) 
AGE  -.055*** -.052*** -.0053*** -.052*** -.049*** -.053*** 
  (-3.983) (-3.881) (-3.812) (-3.823) (-3.730) (-3.841) 
∆RDA  -16.239* -18.661* -17.260* -16.568 -18.155 -13.294 
  (-1.663) (-1.754) (-1.631) (-1.572) (-1.573) (-1.254) 
∆RISK  -49.523** -51.372** -46.127* -56.529*** -59.148*** -38.704 
  (-2.220) (-2.250) (-1.846) (-2.679) (-2.712) (-1.602) 
NEWCEO  -0.108 -0.093 -0.213 -0.052 -0.035 -0.011 
  (-.183) (-.162) (-.348) (-.091) (-.062) (-.019) 
Q(-1)  -0.005   0.0006   
  (-.298)   (.0037)   
Q(-2)  -0.002   -0.007   
  (-.114)   (-.442)   
ROA(-1)   -2.080   -1.341  
   (-.927)   (-.630)  
ROA(-2)   -1.261   -1.705  
   (-.471)   (-.659)  
RETURN(-1)    -0.235   0.460 
    (-.500)   (1.143) 
RETURN(-2)    -0.263   -0.224 
    (-.623)   (-.584) 
Adjusted R2 0.1774 0.2161 0.2222 0.2106 0.2329 0.2380 0.2267 
no. of obs. 538 458 455 452 458 455 451 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each variable are given in 
Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are included for all regressions, but not 
reported. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 
5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
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The estimates of equation (4) are presented in Table 15. Model (1) is a regression 
on ownership variables alone, while models (2) to (4) replace the ownership variables 
with firm characteristics as governance determinants. Models (5) to (7) include 
ownership variables in combination with firm characteristics as independent variables. 
From Table 15 I find that both insider and block shareholdings are positively 
associated with changes in governance score. Changes in firm size are negatively 
correlated with changes in governance, suggesting that larger firms enjoy economies 
of scale in monitoring. 
As expected, changes in governance are more prevalent in younger firms. 
Building on the arguments of Raheja (2005), increased firm risk will increase the cost 
of monitoring management, and lead to lesser use of monitoring systems. The 
negative relationship between the change in the firm’s risk and the change in 
corporate governance is in support of the above argument and also consistent with the 
findings in Denis and Sarin (1999). In addition, there is some evidence of a negative 
relationship between changes in R&D intensity and changes in governance score. This 
is somewhat puzzling, given that increases in the private benefits available for 
management to expropriate should be correlated with enhanced governance (see 
Raheja, 2005). However, when past performance variables are included as additional 
factors, the coefficients on ΔRDA become insignificant. 
According to Denis and Sarin (1999), changes in ownership and control are 
closely linked with changes in the identity of the top executives. I find that the 
estimate of the dummy variable of CEO change is negative but not significant. 
Changes in leverage and governance are negatively related, but not significant at the 
normal level. Most of the past performance variables are negatively associated with 
current changes in governance. However, similar to the findings in Denis and Sarin 
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(1999), the coefficients on past performance are insignificant, indicating that they are 
poor predictors of changes in corporate governance over time. 
5.2 Corporate Governance and Firm Value 
5.2.1 Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Empirical Results 
A common approach to testing whether good governance is reflected in a firm’s 
performance and market valuation is to apply regression analysis. In this section, I 
examine the relationships between SCORE and a valuation measure, namely, Tobin’s 
Q. I continue to use the variables associated with higher governance scores (See 
Section 5.1) to control for their effects on firm value. I use firm fixed effects models 
to estimate equations (5) to (7) below, which are similar to the models discussed in 
Section 5.1. 



























    (7) 
where Q is the market value of ordinary shares issued, the total book value of debt 
and the book value of preference shares, divided by book value of assets. To account 
for the time lag before good governance begins to exert a positive impact on firm 
value, I regress the lead value of Tobin’s Q (denoted FUTUREQ) on the governance 
and control variables in the current year. Using FUTUREQ, may also be useful in 
reducing the effect of endogeneity. This is consistent with previous studies in firm 
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value. For instance, Durnev and Kim (2005) use the years 2000 to 2001 to estimate a 
two-year average Q, and year 2000 for governance measure, while basing the values 
of other control variables on their values between 1998 and 2000. Short and Keasey 
(1999) also use ownership variables at the beginning of the period, while using values 
of the performance variables obtained at the end of the period “…in an attempt to 
reduce potential problems of ‘reverse’ causality arising between the performance of 
firms and ownership” (p.89). 
Table 16 presents the estimated coefficients with FUTUREQ as the dependent 
variable.5 The first column presents the results from equation (5). Column (2) 
presents the estimates of firm characteristics based on equation (6). Finally, the last 
column presents results from equation (7). 
The most notable finding of the valuation analyses is that SCORE has the 
predicted sign and is significant. When FSIZE2 and (K/S)2 are removed from the list 
of control variables, the results are qualitatively similar, but the estimates become 
more significant. For example, the estimate of the coefficient on SCORE in the 
combined model becomes significant at the 5% level. 
In relation to control variables, I find that including firm characteristics changes 
the signs of the estimated coefficients of insider shareholdings and blockholdings. The 
firm characteristics variables are robust to the inclusion of additional ownership 
controls. For all valuation regressions, FUTUREQ is found to be negatively related to 
firm size and “hard” capital. Changes in external financing needs are found to be 
positively associated with changes in firm value. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Results based on pooled data can be found in Appendix 6. 
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Table 16: Determinants of firm value: OLS 
regressions of FUTUREQ on SCORE, ownership 
and/or firm characteristics variables (fixed effects) 
Variable Ownership only Characteristics only Combined 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.877*** 21.874*** 22.038*** 
 (3.844) (4.197) (3.983) 
SCORE 0.015*** 0.010** 0.009* 
 (2.709) (2.077) (1.746) 
INSIDE 0.989** - -0.137 
 (2.462) - (-0.195) 
BLOCK 0.785 - -0.296 
 (0.959) - (-0.569) 
INST -2.509 - -0.478 
 (-1.146) - (-0.431) 
FSIZE - -4.794*** -4.790*** 
 - (-3.462) (-3.305) 
FSIZE2 - 0.276*** 0.276*** 
 - (3.124) (2.989) 
K/S - -0.614*** -0.605*** 
 - (-3.740) (-3.831) 
(K/S)2 - 0.028** 0.027** 
 - (2.399) (2.431) 
Y/S - -0.258 -0.269 
 - (-0.924) (-0.980) 
RDUM - -0.097 -0.086 
 - (-0.404) (-0.385) 
R&D/K - -0.290 -0.252 
 - (-0.103) (-0.086) 
I/K - -0.031 -0.021 
 - (-0.381) (-0.216) 
EXT_FIN - 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 - (2.800) (2.830) 
no. of obs 639 626 626 
Adj. R2 0.4759 0.5744 0.5726 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each variable 
are given in Appendix 4. Year dummies and firm fixed effects are 
included for all regressions, but not reported. * refers to significance 
at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 percent level; 
and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
In order to investigate the influence of governance change on firm performance 
explicitly, I regress the following year’s Tobin’s Q (denoted FUTUREQ) on both the 
governance level (denoted SCORE) and governance change (denoted ΔSCORE), 
while controlling for the current year’s Tobin’s Q (denoted Q) in the presence of other 
control variables. Unlike model (1) which includes only ownership variables, model 
(2) only includes firm characteristics. Model (3), on the other hand, is the combined 
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model, which includes both ownership and firm characteristics variables. I also 
replace FUTUREQ with ΔQ as the dependent variable, which represents the 
difference between FUTUREQ and Q. The regression results are presented in Table 
17. The first three columns present the estimates with FUTUREQ as the dependent 
variable whereas the last three columns present the estimates with ΔQ as the 
dependent variable. 
Table 17: Determinants of firm value: OLS regressions of FUTUREQ or ΔQ 
on ΔSCORE, SCORE, ownership and/or firm characteristics variables 
Variable FUTUREQ FUTUREQ FUTUREQ ΔQ ΔQ ΔQ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 1.387*** 0.097 0.470 -0.552* -4.386 -5.486* 
 (4.101) (0.086) (0.407) (-1.822) (-1.585) (-1.676) 
Q 0.463*** 0.454*** 0.450*** - - - 
 (4.724) (4.382) (4.284) - - - 
ΔSCORE 0.012 0.012* 0.012 0.013*** 0.028** 0.026** 
 (1.590) (1.768) (1.626) (2.836) (2.474) (2.550) 
SCORE -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 0.006 -0.007 -0.005 
 (-2.663) (-3.874) (-2.827) (1.037) (-1.492) (-1.249) 
INSIDE -0.659*** - -0.701*** -0.964* - 0.361 
 (-2.617) - (-3.384) (-1.720) - (0.726) 
BLOCK 0.155 - 0.531* 0.662 - 0.349 
 (0.498) - (1.908) (1.637) - (1.033) 
INST -0.336 - -0.640* 0.589 - 1.167* 
 (-1.238) - (-1.749) (1.083) - (1.659) 
FSIZE - 0.319 0.272 - 1.262 1.330 
 - (1.135) (1.012) - (1.640) (1.636) 
FSIZE2 - -0.018 -0.017 - -0.075* -0.076 
 - (-1.095) (-1.050) - (-1.671) (-1.639) 
K/S - -0.158*** -0.186*** - 0.141* 0.171* 
 - (-2.623) (-2.920) - (1.686) (1.766) 
(K/S)2 - 0.008*** 0.009*** - -0.006 -0.006 
 - (2.739) (3.081) - (-1.470) (-1.474) 
Y/S - 0.415 0.493* - -1.293** -1.166** 
 - (1.453) (1.890) - (-2.562) (-2.521) 
RDUM - 0.015 0.032 - -0.118 -0.124 
 - (0.379) (0.862) - (-0.974) (-1.129) 
R&D/K - -0.024 -0.042 - -0.622 -0.475 
 - (-0.097) (-0.166) - (-1.521) (-1.199) 
I/K - -0.140*** -0.168*** - -0.294* -0.262* 
 - (-2.925) (-2.719) - (-1.873) (-1.754) 
EXT_FIN - 0.002 0.002 - -0.001 -0.011* 
 - (0.277) (0.250) - (-0.094) (-1.703) 
no. of obs 467 461 461 467 461 461 
Adj. R2 0.6946 0.6985 0.7004 0.0320 0.0940 0.1038 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each variable are given in Appendix 4. Year 
and industry dummies are included for all regressions, but not reported. * refers to significance at the 




The evidence above lends support to the hypotheses that improvement in 
corporate governance is related to both higher future value (FUTUREQ) and increase 
in firm value (ΔQ). The results are more pronounced in models where the change in 
firm performance is the dependent variable. However, a higher absolute governance 
score does not contribute to either higher or increased firm value. Indeed, for some of 
the model specifications, firms with better governance tend to have low valuation. 
The following section discusses results related to the combined model. I compare 
the estimates of the regression of FUTUREQ (ΔQ) on both ownership and firm 
characteristics against the estimates of the combined model with fixed effects. 
Although the ownership variables are not significant for the fixed effects model, these 
estimates, however, become significant and, in some cases, change signs in both 
FUTUREQ and ΔQ regressions. I find that the estimates on managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership are significantly negative where FUTUREQ is the dependent 
variable. In contrast, institutional ownership is positively associated with the change 
in Q. 
While the estimate of firm size is negative and significant for the fixed effects 
model, I find that this estimate is no longer significant and that the signs change for 
the FUTUREQ and ΔQ models. In both the fixed effects and FUTUREQ models, I 
find that firms with more tangible assets have lower values. However, I also find that 
in the ΔQ model, more tangible assets lead to increases in Q. The external financing 
need is positively related to Q in the fixed effects model, and not significant in the 
FUTUREQ model. It is negatively related to ΔQ. R&D spending is, however, not 
significantly related to Q in any of the three models. I find that operating income is 
positively related to FUTUREQ but negatively related to ΔQ. Firms with greater 
capital expenditure also seem to have lower FUTUREQ and ΔQ. 
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In brief, both models with fixed effects and the model with the dependent variable 
as the change in governance, consistently show that firms with improvement in 
corporate governance have higher values. However, a higher absolute corporate 
governance score is negatively associated with Tobin’s Q, or insignificant, at best. 
The signs for the ownership and firm characteristics variables are at times sensitive to 
different model specifications. 
5.2.2 Categories and Factors Associated with Firm Value  
In Section 5.2.1, I investigate the governance-valuation relationship using the 
aggregate corporate governance score. However, the question remains as to which 
governance elements are key factors in determining a firm’s value. In this section, I 
therefore examine these issues and also analyze the predictive power of each 
governance category. 
 
Results for Sub-scores and Reduced Indices 
As described in Chapter 4, the overall governance score can be decomposed into 
five categories, namely, board, nomination, remuneration, audit and communication. 
Because nomination is part of “board”, I combine the elements for nomination 
category with the elements for board category as a broader measure of board activity. 
I first regress FUTUREQ on each of the four categories (board, remuneration, audit 
and communication), included individually in separate regressions. The control 
variables in the regression are similar to those adopted in equation (7). The model is 















   (8) 
In equation (8), SUBSCORE separately represents board, nomination, 
remuneration, audit and communication, respectively. Each sub-score is the sum of its 
element points. The fixed effects results from equation (8) are presented in Row 1, 
Table 18. 
When examining the effects of subindices, Black et al. (2006a) raise a potential 
omitted-variable problem in the regression, as the predictive power of sub-score is 
affected by its correlation with the other (omitted) sub-scores. To control this effect, 
they introduce a control variable for each subindex, a Reduced Index that equals the 
difference between the aggregated governance index and the indicated subindex. 
Following their approach, I also add a control variable (denoted REDUCESCORE). 
REDUCESCORE equals the difference between the aggregated governance score and 

















   (9) 
The estimates from equation (9) for SUBSCORE and REDUCESCORE are 
shown in Row (2A) and Row (2B), of Table 18. I also include all the sub-scores 
together in a single regression [as shown in equation (10)]. The estimating results are 

















  (10) 
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Table 18: OLS results for sub-scores (fixed effects) 
  SUB-SCORE Board Remuneration Audit Communication 
Dependent Variable: FUTUREQ         
0.007** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.022 
(2.188) (3.466) (3.492) (0.901) 1 coefficient on sub-score 
0.686 0.686 0.688 0.685 
0.003 0.012* 0.013** 0.005 
(0.551) (1.700) (2.191) (0.173) 2A coefficient on sub-score, with control for reduced score 
0.687 0.687 0.687 0.687 
0.010*** 0.005* 0.004 0.007*** 
(2.187) (1.818) (1.276) (3.771) 2B 
coefficient for reduced score (sum of 
remaining sub-scores)(from same 
regression as column 2A) 0.687 0.972 0.975 0.974 
0.002 0.011 0.011* -0.017 
(0.488) (1.550) (1.809) (-0.474) 3 coefficient from single regression with all sub-scores 
0.687 0.687 0.687 0.687 
The score for each sub-score is the summation of the points gained for all the elements 
within the specific category. In Row 1, I regress FUTUREQ on each indicated sub-score 
alone, without a separate control for the rest of the corporate governance score. In Row 2, 
I add a control variable for a “Reduced Score” which equals the sum of the other three 
sub-scores. In Row 3, I include all four sub-scores as separate independent variables. 
Sample size is 626. The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Adjusted R-squared are 
below the t-statistics. Definitions of each variable are given in Appendix 4. * refers to 
significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and 
*** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Under the fixed effects model, the regression results for individual indicated 
sub-scores (Row 1, Table 18) show that all sub-scores have the predicted signs. 
Except for the communication sub-score, all the other sub-scores are statistically 
significant. 
However, when “reduced score” is introduced as the control variable, the 
predictive powers are reduced for all the categories. When all the categories are 
examined together, the coefficients for board, remuneration and audit sub-scores have 
the expected positive signs, but the communication sub-score has an adverse impact 
on a firm’s value. This could be due to the substitution effects of different governance 
mechanisms. Firms do not need to dominantly choose one governance practice over 
the other. Therefore, in equilibrium, an increase in score in one particular governance 
category does not necessarily lead to an increase in valuation. The results in Row 3, 
Table 18, demonstrate the offsetting effects of different governance categories. 
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Results for Alternative Measures of Score, Sub-scores and Reduced Indices 
In earlier sections, the overall corporate governance score and sub-scores are 
calculated with equal weight for each governance element. In this section, I employ 
an alternative way to compute the score as a robustness check. I standardize the 
sub-scores and then combine them into a standardized overall score, based on Black et 
al. (2006a). Such an approach weighs each category equally rather than weighing each 
element equally. Specifically, to compute sub-scores, I sum up a firm’s score based on 
the elements of each category, divide it by the number of elements, and then multiply 
this ratio by 20. Thus, each sub-score has a value of between 0 and 20. I define the 
overall standardized score as the sum of all the four categories (board, remuneration, 
audit and communication). The correlation between SCORE and standardized score 
(denoted standSCORE) is 0.953 and significant at 0.01. 
I repeat the analysis of determinants of firm value in Table 16 using standSCORE 
as an alternative governance measure. In particular, I replace SCORE in equations (5), 
(6) and (7) with standSCORE and estimate these equations with fixed effects. The 
results are reported in Table 19. 
The findings in Table 19 are qualitatively the same as those in Table 16. The 
coefficients for the control variables are similar in both magnitude and significance. 
The coefficients for standardized score are larger than those for SCORE in all the 
model specifications. In the combined model, the coefficient for standSCORE is 





Table 19: Determinants of firm value: OLS 
regressions of FUTUREQ on standSCORE, 
ownership and/or firm characteristics variables 
Variable Ownership only Characteristics only Combined 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.671 21.831*** 22.045*** 
 (0.799) (4.231) (4.019) 
standSCORE 0.056** 0.017** 0.015* 
 (2.517) (2.265) (1.788) 
INSIDE 0.995** - -0.167 
 (2.517) - (-0.235) 
BLOCK 0.879 - -0.304 
 (1.050) - (-0.588) 
INST -2.464 - -0.455 
 (-1.123) - (-0.408) 
FSIZE - -4.803*** -4.807*** 
 - (-3.477) (-3.320) 
FSIZE2 - 0.276*** 0.277*** 
 - (3.138) (3.004) 
K/S - -0.614*** -0.604*** 
 - (-3.747) (-3.827) 
(K/S)2 - 0.027** 0.026** 
 - (2.333) (2.358) 
Y/S - -0.263 -0.274 
 - (-0.954) (-1.008) 
RDUM - -0.080 -0.070 
 - (-0.333) (-0.311) 
R&D/K - -0.322 -0.291 
 - (-0.114) (-0.099) 
I/K - -0.032 -0.021 
 - (-0.393) (-0.220) 
EXT_FIN - 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 - (2.724) (2.770) 
no. of obs 639 626 626 
Adj. R2 0.479 0.5744 0.5726 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each 
variable are given in Appendix 4. StandSCORE refers to the 
standardized score. Year dummies and firm fixed effects are 
included for all regressions, but not reported. * refers to 
significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 
5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent 
level. 
 
Similarly, as additional robustness tests, I replace the simple summation sub-score 
with the standardized sub-score, where the sub-scores are equally weighted. The fixed 
effects results from the regressions on standardized sub-scores are shown in Table 20. 
The results in Table 20 are generally consistent with the earlier findings shown in 
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Table 18. Moreover, the loading on the communication category decreases 
substantively, indicating that the contribution of communication becomes marginal 
when each category is equally weighed. However, equal weighting does not affect the 
predictive power of other variables in the model. 
Table 20: OLS results for standardized sub-scores (fixed effects) 
  SUB-SCORE Board Remuneration Audit Communication
Dependent Variable: FUTUREQ         
0.023** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.005 
(2.188) (3.466) (3.492) (0.901) 1 coefficient on sub-score 
0.686 0.686 0.688 0.685 
0.007 0.024** 0.023*** 0.001 
(0.392) (2.034) (2.563) (0.194) 2A coefficient on sub-score, with control for reduced score 
0.686 0.686 0.687 0.687 
0.009* 0.005 0.002 0.011*** 
(1.857) (1.341) (0.502) (3.681) 2B 
coefficient for reduced score (sum of 
remaining sub-scores)(from same 
regression as column 2A) 0.686 0.686 0.687 0.687 
0.008 0.018 0.016* -0.004 
(0.488) (1.550) (1.809) (-0.474) 3 coefficient from single regression with all sub-scores 
0.687 0.687 0.687 0.687 
The sub-scores are standardized to weigh each sub-score equally. In Row 1, I regress 
FUTUREQ on each indicated sub-score alone, without a separate control for the rest of the 
corporate governance score. In Row 2, I add a control variable for a “Reduced Score” which 
equals the sum of the other three sub-scores. In Row 3, I include all four sub-scores as 
separate independent variables. Sample size is 626. The values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Adjusted R-squared are below the t-statistics. Definitions of each variable are given in 
Appendix 4. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 
percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Individual Corporate Governance Element 
Appendix 7 lists each corporate governance element, and the percentage of firms 
which satisfied the indicated corporate governance element for the period of my 
analysis. Appendix 8 classifies the governance elements into three groups. They are 
fully complied, complied by more than 90% and complied by less than 10% of the 
companies. 
All of the sample firms met the following seven corporate governance criteria: 
(1) complete disclosure of board members;  
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(2) appointment of a remuneration committee; 
(3) remuneration committee determines specific remuneration packages for 
executive directors and the CEO;  
(4) remuneration committee reviews all aspects of remuneration; 
(5) the executive director’s compensation is linked to industry, company and/or 
individual performance; 
(6) disclosure of audit committee members; and 
(7) the publication of the company’s annual reports on its website. 
The reason for all the companies to comply fully with the above seven criteria is 
not because these elements are treated differently from other elements by law. While 
adherence to certain governance disclosure requirements is mandatory in the U.S., it 
is considered as “comply or explain” in the U.K. The London Stock Exchange Listing 
Rules require a statement to be included in the annual report relating to compliance 
with the Code. A company needs to give reasons for any non-compliance. Therefore, 
100% compliance is the choice of all firms, but not necessary by law. 
Except for the abovementioned seven elements, 21 governance elements are 
satisfied by most firms (90% or more). I report three of them as representatives: 
(1) disclosure of detailed information on each director; 
(2) disclosure of detailed information of each director’s previous employment; and 
(3) disclosure of other directorships of directors. 
In contrast, 33 corporate governance criteria are met by less than 10% of 
companies, for example:  
(1) 100% attendance of board meetings by directors;  
(2) disclosure of the attendance of individual directors at board meetings; and 
(3) more than 2/3 of the board are independent directors. 
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With respect to each element, the compliance rate has increased over time for 
almost all the corporate governance elements. 
5.2.3 Corporate Governance, Free Cash Flow, and Firm Value: Empirical 
Results 
In Section 5.2.1, I reported that improvement in corporate governance is 
associated with higher firm value. In this section, I will test whether the positive 
impact of governance on firm value is caused by free cash flow. As discussed in my 
hypothesis development, corporate governance may play two roles in cash-rich firms 
where the agency problems are more severe. On the one hand, corporate governance 
may reduce managerial discretion on cash policy, resulting in less cash holdings. On 
the other hand, corporate governance may mitigate the adverse impact of excess cash 
on firm value, resulting in higher firm value. These two effects may happen 
sequentially, i.e., reducing cash holdings first and enhancing firm value later. 
In the first stage, I explore the determinants of cash holdings to test whether better 
governance or improvement in governance results in lower cash balances. I apply 
methods similar to those used in previous studies that examine the determinants of 
cash holdings, particularly the set of variables used in Opler et al. (1999). The key 
variable used for this part of the study is the firm’s cash holdings (CASH), which is 
defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets minus cash and 
marketable securities. For the baseline model, I regress the firm’s cash holdings 
against governance variables and other control variables identified in previous 
research as being important predictors of cash holdings. Among the list of governance 
variables that I include, are the change in corporate governance, the corporate 
governance level, and three ownership variables. The first model includes only the 
change in corporate governance as the dependent variable; the second model 
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incorporates both the change in corporate governance and the corporate governance 
level; while the third model which is the combined model, incorporates the change in 
corporate governance, the level of governance as well as ownership variables. All 
three models include the following variables as controls: REALSIZE, which is the 
natural log of assets, deflated using the CPI (Consumer Price Index); INV_OPP, 
which captures investment opportunities, and is the geometric average of annual 
percentage sales growth both in the past and current years; CASHFLOW, which is the 
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes, but before depreciation and amortization, 
less interest, taxes and common dividends, divided by net assets, and where Net assets 
are assets net of cash; WC or net working capital, which is defined as current assets 
net of cash minus current liabilities divided by net assets; D/V, where D/V= 
(LTD+STD+PFD-CASH)/V, where V= total liabilities + preferred capital + market 
value of equity, LTD = Book value of long-term debt, STD = Book value of 
short-term debt, PFD = preferred capital, CASH = cash and marketable securities; 
SIGMA: the firm’s standard deviation of the cash flow ratio (CASHFLOW) from year 
1994 to year 2002; DIV_D, which is equal to one if the firm had paid a dividend in 
the year, and zero otherwise; REG, which is equal to one for a firm in a regulated 
industry, viz. public utility, railroad (i.e., primary 2-digit SIC code=40, 48, 49, 60, 61 
or 63), and zero otherwise; RDUM, which is equal to one if R&D data are available, 
and zero otherwise; R&D/S, which is the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales; and 
CPEX, which is defined as capital expenditure divided by net assets. 
All the variables are consistent with Opler et al. (1999) except for INV_OPP, D/V 
and SIGMA. I adopt the definition of INV_OPP using Durnev and Kim (2005) as a 
proxy of firm growth rate, which replaces the market-to-book ratio in Opler et al. 
(1999) as the growth measure. This is mainly because the market-to-book ratio is 
94 
highly correlated with the Tobin’s Q measure used in this study. To minimize the 
problems of endogeneity, I use INV_OPP as the proxy for the firm’s growth measure. 
While I/K is another suitable proxy for the firm growth measure, I use INV_OPP 
instead, as I/K is very close to CPEX in the calculation in my study. Opler et al. (1999) 
use another leverage measure, namely the debt ratio, defined as total debt divided by 
total assets. For my study, I use the ratio of total debt divided by the market value of 
assets, as used in Agrawal and Knoeber (1999). Using the same leverage measure in 
Opler et al. (1999) as a robustness check, I find that the results that I obtained are 
qualitatively similar. Unlike Opler et al. (1999) who calculate SIGMA using data of 
20 years, my study only uses nine available years to compute SIGMA. 






























  (13) 
The empirical results from all three models are presented in Table 21. All 
estimates for the coefficients of governance changes are negative, with two estimates 
being statistically significant. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
cash holdings are inversely related to corporate governance change. In contrast, a 
higher corporate governance level is found to be associated with more cash holdings, 
rejecting the agency cost hypothesis. All ownership variables are significant and 
positive, suggesting that larger shareholders fail to reduce cash holdings of firms. 
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Table 21: Corporate governance and corporate cash 
holdings: OLS regressions of CASH on ΔSCORE, 
SCORE, ownership and other control variables 
Variable CASH CASH CASH 
Stage 1 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.387*** 0.335*** 0.280*** 
 (14.777) (8.239) (6.181) 
ΔSCORE -0.001 -0.002* -0.002* 
 (-1.598) (-1.740) (-1.841) 
SCORE - 0.001** 0.001*** 
 - (2.318) (2.979) 
INSIDE - - 0.064*** 
 - - (3.863) 
BLOCK - - 0.023*** 
 - - (3.505) 
INST - - 0.060*** 
 - - (3.132) 
REALSIZE -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010*** 
 (-3.725) (-4.156) (-2.625) 
INV_OPP -0.049* -0.042 -0.040 
 (-1.706) (-1.467) (-1.529) 
CASHFLOW 0.108 0.111* 0.112 
 (1.591) (1.662) (1.617) 
WC -0.171*** -0.172*** -0.173*** 
 (-7.334) (-7.116) (-6.927) 
D/V -0.559*** -0.566*** -0.564*** 
 (-12.257) (-12.257) (-11.839) 
SIGMA -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (-1.445) (-1.324) (-1.512) 
DIV_D -0.159*** -0.161*** -0.159*** 
 (-4.276) (-4.417) (-4.234) 
REG 0.006 0.004 0.008 
 (0.263) (0.211) (0.376) 
RDUM -0.021** -0.024** -0.024** 
 (-2.311) (-2.373) (-2.294) 
R&D/S 1.222*** 1.203*** 1.258*** 
 (6.160) (6.250) (6.916) 
CPEX 0.012 0.014 0.016 
 (0.937) (1.047) (1.215) 
no. of obs 516 516 516 
Adj. R2 0.5928 0.5935 0.5946 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each variable 
are given in Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are included for 
all regressions, but not reported. * refers to significance at the 10 
percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and *** 
refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
The signs of the control variables are in the expected direction. Specifically, as 
expected, small firms tend to hoard more cash since they are more likely to face 
heavier borrowing constraints as compared to large firms. Moreover, Kalcheva and 
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Lins (2005) also argue that the directions of the coefficients for leverage (D/V) and 
the two investment opportunities measures (INV_OPP and CPEX) are unpredictable 
ex-ante. This is because both variables could be related either to a build up of cash in 
anticipation of making payments to lenders or capital equipment suppliers, or to a 
drawdown of cash once such payments are completed. In addition, both leverage and 
investment opportunities could be associated with managerial agency problems, given 
the findings in McConnell and Servaes (1995) and Harvey et al. (2004) that debt 
could reduce or enhance managerial agency problems, depending on the investment 
opportunity set faced by the firm. My results show that the coefficients of INV_OPP 
and CPEX are insignificant for most of model specifications. The coefficient of the 
leverage measure is negative and significant, implying that firms pay out cash to a 
firm’s debt-holders. 
As CASHFLOW is used to control for profitability, it is expected to be positively 
related to higher levels of cash. My findings are consistent with this prediction as the 
coefficients on CASHFLOW are positive and marginally significant. As expected, the 
coefficients for the ratio of net working capital to net assets are negative and 
significant. Since cash and net working capital are two kinds of liquid assets, more net 
working capital in hand could indicate that lower cash balances need to be held. 
Similar to my corporate governance variables, dividend payments could also 
indicate that expected agency costs of overinvestment are less prevalent when cash 
has been returned to the investors. My results show strong support for this hypothesis. 
Consistent with Opler et al. (1999), cash holdings increase significantly with an 
increase in the R&D-to-sales ratio. Since R&D spending is a form of investment 
where information asymmetries are most important, my findings also support the 
hypothesis that information asymmetries make it harder to raise outside funds, and 
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thus increases the need for cash holdings. The cash flow riskiness (SIGMA) and the 
regulation dummy do not appear to have any significant influence on cash holdings. 
Having established the relation between corporate governance change and 
corporate cash holdings, I now assess the impact of governance change and excess 
cash holdings on firm valuation. Excess cash holdings are cash reserves held in excess 
of those needed for operations. According to Jensen (1986), such free cash flows in 
excess of operation needs are mostly subject to management’s discretion, and are at 
most risk of being wasted. 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) employ a two-stage method to evaluate the value 
effects of governance on cash reserves. The first-stage regression is based on Opler et 
al. (1999). The residual from the first-stage regression is used to proxy for free cash 
flow. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) hypothesize that better governance leads to a 
more positive effect of excess cash on firm value. They test this hypothesis by 
interacting the corporate governance variable with excess cash, to determine the 
incremental impact on firm value. 
Similar to Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), who employ a two-stage method to 
evaluate the effects of governance on cash reserves, I estimate the optimal cash 
holdings with equations (11), (12) and (13), respectively. Residuals generated from 
these regressions are defined as excess cash (denoted EXCESSCASH) and are used, 
together with governance change and their interaction term, as independent variables 
in the second stage. 
In the second stage, firm value (proxied either by FUTUREQ or by ΔQ) is 
regressed on ΔSCORE, SCORE, EXCESSCASH, and the interaction terms of the 
excess cash and the governance variables, controlling for other relevant variables 
included in the firm value regressions discussed in Table 17, Section 5.2.1. 
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Specifically, the following equations describe the second stage of the firm value 
estimation: 






































where Qit+1 is denoted as FUTUREQ and used as a dependent variable. The results are 
reported in Columns (1) to (6). I also repeat the same procedures using ΔQ, namely 
the difference between FUTUREQ and Q, as an alternative valuation measure. The 
results are reported in Columns (7) to (12). When ΔQ is the dependent variable, Q is 
dropped from the right-hand side of the equations, while the other independent 
variables remain unchanged as in equations (14) and (15), respectively. In total, 12 
models are estimated and the results are presented in Table 22 [labeled (1) to (12)]. 
EXCESSCASH in models labeled (1), (2), (7) and (8) refers to the residual obtained 
from equation (11). EXCESSCASH in models (3), (4), (9) and (10) refers to the 
residual obtained from equation (12). EXCESSCASH in models (5), (6), (11) and (12) 
refers to the residuals obtained from equation (13). 
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Table 22: Determinants of firm value: OLS regressions of FUTUREQ or ΔQ on ΔSCORE, SCORE, EXCESSCASH, 
ΔSCORE *EXCESSCASH and SCORE*EXCESSCASH, ownership and/or firm characteristics variables 
Variable FUTUREQ FUTUREQ FUTUREQ FUTUREQ FUTUREQ FUTUREQ  ΔQ  ΔQ  ΔQ  ΔQ   ΔQ   ΔQ  
Stage 2 （1） (2) （3） （4） （5） （6） （7） (8) （9） （10） （11） （12） 
Constant -0.415 -0.061 -0.384 -0.032 -0.406 0.053 -3.609 -4.960 -3.516 -4.867 -3.517 -4.596 
 (-0.302) (-0.044) (-0.283) (-0.023) (-0.291) (0.040) (-1.357) (-1.613) (-1.345) (-1.617) (-1.309) (-1.564) 
Q 0.482*** 0.481*** 0.482*** 0.481*** 0.483*** 0.481*** - - - - - - 
 (11.216) (10.853) (11.231) (10.868) (11.320) (10.879) - - - - - - 
ΔSCORE 0.018*** 0.018** 0.019*** 0.019** 0.018*** 0.019** 0.028** 0.029** 0.030** 0.031** 0.029** 0.031*** 
 (2.729) (2.466) (2.769) (2.509) (2.773) (2.488) (2.251) (2.483) (2.317) (2.586) (2.315) (2.633) 
SCORE -0.005 -0.005 -0.005** -0.006* -0.005** -0.006** -0.002 -0.00001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
 (-1.555) (-1.296) (-2.387) (-1.732) (-2.349) (-2.021) (-0.947) (-0.002) (-1.371) (-0.496) (-1.290) (-1.018) 
EXESSCASH -7.826** -7.791** -7.691** -7.669** -7.321** -7.333** -19.397*** -21.232*** -19.395*** -21.210*** -19.859*** -21.469*** 
 (-2.174) (-2.123) (-2.161) (-2.113) (-2.001) (-1.998) (-3.154) (-3.221) (-3.183) (-3.231) (-3.002) (-3.233) 
ΔSCORE *EXCESSCASH 0.074 0.074 0.082* 0.084* 0.091** 0.089** 0.345*** 0.354*** 0.353*** 0.363*** 0.353*** 0.368*** 
 (1.445) (1.504) (1.837) (1.915) (2.258) (2.174) (3.717) (3.573) (4.081) (3.835) (4.501) (4.165) 
SCORE*EXCESSCASH 0.111** 0.111** 0.108** 0.108** 0.101** 0.102** 0.263*** 0.289*** 0.262*** 0.288*** 0.267*** 0.292*** 
 (2.158) (2.138) (2.150) (2.14) (1.982) (2.000) (3.380) (3.451) (3.434) (3.477) (3.167) (3.464) 
INSIDE - -0.873** - -0.872** - -0.955** - -0.115 - -0.112 - -0.350 
 - (-2.000) - (-1.997) - (-2.202) - (-0.103) - (-0.100) - (-0.335) 
BLOCK - 0.391** - 0.405** - 0.371** - 0.285 - 0.328 - 0.236 
 - (2.121) - (2.191) - (2.024) - (0.975) - (1.100) - (1.019) 
INST - -0.283 - -0.298 - -0.334 - 1.724*** - 1.680*** - 1.580*** 
 - (-1.037) - (-1.106) - (-1.365) - (3.412) - (3.436) - (3.898) 
FSIZE 0.385 0.324 0.385 0.324 0.386 0.312 1.107 1.132* 1.102 1.130* 1.082 1.082 
 (1.308) (1.167) (1.300) (1.158) (1.260) (1.108) (1.600) (1.662) (1.588) (1.650) (1.516) (1.560) 
FSIZE2 -0.022 -0.019 -0.022 -0.019 -0.022 -0.019 -0.063 -0.061 -0.062 -0.061 -0.061 -0.058 
 (-1.230) (-1.169) (-1.223) (-1.162) (-1.181) (-1.107) (-1.495) (-1.534) (-1.486) (-1.525) (-1.409) (-1.425) 
K/S -0.133** -0.156** -0.135** -0.158** -0.135** -0.159** 0.161 0.206 0.158 0.200 0.163 0.197 
 (-2.362) (-2.398) (-2.365) (-2.412) (-2.364) (-2.471) (1.120) (1.292) (1.093) (1.263) (1.130) (1.271) 
(K/S)2 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
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Variable FUTUREQ FUTUREQ FUTUREQ FUTUREQ FUTUREQ FUTUREQ  ΔQ  ΔQ  ΔQ  ΔQ   ΔQ   ΔQ  
Stage 2 （1） (2) （3） （4） （5） （6） （7） (8) （9） （10） （11） （12） 
 (2.653) (2.769) (2.657) (2.783) (2.695) (2.840) (-1.008) (-1.084) (-0.989) (-1.058) (-1.030) (-1.074) 
Y/S 0.466** 0.522*** 0.480** 0.538*** 0.496** 0.544*** -1.389** -1.213** -1.357** -1.172** -1.320** -1.161** 
 (2.383) (3.011) (2.437) (3.092) (2.480) (3.067) (-2.340) (-2.465) (-2.336) (-2.446) (-2.347) (-2.398) 
RDUM 0.036 0.043 0.036 0.044 0.035 0.042 -0.058 -0.068 -0.058 -0.066 -0.056 -0.066 
 (0.943) (1.281) (1.007) (1.407) (0.969) (1.302) (-0.492) (-0.732) (-0.517) (-0.770) (-0.505) (-0.736) 
R&D/K -0.130 -0.141 -0.127 -0.138 -0.120 -0.140 -0.902** -0.747** -0.897** -0.740** -0.892** -0.763** 
 (-0.413) (-0.458) (-0.405) (-0.451) (-0.383) (-0.452) (-2.262) (-1.981) (-2.250) (-1.967) (-2.266) (-2.034) 
INV_OPP -0.106 -0.108 -0.113 -0.116 -0.113 -0.118 -1.263*** -1.057*** -1.281*** -1.080*** -1.272*** -1.084*** 
 (-1.033) (-1.063) (-1.050) (-1.089) (-1.071) (-1.096) (-4.567) (-4.440) (-4.447) (-4.325) (-4.461) (-4.224) 
EXT_FIN -0.004** -0.004 -0.004* -0.004 -0.004* -0.004 -0.029* -0.038*** -0.029* -0.038*** -0.030* -0.038*** 
 (-2.019) (-1.628) (-1.818) (-1.538) (-1.736) (-1.529) (-1.786) (-3.353) (-1.763) (-3.226) (-1.935) (-3.340) 
no. of obs 511 511 511 511 511 511 511 511 511 511 511 511 
Adj. R2 0.7157 0.7173 0.7155 0.7171 0.7146 0.7165 0.2453 0.2673 0.2449 0.2667 0.2490 0.2673 
In Stage 1, EXCESSCASH is estimated as the residual from equation (11), (12) or (13). EXCESSCASH in models labeled (1), (2), (7) and (8) is the 
residual from equation (11). EXCESSCASH in models labeled (3), (4), (9) and (10) is the residual from equation (12). EXCESSCASH in models 
labeled (5), (6), (11) and (12) is the residual from equation (13). In stage 2, FUTUREQ are evaluated with equation (14) or equation (15), and are 
labeled from (1) to (6) in Raw 2. The other six models labeled (7) to (12) replace FUTUREQ with ΔQ as the dependent variable in Stage 2. The 
values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each variable are given in Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are included for all 
regressions, but not reported. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and *** refers to 
significance at the 1 percent level. 
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In the first six columns of Table 22, I present the impact of the governance level 
and change on the following year’s value of excess cash. I find that both higher 
corporate governance rankings and improvements in corporate governance increase 
the value of cash holdings. The estimates of the coefficients on the interaction 
variable between excess cash and the change in corporate governance are positive and 
significant for all the model specifications, except for models (1) and (2). The 
estimates of the coefficients on the interaction variable between excess cash and the 
corporate governance level are positive and significant for all the model specifications. 
To interpret these estimates, consider a firm with one dollar in excess cash. In this 
case, the coefficient on the interaction of ΔSCORE (SCORE) and EXCESSCASH is 
zero if the governance change (level) has no impact on the value of the dollar. My 
results show that the value-destroying effects of the excess cash holdings are reduced 
if the firm has better governance and/or improvement in governance. This is 
consistent with the finding in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) that the market value 
of excess cash reserves is reduced when firms are poorly governed. 
The relative size of the estimates of the coefficients on excess cash alone, and on 
the interaction term of excess cash and governance change indicates that a one-point 
increase in the corporate governance score, offsets the marginal negative impact of 
excess cash on firm value by about 1%. The positive effect of the governance level on 
the value of excess cash is greater than that of governance change. However, as the 
governance level itself affects firm value negatively, the positive effect of governance 
the level on excess holdings may not necessarily mean that better governance will 
enhance the firm value in aggregate. The estimates on ΔSCORE alone are positive 
and significant as predicted. I also find that the estimates on EXCESSCASH are 
negative and significant for all the model specifications, supporting the free cash flow 
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argument documented in Jensen (1986). 
My results are robust for the excess cash holdings measures obtained using 
different models described in Stage 1, and are robust with or without ownership 
variables as the independent variables used in stage 2. Regarding control variables, 
firms with more tangible assets and more external financing needs have lower Tobin’s 
Q, but firms with higher operating income have higher Tobin’s Q. The other control 
variables remain insignificant. 
My findings with regard to the impact of governance change on the value of 
excess cash holdings, when ΔQ is employed as the dependent variable, are also robust 
to different model specifications. The predictors of the change in Tobin’s Q differ 
from those of the level of Q. Firms with higher institutional ownership are associated 
with larger increases in Q. Higher operating income, higher R&D spending, higher 
investment opportunities and higher external financing needs, seem to reduce the firm 
value below the current level. 
Generally, my findings in Stage 1 support the prediction that improvements in 
corporate governance and not the level of corporate governance, play an important 
role in preventing managers from stockpiling large cash reserves. The residuals from 
the first stage regressions are defined as excess cash holdings to measure the firm’s 
free cash flow. The results from Stage 2 regressions consistently suggest that both 
corporate governance level and change add value to the firm when excess cash is 
available, and these results are robust to different model specifications. Since my 
analyses in this section are entirely based on OLS estimations, I do not address any 




5.2.4 Analysis of the Relationship among Corporate Governance, Free Cash 
Flow and Firm Value, Using Simultaneous Equations System 
Himmelberg (2002) discusses the difficulty of inferring causality from correlation, 
and proposes to use structural econometric models to study the real effects of corporate 
governance on firm performance. Among others, Himmelberg et al. (2002) and Coles et 
al. (2003) employ quantitative models to address the endogeneity issues. 
Coles et al. (2003) construct a structural model to evaluate whether commonly used 
econometric approaches, such as using control variables, fixed effects, and simultaneous 
equations, are able to fully address the endogeneity issues. Their empirical findings cast 
doubt on the overall effectiveness of such remedies. Specifically, they show that (1) 
using firm size (assets), leverage, R&D expense, advertising expense, or industry to 
proxy for the unobserved structural productivity parameters, is unlikely to eliminate 
serious specification problems; (2) inclusion of fixed effects controls for the 
endogeneity problem to some extent but is far from a complete solution; and (3) 
inferences are sensitive to small change in regressions and simultaneous equations 
approach may fail to fully address the endogeneity issues. 
Most empirical studies of governance mechanisms focus on cross-sectional analyses. 
My thesis directly examines instances in which changes in corporate governance are 
observed. It departs from the existing reliance on reduced form analyses to relate 
governance to firm value. I investigate whether changes in corporate governance lead to 
future changes in firm value. Therefore the more difficult measurement of the changes 
in governance mechanisms due to past changes in firm performance is avoided. 
Coles et al. (2003) show that when the system is instrumented with a somewhat 
arbitrary approach, it gives rise to a specification issue. Therefore one needs to be 
cautious regarding the choice of both the specification and the estimator of the 
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simultaneous equation system. I try to employ a more complete set of control 
mechanisms within my simultaneous equation system to minimize the possibility of 
omitted variable bias. I also control for fixed effects when estimating the system. These 
features of the experimental setting mitigate the problem of endogeneity to a certain 
extent. I perform Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests on the endogenous variables. These tests 
allow me to assess the extent to which endogeneity is a quantitative problem in my 
sample. 
In Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), a system of seven mechanisms is used to 
examine the interaction of different governance devices and their impact on firm 
value. The endogenous variables comprise shareholdings of insiders, institutions, 
large shareholders, use of outside directors, debt policy, the managerial labor market, 
and the market for corporate control. While I adopt a similar approach to Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), my model differs in several respects. First, I include a 
comprehensive governance measure using the corporate governance score. Second, I 
control for unobserved heterogeneity with fixed effects in the simultaneous analysis. 
While fixed effects and instrument variables are alternative approaches to dealing 
with endogeneity, using them together may further mitigate the endogeneity problem.6 
Third, since the presence of outsiders on the board has already been captured in the 
governance score, I exclude this variable from the equation system. As the focus of 
my study relates to internal control, the managerial labor market and the market for 
corporate control are beyond the scope of this study, and hence are also excluded. 
Finally, as the earlier results suggest that corporate governance change may affect 
firm value by reducing the negative effect of free cash flow, free cash flow therefore 
becomes an important element in the system of governance and firm valuation. 
                                                 
6 On the other hand, as discussed earlier, changes in governance may have a greater impact on 
performance than the level of governance itself. 
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Moreover, Jensen (1986) finds that the higher a firm’s free cash flow, the higher the 
desired level of corporate governance, all else being equal. 
 
Relationships among the Control Mechanisms 
The five governance mechanisms that I analyze comprise the corporate 
governance score (SCORE), shareholdings of insiders (INSIDE), institutions (INST), 
blockholders (BLOCK), and debt policy (D/V), all of which are endogenously 
determined. Another endogenous variable included is the firm’s cash holdings 
(CASH). In the first part of this analysis, I estimate six equations using these six 
endogenous variables to determine the interrelations among the control mechanisms, 
as well as their interaction with the firm’s cash holdings. I introduce firm value into 
this equation system in the second part of the study. In estimating the simultaneous 
equation system, I adopt the following variables as instruments: FSIZE, ADR, REG, 
OUTDIRE, TENURE, NOD, RISK, RDA, RDAI, NINSTI, CR, COLLATERAL, 
TAXSHIELD, CASHFLOW, WC, SIGMA, DIV_D, and CPEX. They are measured 
as follows: 
FSIZE: the natural logarithm of sales; 
ADR: a dummy variable equal to one if a firm trades ADRs on a major U.S. exchange 
(NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ), and zero otherwise; 
REG: one for a firm in a regulated industry, viz. public utility, railroad (i.e., primary 
2-digit SIC code=40, 48, 49, 60, 61 or 63), and zero otherwise; 
OUTDIRE: average number of directorships held by non-executive directors in 
unaffiliated firms;  
TENURE: average number of years directors have stayed on the board; 
NOD: total number of directors; 
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RISK: the standard deviation of idiosyncratic stock price risk (calculated as the 
standard error of the residuals from a CAPM model estimated using daily data for the 
period covered by the annual sample); 
RDA: the ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets; 
RDAI: average RDA for the 2-digit SIC industry of the firm; 
NINSTI: average number of institutional owners for the 2-digit SIC industry of the 
firm; 
CR: the operating cash flow return on firm value = OCF/V 
where 
V = total liabilities + preferred capital + market value of equity; 
OCF = sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general and administrative expense + 
depreciation; 
COLLATERAL: collateral value of assets, measured by the ratio of inventory to total 
assets; 
TAXSHIELD: non-debt tax shield, measured by the ratio of depreciation to earnings 
before depreciation; 
CASHFLOW: cash flow ratio, defined as earnings before interest and taxes, but 
before depreciation and amortization less interest, taxes and common dividends, 
divided by net assets, and where net assets are assets net of cash; 
WC: net working capital, which is current assets net of cash minus current liabilities 
divided by net assets; 
SIGMA: the firm’s standard deviation of the cash flow ratio (CASHFLOW) from year 
1994 to year 2002; 
DIV_D: equal to one if the firm paid a dividend in the year, and zero, otherwise; 
CPEX: capital expenditure divided by net assets. 
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To satisfy the order condition which ensures that the equations in the simultaneous 
equation system are identified, each equation must exclude at least five of the 
exogenous variables. The specifications of equations (16) to (21) given below are 
therefore partially driven by the need to satisfy this condition. Inasmuch as possible, 
my model specification attempts to link these constraints to existing theory or prior 
research to determine the exogenous variables included or excluded in the equation 














































In the equation system, SCORE is assumed to be positively correlated with firm 
size, the ADR dummy, as well as an external director’s value, measured by the 
average number of directorships held by non-executive directors in unaffiliated firms. 
This is because larger firms and firms issuing ADR may have more channels for 
disclosure. External directors who hold other positions as directors in unaffiliated 
firms are likely to be experienced professionals, and are as such likely to encourage 
firms to comply with higher standards of governance. On the other hand, if these 
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directors have too many outside directorships, they may exert less effort on one 
particular firm due mostly to time constraints. Hence the reverse may also hold true. 
Regulated firms may have different disclosure requirements, which are captured using 
the REG dummy. Following Agrawl and Knoeber (1996), I expect insider 
shareholdings to be positively correlated with a director’s average number of years of 
service and the number of directors but negatively correlated with firm risk, 
regulation and firm size. I exclude the FOUNDER dummy presented in Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), as the majority of firms in my sample are mature large firms and do 
not have founders holding key positions. 
In equation (18) of the system, I examine the relation with blockholdings as the 
dependent endogenous variable. I include a similar set of exogenous variables as 
those included in the equation of insider shareholdings, except that TENURE and 
NOD are replaced with RDAI. The directions of coefficients are similar to those for 
INSIDE. Moreover, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that technology becomes 
more firm-specific when the industry average ratio of R&D to asset ratio increases, 
making outside monitoring less effective. Therefore, I expect a negative coefficient 
for RDAI. The choice of the explanatory variables for INST closely follows Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996). I expect larger firms and firms issuing ADRs in the U.S., to be 
more attractive investments for institutions. NINSTI is used in Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) as an additional measure of attractiveness to institutions. However, I do not 
expect to observe a positive relationship between INST and NINSTI, because I 
compute institutional shareholdings by summing the institutional shareholdings that 
are larger than 3%. As the number of institutions in the industry increases, the 
proportional shareholdings of each institution may, in fact, decrease, which may result 
in a spurious negative relationship between INST and NINSTI. This argument is also 
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applicable to ADR and FSIZE. When one firm has a large number of institutions, 
some of these institutions may hold less than 3% of the firm’s shares, and 
subsequently their holdings are not included in INST. Since generally NINSTI, ADR 
and FSIZE are positively correlated, the negative association between NINSTI and 
INST may correspondingly lead to a negative relation between INST and ADR, and 
also a negative relation between INST and FSIZE. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that D/V should be positively related to firm 
size, as the expected bankruptcy costs of debt should be smaller for larger firms. They 
also postulate a negative relation with REG and CR since regulation reduces agency 
problems, and the adequacy of internal funds reduces the need to finance debt. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examine the influence of other variables such as the 
collateral value of assets, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shield, and the volatility 
of cash flow as determinants of debt ratio, which they find to be insignificant. In my 
study, however, I include the collateral value of assets (COLLATERAL) and 
non-debt tax shield (TAXSHIELD) in my model specifications. Firms with more 
property that can be used as collateral are likely to issue more debt, indicating a 
positive relationship between D/V and COLLATERAL. On the contrary, firms with 
less collateralizable assets may choose higher debt levels as a mechanism to limit 
their managers’ consumption of perquisites. As to which impact dominates, it is 
essentially an empirical question. Tax deduction for depreciation substitutes for the 
tax benefits of debt financing. As a result, firms with large non-debt tax shields 
relative to their expected cash flow, include less debt in their capital structures. 
Equation (21) relates to the firm’s cash holdings. Definitions for CASHFLOW, 
WC, SIGMA, DIV_D, REG, and CPEX are according to that for equation (12). I 
rename FEALSIZE to FSIZE and R&D/S to RDA to keep the variable acronyms 
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consistent with all other variables used in the various equations within the equation 
system. I exclude INV_OPP because in Stage 2, I will incorporate Tobin’s Q as an 
endogenous variable into the model as Tobin’s Q is a better measure of growth than 
INV_OPP.7 
Table 23 shows the results of the 2SLS estimation for the fixed effects 
specification.8 Since REG and SIGMA are constant over time for every firm, these 
variables are excluded from the fixed effects model. Governance disclosure and 
blockholdings are found to have a substitutive relationship. Decrease in insider 
shareholdings and increase in institutional shareholdings will lead to improvement in 
governance disclosure, but SCORE does not significantly affect INSIDE and INST. 
Improvements in governance result in a higher level of debt in the firm. CASH is 
found to be significant and positively related to SCORE, implying that an increase in 
the firm’s cash holdings increases the need for additional monitoring as reflected in 
the improvement in corporate governance. 
Table 23: Coefficient estimates from 2SLS regressions of 
control mechanisms (fixed effects) 
Panel A Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables SCORE INSIDE BLOCK 
CONSTANT 60.647*** 0.056 0.021 
 (10.154) (0.270) (0.261) 
SCORE - 0.001 -0.002* 
 - (0.292) (-1.914) 
INSIDE -20.876** - 0.587 
 (-2.058) - (1.486) 
BLOCK -24.672* 0.083 - 
 (-1.675) (0.292) - 
INST 62.051*** 0.149 1.423*** 
 (2.669) (0.239) (3.075) 
D/V -1.636 0.014 0.167** 
 (-0.450) (0.158) (2.105) 
CASH 6.252* -0.020 0.163*** 
 (1.816) (-0.216) (3.685) 
FSIZE -1.387** -0.022*** -0.004 
 (-2.481) (-2.779) (-0.335) 
ADR -3.869*** - - 
                                                 
7 While INV_OPP is the past sales growth measure, Tobin’s Q is a forward looking measure of future 
growth opportunities. 
8 The results of the 2SLS estimation for the pooled data without fixed effects are presented in 
Appendix 9. 
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 (-5.480) - - 
OUTDIRE 0.543*** - - 
 (5.270) - - 
TENURE - 0.006** - 
 - (2.167) - 
NOD - 0.002 - 
 - (1.221) - 
RISK - -0.298** 0.365 
 - (-2.457) (1.313) 
RDAI - - -0.428*** 
  - - (-2.816) 
Panel B Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables INST D/V CASH 
CONSTANT -0.023 -0.119 0.749 
 (-0.210) (-0.262) (1.221) 
SCORE 0.002 0.008*** -0.002 
 (1.422) (2.599) (-0.212) 
INSIDE -0.206 -0.861 -1.935 
 (-0.826) (-0.586) (-1.190) 
BLOCK 0.462** 1.485** 1.662 
 (2.448) (2.391) (1.101) 
INST - -2.499*** -2.272 
 - (-4.194) (-1.169) 
D/V -0.116*** - -1.168* 
 (-4.052) - (-1.886) 
CASH -0.098*** -0.811*** - 
 (-3.169) (-4.941) - 
FSIZE 0.006 0.026 -0.029 
 (0.758) (0.730) (-0.578) 
ADR 0.025** - - 
 (2.481) - - 
NINSTI 0.000 - - 
 (0.538) - - 
CR - -0.088 - 
 - (-1.222) - 
COLLATERAL - -0.207* - 
 - (-1.675) - 
TAXSHIELD - 0.006*** - 
 - (2.618) - 
CASHFLOW - - 0.051 
 - - (0.188) 
WC - - -0.230* 
 - - (-1.817) 
DIV_D - - 0.033 
 - - (0.526) 
RDA - - -0.294 
 - - (-0.133) 
CPEX - - 0.008 
 - - (0.175) 
Adjusted R2 0.851 0.200 0.363 
no. of obs. 630 630 630 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Variables are defined in Appendix 4. 
Year dummies and firm fixed effects are included for all regressions, but not 
reported. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to 
significance at the 5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 
percent level. 
 
The coefficients on the exogenous variables generally have the predicted sign and 
usually are significant at normal levels. When external directors’ directorship 
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increases, governance disclosure improves accordingly. Once larger firms and firms 
issuing ADR reach a higher governance score, they are less likely to show further 
improvement as these firms may have already aligned their governance levels with the 
highest disclosure standards. 
In equation (17), I find that with the increase in firm size, insider ownership 
reduces accordingly. The estimate for RISK is negative as expected in equations (17). 
RDAI is significantly negative in equation (18), suggesting that, when the industry’s 
R&D ratio increases, the firm becomes less attractive to block shareholders. 
Next, I include ΔSCORE into the equation system. ΔSCORE is added as an 
independent variable in equations (16) to (21) while, in the seventh equation, 
ΔSCORE is the dependent variable. The seventh equation in the equation system is 











The estimates of the 2SLS for equations (16) to (22) are presented in Table 24. 
Consistent with the findings in the OLS model in Section 5.1.2, a change in 
governance score is positively associated with insider ownership but negatively 
associated with the age of firm as well as changes in firm size and risk. Under the 
2SLS the previously low value measured by Q(-1) is now found to be associated with 
the future improvements in governance, supporting the hypothesis that low value 
requires additional monitoring. The coefficient on the dummy variable of CEO 
change changes the sign but remains insignificant. 
As expected, an increase in governance score is found to result in higher 
governance scores. Changes in the corporate governance score are also found to affect 
insider ownership and blockholdings positively, but are negatively related to the 
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firm’s debt ratio. 
Table 24: Coefficient estimates from 2SLS regressions of the 
control mechanisms including ΔSCORE 
Panel A Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables ΔSCORE SCORE INSIDE BLOCK 
CONSTANT -1.962 53.965*** 0.340*** 0.772*** 
 (-0.306) (17.823) (18.121) (4.411) 
ΔSCORE - 0.376*** 0.003*** 0.011*** 
 - (11.806) (14.325) (2.606) 
SCORE 0.192 - -0.004*** -0.012*** 
 (1.291) - (-12.122) (-6.844) 
INSIDE 9.865*** -39.141*** - -0.500** 
 (2.862) (-7.404) - (-2.173) 
BLOCK 15.195 -47.937*** -0.115*** - 
 (1.055) (-10.614) (-4.189) - 
INST -20.787 40.845*** -0.083*** 0.455** 
 (-1.494) (20.778) (-7.310) (2.359) 
D/V -4.182 2.443*** -0.062*** 0.080 
 (-1.134) (2.942) (-6.113) (0.904) 
CASH -1.527 -0.896 -0.079*** -0.103* 
 (-0.768) (-0.483) (-5.354) (-1.671) 
REG - 1.479*** -0.038*** 0.024 
 - (8.846) (-8.359) (0.640) 
FSIZE - 0.099 -0.013*** -0.009 
 - (0.342) (-19.252) (-0.830) 
ADR - 1.639*** - - 
 - (7.377) - - 
OUTDIRE - -0.030 - - 
 - (-0.116) - - 
TENURE - - 0.004*** - 
 - - (7.692) - 
NOD - - -0.002*** - 
 - - (-6.134) - 
RISK - - 0.918*** 2.790*** 
 - - (3.752) (8.880) 
RDAI - - - -0.146 
 - - - (-1.091) 
ΔFSIZE -2.748*** - - - 
 (-5.125) - - - 
AGE -0.043*** - - - 
 (-3.216) - - - 
ΔRDA -22.329 - - - 
 (-1.327) - - - 
Q(-1) -0.029*** - - - 
 (-3.453) - - - 
ΔRISK -44.988*** - - - 
 (-3.274) - - - 
NEWCEO 0.044 - - - 
 (0.070) - - - 
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.996 0.319 0.061 
no. of obs. 462 462 462 462 
Panel B Dependent Variable   
Independent Variables INST D/V CASH  
CONSTANT 0.318*** 0.077 0.586  
 (4.406) (0.205) (1.185)  
ΔSCORE -0.002 -0.011*** -0.005  
 (-0.730) (-7.019) (-0.721)  
SCORE 0.002** 0.005** 0.003  
 (2.255) (1.995) (0.404)  
INSIDE -0.162*** -0.393* 0.312**  
 (-4.204) (-1.655) (2.261)  
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BLOCK 0.438*** 0.892*** -0.031  
 (4.860) (2.945) (-0.091)  
INST - -0.807*** -0.572***  
 - (-4.580) (-4.185)  
D/V -0.119* - 0.136  
 (-1.842) - (0.308)  
CASH -0.116*** -0.545*** -  
 (-5.609) (-7.257) -  
REG -0.062*** -0.022 -0.079***  
 (-14.999) (-1.081) (-3.034)  
FSIZE -0.019*** -0.019 -0.034***  
 (-4.682) (-0.966) (-5.284)  
ADR -0.009* - -  
 (-1.774) - -  
NINSTI -0.000*** - -  
 (-5.682) - -  
CR - 0.013 -  
 - (0.602) -  
COLLATERAL - -0.112*** -  
 - (-16.359) -  
TAXSHIELD - 0.001 -  
 - (0.436) -  
CASHFLOW - - 0.203***  
 - - (2.607)  
WC - - -0.108*  
 - - (-1.875)  
SIGMA - - 0.000  
 - - (0.076)  
DIV_D - - -0.159***  
 - - (-7.527)  
RDA - - 2.413***  
 - - (2.750)  
CPEX - - 0.006  
 - - (0.719)  
Adjusted R2 0.388 0.249 0.095  
no. of obs. 462 462 462  
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each variable are 
given in Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are included for all 
regressions, but not reported. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; 
** refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and *** refers to significance 
at the 1 percent level.  
 
Firm Value and the Control Mechanisms 
In this section, I investigate the relationship between the corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm value from my second stage analysis. Based on Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), I control for R&D expenditure and firm size, and I expect R&D 
expenditure to indicate growth opportunities and hence be positively related to Q. 
Since Q should be lower for larger firms, I also control for firm size in my model. 
Equation (23) is added to the equation system comprising equations (16) to (21). Q is 
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  (23) 
To accommodate the fact that there is a time lag between governance and firm 
value, I estimate the equation system using the contemporaneous Q as the value 
measure, and later repeat the estimation with the following year’s Tobin’s Q 
(FUTUREQ) as the firm value measure. In addition to treating Q (FUTUREQ) and all 
the governance mechanisms and CASH as endogenous, and estimating the model 
using 2SLS, I also estimate Q (FUTUREQ) using OLS, treating all the other variables 
as exogenous for comparison purposes. To further control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity and to explore the impact of changes in the governance scores on firm 
value, the models are estimated with firm fixed effects, the results of which are 
presented in Table 25.9  
Similar to the findings in Section 5.2.1 with panel data, the OLS estimate of 
SCORE suggests a positive effect of governance disclosure on the firm’s future value, 
implying that an improvement in governance disclosure is reflected in firm value, 
with a lag. Since the correlation between Q and SCORE for OLS is positive but 
insignificant, it provides further evidence that a time lag exists between governance 
improvement and value increase. The findings for control mechanisms are similar in 
both the Q and FUTUREQ regressions, with results showing that both models result 
in estimates having the same signs, except that for BLOCK and D/V, the estimates 
become insignificant in the FUTUREQ regression. 
 
 
                                                 
9 For the pooled specification, both OLS and 2SLS results for equation (23) are shown in Appendix 
10. 
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Table 25: Coefficient estimates from OLS and 2SLS regressions 
of Q or FURTUREQ on control mechanisms (fixed effects) 
  OLS Estimates 2SLS Estimates OLS Estimates 2SLS Estimates 
Independent 
Variables Q Q FUTUREQ FUTUREQ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT 24.192*** 18.467** 10.064*** 4.995*** 
 (4.994) (2.155) (5.068) (3.274) 
SCORE 0.008 0.044 0.011*** 0.081* 
 (0.741) (0.282) (3.162) (1.892) 
INSIDE -0.989 35.652 -0.033 16.039 
 (-1.083) (0.925) (-0.045) (1.427) 
BLOCK 0.569 -44.936** 0.685 -11.400 
 (0.317) (-2.295) (1.405) (-1.333) 
INST -7.677* 13.144 -2.511 0.111 
 (-1.668) (0.819) (-1.535) (0.014) 
D/V 5.627*** 9.454*** 2.812*** 3.944 
 (2.589) (4.169) (3.224) (1.006) 
CASH 3.825*** 8.538** 1.330*** 1.128 
 (4.513) (2.016) (3.046) (0.502) 
RDA -2.419** 0.964 4.976 9.437 
 (-2.536) (0.169) (1.463) (1.165) 
FSIZE -2.954*** -2.252*** -1.193*** -0.938*** 
 (-4.501) (-3.267) (-4.108) (-3.321) 
Adjusted R2 0.455 0.070 0.490 0.273 
no. of obs. 636 630 631 625 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Variables are defined in Appendix 4. Year 
dummies and firm fixed effects are included for all regressions, but not reported. * 
refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 percent 
level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
To further control for the endogeneity problem, I now refer to the 2SLS estimates 
shown in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 25. When controlling for fixed effects, the 
evidence for future value is consistent with the optimal choice of all the control 
mechanisms, with the exception of corporate governance change. Regarding current Q, 
Column 2 shows that while the corporate governance score is optimally chosen, block 
ownership, use of debt and cash holdings are not. 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is run to test whether SCORE is endogenously 
affected by Q (FUTUREQ). In the first stage, I regress SCORE on all the instruments 
and other exogenous control variables, and obtain the residual and predicted SCORE 
from this regression. In the second stage, I regress Q (FUTUREQ) on the predicted 
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SCORE, control variables and the residual term. A significant coefficient on the 
residual is the evidence of endogeneity. The coefficient on the residual term is -0.002 
(0.006) with t-value of 0.868 (0.139) for Q (FUTUREQ). As the coefficients on both 
of the first stage residuals are insignificant, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity. 
I then regress Q or FURTUREQ against governance score change and also control 
the past value of the firm as measured by Q(-1) for Q, and Q for FUTUREQ, 
respectively; specifically, this means replacing equation (23) with equation (24). The 
other equations in the system are equations (16) to (22). There are altogether eight 
endogenous variables, namely, Q, ΔSCORE, SCORE, INSIDE, BLOCK, INST, D/V, 
and CASH in this equation system. When the dependent variable is FURTUREQ, 







  (24) 
The results for the simultaneous equation system are presented in Table 26. The 
estimates for ΔSCORE are statistically insignificant in all three models, except for the 
OLS estimate for future value. This result corroborates my previous findings that a 
time lag is necessary for governance change to take effect. With respect to the 2SLS 
results, since the estimates for ΔSCORE are insignificant, it suggests that governance 
changes are optimally chosen for both the current and future value. Besides ΔSCORE, 
the 2SLS estimates for all the other governance mechanisms are not significant for 
FUTUREQ. The results also suggest that all the control mechanisms are appropriately 
chosen when governance change is incorporated into the model. However, this is not 
the case when Q is used as the value measure. The variables in the equation system 
show that SCORE, INSIDE, and BLOCK have a negative effect on current firm 
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value. 
Table 26: Coefficient estimates from OLS and 2SLS 
regressions of Q or FURTUREQ on control mechanisms 
including ΔSCORE 
  OLS Estimates 2SLS Estimates OLS Estimates 2SLS Estimates 
Independent 
Variables Q Q FUTUREQ FUTUREQ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT 1.350*** 3.535** 1.157*** -0.346 
 (4.170) (1.998) (8.687) (-0.266) 
ΔSCORE -0.006 0.040 0.012* -0.001 
 (-0.732) (1.014) (1.697) (-0.035) 
SCORE -0.002 -0.045* -0.006 0.026 
 (-0.840) (-1.906) (-1.546) (1.488) 
INSIDE -0.665** -3.250** -0.534*** 1.121 
 (-2.143) (-2.043) (-4.997) (0.904) 
BLOCK -0.339 -2.994* 0.358 1.432 
 (-0.646) (-1.953) (1.468) (1.307) 
INST -0.376 1.680 -0.254 -2.351 
 (-1.039) (0.864) (-1.042) (-1.624) 
D/V -1.036** -0.861 -0.723 -0.895 
 (-2.254) (-0.672) (-1.025) (-0.842) 
CASH -1.573** -1.065 -0.977 0.076 
 (-2.369) (-1.226) (-1.217) (0.139) 
Q - - 0.478*** 0.455*** 
 - - (11.436) (20.410) 
Q(-1) 0.436*** 0.432*** - - 
 (28.356) (29.197) - - 
RDA 1.574 0.285 1.222 -1.915 
 (1.130) (0.084) (0.422) (-0.722) 
FSIZE 0.020 0.015 0.037 0.026 
 (0.612) (0.207) (1.324) (0.501) 
Adjusted R2 0.843 0.795 0.702 0.618 
no. of obs. 467 462 464 457 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each variable are given in 
Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are included for all regressions, but not 
reported. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at 
the 5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
The findings also show that the control mechanisms are sensitive to the model 
specifications and estimation methods used. Results differ somewhat when results 
from Table 26 are compared to the fixed effects results in Table 25. For instance, D/V 
and CASH change their signs for the OLS estimates with Q as the dependent variable. 
Once again, I run the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to test for the endogeneity of 
ΔSCORE. The coefficients for the residual terms are -0.009 (t-value = 0.094) for Q, 
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and 0.002 (t-value = 0.815) for FUTUREQ. It implies that future Q does not affect 
change in governance, unlike the values of current Q. 
5.3 Summary 
The empirical models used in Section 5.1 indicate the effect of different 
environmental factors on corporate governance evolution. As predicted, an 
improvement in investment opportunities, an increase in external financing needs, 
R&D spending by firms, and an increase in free cash flow, are associated with an 
improvement in corporate governance. When changes in governance scores are 
regressed on firm characteristics, change in firm size, change in risk and firm age are 
found to be negatively associated with changes in score. The coefficient on past 
performance is found to be negative but insignificant. 
The basic findings in Section 5.2 are consistent with my hypothesis that it is the 
improvement in governance that leads to future increase in a firm’s valuation. Even 
though there is still a positive relationship between governance and current value, this 
relationship is not statistically significant. 
Using OLS regressions, I find that improvement in corporate governance plays an 
important role in preventing managers from stockpiling large cash reserves. Moreover, 
when there is excess cash, both corporate governance level and change in corporate 
governance help to mitigate the negative impact of excess cash on firm value. Since 
governance mechanisms, free cash flow and performance may be endogenously 
chosen by a firm, I further employ a 2SLS estimation to analyze the interactions 
among these variables. 
The 2SLS result for the explicit ΔSCORE is consistent with the optimal choice of 
control mechanisms. However, the 2SLS result for SCORE with fixed effects suggests 
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that governance change positively affects future value. This relationship runs from 
governance change to FUTUREQ. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test fails to reject the 
null hypothesis that future value is not endogenous. 
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Chapter 6 
Corporate Governance and Stock Returns 
Earlier, in Section 5.2.3, I showed that the free cash flow problem is mitigated 
when firms improve their corporate governance. Moreover, in Section 5.2.4, based 
upon the results of estimating governance mechanisms, free cash flow and firm value 
in a simultaneous equation system, I find that improvements in corporate governance 
result in an improvement in a firm’s future value, as measured by FUTUREQ. 
In this chapter, I further investigate the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance, measured in terms of stock returns. In Section 6.1 of this 
chapter, I examine whether a trading strategy based on corporate governance yields 
abnormal returns. In Section 6.2, I investigate if the abnormal returns obtained are due 
to mispricing or risk. 
6.1 Abnormal Returns from Trading Strategies on Corporate 
Governance 
According to Gompers et al. (2003), if the impact of corporate governance on firm 
performance is fully incorporated by the market, the stock price should quickly adjust 
to any change in the firm’s governance and, therefore, corporate governance should 
not be relevant to predicting future returns. Gompers et al. (2003), however, find that 
a trading strategy based on their corporate governance index yields abnormal returns 
of 8.5 percent per year. 
In this section, I investigate whether abnormal returns can be earned from a zero 
investment portfolio by holding a long position in good governance or 
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governance-improving firms, and a short position in bad governance or 
governance-deteriorating firms. 
Bauer et al. (2004) construct corporate governance factor portfolios to analyze the 
impact of corporate governance on equity returns and find that over the period from 
January 1997 until July 2002, the equal-weighted returns to a zero investment strategy 
that involves holding a long position in the “good governance portfolio” and a short 
position in the “bad governance portfolio” are 2.1% for the EMU portfolio and 7.1% 
for the U.K. portfolio. Using Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, Bauer et al. (2004) 
find a positive, although statistically insignificant abnormal return for U.K. firms. 
Adopting the approach in Bauer et al. (2004), I form a zero investment portfolio by 
holding a long position in the highest 20% ranked firms and selling the lowest 20% 
ranked firms with each of these portfolios reset every 31 March, over the period from 
2000 to 2003. The London Stock Exchange requires firms to publish their annual 
reports within three months after the end of their respective fiscal year. In my sample, 
682 out of 707 (96.5%) annual reports are available before 1 April of the following 
year, and are, therefore, used to form portfolios at the end of March each year. This 
ensures that corporate governance information is available to the public, and thus 
enables the trading strategy to be employed. Similar to Fama and French (1993), I 
obtain the book-to-market equity (BE/ME) as the book value of common equity for 
the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1, which is divided by the market value of 
equity at the end of December of year t-1. Size (ME) is defined as the market value 
(price times shares outstanding) in March of year t. Unlike Fama and French (1993) 
who adopt the market value in June of year t to measure firm size, in my study, I form 
portfolios in March instead of June. These portfolios are then held from April of year t 
to March of t+1, and the portfolios are then rebalanced. 
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Even though the governance level is important to equity returns, a more 
interesting question is whether a change of governance has any association with stock 
returns. Adopting a similar methodology to construct a zero investment strategy, I 
form portfolios that rank firms on the basis of their one-year change in corporate 
governance ratings. I allocate 20% of firms with the greatest improvement in ratings 
to the “improvement portfolio” and 20% of firms with the largest deterioration in their 
ratings to the “deterioration portfolio”, similarly rebalancing these portfolios in March 
of each year. Calculating equal-weighted portfolio returns for each corporate 
governance portfolio, I find that the average monthly return on the “good governance 
portfolio” minus the “bad governance portfolio” is -0.38% while the average monthly 
return on the “improvement portfolio” minus the “deterioration portfolio” is 0.72%. 
Unlike Bauer et al. (2004), I find that investors, on average, incur losses if their 
trading strategy is based on the level of corporate governance. Bauer et al. (2004), in 
fact, obtain an annual return of 7.1% for U.K. firms over the period January 1997 
until July 2002. This difference is mainly due to the sample period and portfolio 
construction.10 
While a trading strategy based on the level of corporate governance does not 
result in significant abnormal returns, the trading strategy based on the change in 
corporate governance yields an average monthly return of 72 basis points, or about 
8.6% per year, supporting my hypothesis that firms with improved governance scores 
tend to outperform firms with deteriorating governance scores. My results suggest that 
improvements in governance scores are not fully incorporated into stock prices. 
To complement the earlier results, I also investigate the association between the 
governance score (or change in governance score) and the stock returns using all 
                                                 
10 Essentially, Bauer et al. (2004) do not rebalance their portfolio; instead, they use the 2001 ratings to 
assign firms into the appropriate portfolios. In contrast, my portfolios are rebalanced each year using a 
20% cutoff point instead of the 25% used in Bauer et al. (2004). 
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sample observations. I sort the data in ascending order of the corporate governance 
score and further divide them into quintiles. For each governance quintile, I compute 
the average value of governance score (SCORE), the book-to-market ratio (BE/ME), 
size (ME), beta (BETA), and average returns over different holding periods, namely, 
1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 9-month, 1-year, 2-year and 3-year holding periods. 
These results are tabulated in Table 27 below. 
Table 27: Firm characteristics and returns of corporate governance quintile 
portfolios 
Variable 
Q1        
(Low SCORE) Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q5       
(High SCORE) All firms 
Q5-Q1 
Diff. 
SCORE 50.261  57.645 61.251  65.309  73.176  61.577  22.915***
B/M 0.501  0.538 0.761  0.600  0.580  0.601  0.079  
ME 672  320  956  622  586  632  -85  
BETA 0.955  1.057 0.970  1.003  1.100  1.018  0.145* 
1-month -0.004  -0.006 -0.005  -0.006  -0.008  -0.006  -0.004  
3-month -0.010  -0.019 -0.016  -0.020  -0.025  -0.017  -0.015* 
6-month -0.031  -0.045 -0.040  -0.048  -0.061  -0.043  -0.029***
9-month -0.060  -0.072 -0.064  -0.081  -0.100  -0.072  -0.040***
1-year -0.107  -0.112 -0.106  -0.134  -0.161  -0.120  -0.053***
2-year -0.338  -0.282 -0.313  -0.381  -0.408  -0.338  -0.070***
3-year -0.352  -0.355 -0.345  -0.433  -0.513  -0.389  -0.161***
Firms are ranked on corporate governance score, and divided into quintiles. SCORE refers to the 
corporate governance score; BE/ME is defined as the book value of common equity for the fiscal year 
ending in calendar year t-1 divided by the market value of equity at the end of December of year t-1; 
ME is defined as the market value in millions of pounds at the end of March of year t; BETA is the 
firm’s market-model beta coefficient based on 60 consecutive monthly returns ended at the fourth 
month after the end of the firm’s fiscal year; 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 9-month, 1-year, 2-year and 
3-year refer to equal-weighted returns over the 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 9-month, 1-year, 2-year 
and 3-year period, respectively, beginning April of year t. The portfolios are rebalanced in March 
2000, March 2001, March 2002 and March 2003. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** 
refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table 27 shows that the average equal-weighted portfolio returns for the “good 
minus bad” trading strategy, that is, (Q5 – Q1) are consistently negative at all holding 
periods with the magnitude of the returns monotonically increasing in the holding 
period. The returns are furthermore statistically significant at all holding periods 
except for the 1-month holding period. This suggests that buying good governance 
firms and selling bad governance firms results in trading losses. Table 27 also 
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indicates that BETA is significantly higher for good governance quintile Q5 than for 
bad governance quintile Q1 (1.10 vs. 0.96). On the other hand, the two quintiles are 
similar for other firm characteristics such as book-to-market and firm size. 




△SCORE) Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q5 (High 
△SCORE) All firms 
Q5-Q1 
Diff. 
△SCORE -2.943  0.358  2.173  4.497  10.787  3.253  13.730***
B/M 0.501  0.538  0.761  0.600  0.580  0.601  0.079  
ME 672  517  519  680  719  603  47  
BETA 1.054  0.972  1.146  1.029  1.033  1.040  -0.021  
1 month -0.006  -0.004  -0.007  -0.008  -0.002  0.001  0.004* 
3 months -0.022  -0.012  -0.035  -0.024  0.000  -0.022  0.022*** 
6 months -0.057  -0.029  -0.065  -0.051  -0.007  -0.048  0.050*** 
9 months -0.082  -0.037  -0.081  -0.074  -0.010  -0.066  0.072*** 
1 year -0.138  -0.075  -0.128  -0.133  -0.040  -0.115  0.098*** 
2 years -0.310  -0.182  -0.283  -0.306  -0.114  -0.265  0.196*** 
3 years -0.215  -0.094  -0.381  -0.218  0.046  -0.213  0.261*** 
Firms are ranked on corporate governance score change, and divided into quintiles. △SCORE refers 
to the corporate governance score change; BE/ME is defined as the book value of common equity for 
the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1 divided by the market value of equity at the end of 
December of year t-1; ME is defined as the market value in millions of pounds at the end of March of 
year t; BETA is the firm’s market-model beta coefficient based on 60 consecutive monthly returns 
ended at the fourth month after the end of the firm’s fiscal year; 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 9-month, 
1-year, 2-year and 3-year refer to equal-weighted returns over the 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 
9-month, 1-year, 2-year and 3-year period, respectively, beginning April of year t. The portfolios are 
rebalanced in March 2000, March 2001, March 2002 and March 2003. * refers to significance at the 
10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 
percent level. 
 
I also form quintiles by △SCORE, which is the change in corporate governance 
score. The firm characteristics and post-investment returns are reported in Table 28. 
The buy and hold returns for the “improvement minus deterioration” portfolio (Q5 – 
Q1) are positive and significant at all the holding periods, which are also found to be 
increasing in the holding period. It contrasts sharply against the trading losses 
resulting from a trading strategy based on the level of corporate governance. There is 
no statistically significant difference between the governance-improving and 
governance-deteriorating quintiles in terms of firm characteristics. The findings in 
Tables 27 and 28 suggest that it is the change in corporate governance, and not the 
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level of governance, that is positively associated with subsequent returns. 
To account for the risk in the excess returns from these trading strategies, I 
employ Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, which is estimated using the following 
model: 
tεMOMβHMLβSMBβ)R(RβαR t4t3t2ftmt1LSt ++++−+=                (25) 
where RLSt is the monthly excess return of the zero investment portfolio from buying 
governance improvement firms and selling governance deterioration firms; Rmt which 
is the monthly value-weighted return of the market portfolio calculated from the 
market index of FTSE A ALL SHARES; Rft, which is the monthly risk-free interest 
rate (measured by the UK TREASURY BILL rate); SMB (Small Minus Big) is the 
monthly return on a size factor portfolio; HML (High Minus Low) is the monthly 
return on a book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio based on the book-to-market 
ratio; and MOM (Momentum), is the monthly return on a momentum factor portfolio. 
I form six portfolios based on size and book-to-market. Consistent with Fama and 
French (1993), I construct six portfolios from the intersections of the two portfolios 
formed on size (market equity, ME) and the three portfolios formed on the ratio of 
book equity to market equity (BE/ME) at the end of March each year. Firms with 
negative book value are not included. The size breakpoint for year t is the median 
market equity of all the constituent stocks of the FTSE A ALL-SHARES index at the 
end of March of year t. The BE/ME for March of year t is the book equity for the last 
fiscal year ending in t-1 divided by ME for December of t-1. The BE/ME breakpoints 
are the based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of all the constituent stocks. SMB is the 
average return on three small portfolios minus the average return on three big 
portfolios, and HML is the average return on two value portfolios minus the average 
return on two growth portfolios. MOM (Momentum) is the monthly return on a 
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momentum factor portfolio. Following Bauer et al. (2004), I construct MOM as the 
value-weighted average of firms with the highest 30% eleven-month returns lagged 
by one month minus the value-weighted average of firms with the lowest 30% 
eleven-month returns lagged by one month. The constant, α, represents the abnormal 
return an investor could have earned pursuing this investment strategy. 
Table 29: Four-factor model 
















Adjusted R2 0.079 
no. of obs. 36 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
The dependent variable is the zero 
investment portfolio return from buying 
an “improvement portfolio” and selling a 
“deterioration portfolio”. Portfolios are 
rebalanced in March 2001, March 2002 
and March 2003, and held until March 
2004. * refers to significance at the 10 
percent level; ** refers to significance at 
the 5 percent level; and *** refers to 
significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table 29 presents the estimation results for the “improvement minus 
deterioration”. It shows significant abnormal returns to this portfolio of 0.9% per 
month.11 The coefficient on (Rm-Rf) is significant and positive, suggesting that the 
“improvement portfolio” has a higher exposure to market risk than the “deterioration 
portfolio”. The loading on size factor is negative, indicating that 
                                                 
11 Earlier results show no significant returns to a trading strategy based on governance levels. For 
completeness, the results on a trading strategy in levels are reported in Appendix 11. 
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governance-improving firms are more likely to be large firms. 
6.2 Distinguishing between the Risk and Mispricing Explanations for 
Excess Returns to Governance-Improving Firms 
The results in Section 6.1 provide evidence of a positive association between the 
changes in corporate governance and post-investment abnormal returns. In this 
section, I examine whether the observed abnormal returns may be due to risk or 
mispricing. Risk explanation suggests that conventional controls cannot capture the 
risks of governance-improving firms completely. It results in measured abnormal 
returns being biased upward. On the other hand, mispricing explanation suggests that 
the shares of governance-improving (governance-deteriorating) firms are “mispriced” 
because investors fail to understand the implications of current governance change for 
future performance. 
In this section, I examine whether excess returns are more consistent with a risk 
explanation or a mispricing explanation. The analysis is focused on the explanation 
for excess returns on governance-improving firms. Although no evidence of excess 
returns is found for good-governance firms, I conduct a similar analysis for returns on 
good-governance firms and report the results in appendix for the completeness of 
analysis. 
6.2.1 Evidence on Risk Explanation for Excess Returns to Governance 
Change Firms 
In this section, I conduct two tests to examine whether the reason why 
governance-improving firm’s stock return is high is due to the change in risk. First, I 
analyze the differences in the cost of equity capital before and after the change in 
corporate governance. Second, I examine whether abnormal returns to the corporate 
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governance change portfolio are significant in explaining the excess returns to all 
stocks in the U.K. market, after controlling for the four risk factors. 
 
Corporate Governance and the Cost of Equity Capital 
If a firm’s cost of equity capital is reduced after improvement in corporate 
governance, it provides evidence that corporate governance is related to risk. Here, I 
investigate whether the cost of equity capital comprises a governance risk component; 
and whether the governance risk is subsumed by the market risk (beta). 
(1) Estimation of the Cost of Equity Capital 
Following the approach in Hail and Leuz (2006) and Chen et al. (2004), I estimate 
the cost of equity (denoted R) using the arithmetic average of the cost of equity 
estimates from four equity valuation models.12 The cost of equity from each model is 
in fact simply the internal rate of return that equates the current stock price to the 
expected future cash flows in the form of residual incomes or abnormal earnings. 
The four valuation models used to estimate the cost of equity are based on the 
following studies: (1) Gebhardt et al. (2001); (2) Claus and Thomas (2001); (3) 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2002); and (4) Easton (2004). Models (1) and (2) are 
based on the residual income valuation approach, while models (3) and (4) are based 
on abnormal earnings growth valuations. To compute the cost of equity based on the 
four models, I obtain stock prices, the return-on-equity (ROE), book value per share, 
and dividend payout ratios from Datastream International. Analysts’ forecasts 
information is obtained directly from I/B/E/S. Monthly inflation rates are obtained 
                                                 
12 I use the ex ante (or implied) cost of equity. I do not use ex post realized returns to estimate cost of 
equity capital because recent finance literature suggests that realized returns are poor measures (Fama 
and French, 1997; Rlton, 1999). The models’ key assumptions and details on data requirements and 
implementation choices are described in Appendix 12. 
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from the Office for National Statistics.13 
I estimate the firm’s cost of equity capital in the fourth month after the end of their 
respective fiscal years to ensure that financial data is publicly available. This timing 
approach is similar to Cheng et al. (2004) and Huang (2004). 
Table 30: Distributional statistics for the cost of equity 
capital estimates 
Variable R _GLS R_CT R_OJ R_PEG R 
Mean 12.46% 7.92% 11.69% 11.61% 10.92% 
Median 12.25% 7.56% 10.97% 10.90% 10.45% 
St. Dev 4.31% 2.68% 3.78% 4.74% 3.10% 
Min 3.35% 1.58% 2.98% 1.54% 3.15% 
Max 35.57% 24.30% 32.26% 43.92% 26.98% 
No. of obs. 551 551 551 551 551 
There are 551 firm-years for my analysis. The implied cost of equity capital 
estimates, R_GLS, R_CT, R_OJ, and R_PEG, are derived as the internal rate 
of return in the models of Gebhardt et al. (2001), the Claus and Thomas 
(2001), the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and the Easton (2004), 
respectively. The computation of the cost of equity capital for each model is 
detailed in Appendix 12. R is the mean of the four estimates for the implied 
cost of equity capital. All estimates use mean analyst consensus forecasts and 
realized price data as of month +4 after the fiscal-year end. 
 
Table 30 presents some summary statistics for the cost of capital estimates 
obtained. While the estimates using the Claus and Thomas (2001) approach generally 
yields the lowest estimates, the estimates based on the other approaches are relatively 
close. The average of all four estimates is 10.9%, slightly lower than the values 
reported in Hail and Leuz (2006) and in Chen et al. (2004), at 12.5% and 16.9%, 
respectively. These results suggest that U.K. firms enjoy a better external financing 
environment than firms in other international and particularly, emerging markets. In 
order to reduce the effects from outliers, Chen et al. (2004) winsorize their estimates 
of the cost of equity capital to within 0 and 0.6. My estimates fall within the range of 
0 to 0.6. There is also little evidence of skewness in the cost of equity estimates. 
 
                                                 
13 Website: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/Product.asp?vlnk=2328&More=N. 
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Table 31: Pearson correlation coefficients 
among cost of equity capital estimates 
Variable R _GLS R_CT R_OJ R_PEG
R_CT 0.219** - - - 
R_OJ 0.486** 0.516** - - 
R_PEG 0.476** 0.328** 0.897** - 
R 0.725** 0.575** 0.928** 0.892**
There are 551 firm-years for my analysis. The implied 
cost of equity capital estimates, R_GLS, R_CT, R_OJ, 
and R_PEG, are derived as the internal rate of return in 
the models of Gebhardt et al. (2001), the Claus and 
Thomas (2001), the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), 
and the Easton (2004), respectively. The computation of 
the cost of equity capital for each model is detailed in 
Appendix 12. R is the mean of the four estimates for the 
implied cost of equity capital. All estimates use mean 
analyst consensus forecasts and realized price data as of 
month +4 after the fiscal-year end. ** refers to 
significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
The correlation coefficients presented in Table 31 show that the four estimates are 
significantly correlated. The estimates from the Claus and Thomas (2001) model have 
the lowest correlation, while the estimates from the other three models are each highly 
correlated. 
(2) Control Variables 
The first set of control variables are the three risk factors in Fama and French 
(1992). Specifically, I expect that R will be negatively associated with firm size (ME), 
but positively associated with the book-to-market ratio (BM), and market beta 
(BETA). There is, however, some debate about the inclusion of BM in the implied 
cost of capital regressions since the estimated cost of equity capital is derived from 
BM. Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), and Francis et al. (2003), for 
example, exclude BM as a control variable when they examine the effect of disclosure 
on the cost of equity capital. Following Chen et al. (2004), I run regressions with and 
without BM as a control variable. 
Two additional control variables are used in this study, namely, analysts’ forecast 
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errors (FERR) and price momentum (MMT6) used in Chen et al. (2004). Although 
the analysts’ forecast error is not a risk factor, Chen et al. (2004) include this variable 
to avoid potential bias in their inferences. They argue that analysts’ forecasts will be 
biased upward if they underestimate the effect of poor corporate governance on future 
earnings. Such bias will translate into an overstated estimate of the cost of equity 
capital, leading to a spurious correlation between corporate governance and the cost 
of equity capital. According to Guay et al. (2003), analysts are sluggish in 
incorporating the information in past stock returns into their forecasts, and hence the 
accounting estimates of the ex ante cost of equity capital may be biased. Therefore, 
recent stock returns should be included as a control variable, hence the use of MMT6. 
In particular, the control variables are as follows: 
ME: firm size, the natural logarithm of the market value of equity in the fourth 
month after the end of the firm’s fiscal year; 
BM: book value of equity at the end of fiscal year divided by the market value of 
equity in the fourth month after the end of the firm’s fiscal year; 
BETA: the firm’s market-model beta coefficient based on 60 consecutive monthly 
returns ending in the fourth month after the end of the firm’s fiscal year; 
FERR: analyst forecast error. the actual earnings minus the mean I/B/E/S 
consensus forecast of annual earnings per share, measured eight months before the 
end of the firm’s fiscal year, scaled by share price at the fourth month after the end 
of the firm’s fiscal year; and 
MM6: the compounded returns over the previous six months. 
(3) Validation of Cost of Equity Capital Measure 
According to Botosan and Plumlee (2004), the evaluation criteria for the validity 
of the estimate of a firm’s cost of equity capital is based on the association between 
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measures of expected returns and known risk factors, such as beta, size, and the 
market-to-book ratio. Ashbaugh et al. (2004a) propose that a good measure of 
expected return should be positively related to beta and negatively related to size and 
the market-to-book ratio, which they further test by regressing the firm’s cost of 
equity against beta, size, market-to-book ratio, and year dummy variables. Similarly, I 
validate my estimate of a firm’s cost of equity by examining the relationships between 
R and the abovementioned risk factors. However, I use the inverse of the 
market-to-book ratio because BM is the control variable that I will use in the later part 
of my analysis. Specifically, the validation model is expressed as: 
itηBMβMEβBETAβαR it3it2it1iit ++++=   (26) 
Year dummies are included as control variables and the regression is estimated 
with firm fixed effects. 
Table 32: Validation of cost of equity 
capital measure 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.084*** - 0.099*** 0.502*** 
 (31.179) - (132.547) (27.275) 
BETA 0.025*** - - 0.004* 
 (10.316) - - (1.796) 
ME - 0.660*** - -0.021*** 
 - (23.486) - (-25.178) 
BM - - 2.538*** 1.610*** 
 - - (29.669) (17.895) 
Adjusted R2 0.652 0.680 0.662 0.688 
no. of obs. 549 547 547 547 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions 
of each variable are given in Appendix 4. Year 
dummies and firm fixed effects are included for all 
regressions, but not reported. * refers to significance 
at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 
5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 
percent level. 
 
The first three columns in Table 32 present the results from regressing R on 
BETA, SIZE, and BM, respectively. The last column shows the result from regressing 
R on all the three risk proxies together. R is positively-related to BETA and BM, and 
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negatively-related to SIZE in all the four model specifications. All the coefficients are 
significant at 10 percent level or better. These findings are also consistent with those 
in Ashbaugh et al. (2004a). It shows that R validates itself as a good proxy for a 
firm’s cost of equity capital, according to Botosan and Plumlee’s (2004) evaluation 
criteria. 
(4) Effects of Corporate Governance on Cost of Equity Capital 
I estimate the following regression model to investigate the impact of both 








  (27) 
As previously discussed, I include the market beta (BETA), firm size (ME), 
book-to-market ratio (BM), analysts’ forecast errors (FERR), and momentum returns 
(MMT6) as control variables. The relationship between R and SCORE is examined 
under several model specifications using fixed effects procedures which are based 
generally on equation (27). Models (1) to (4) refer to equation (27) where BM is 
excluded whereas models (5) to (8) include BM. Ownership variables are excluded in 
odd-numbered models, but included in even-numbered models. Models (1), (2), (5), 
and (6) include ordinary risk factors only, and models (3), (4), (7), and (8) include 
forecasts’ error and momentum returns as additional controls. The results are 
presented in Table 33.14 
Improvements in corporate governance are found to have a significant effect in 
reducing the cost of equity. This is observed in all eight models except model (2). 
Inclusion of the BM does not appear to affect the general results. The estimates on the 
                                                 
14 I also estimate equation (27) with pooled data setup and report the results in Appendix 13. 
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BM are both positive and significant as expected. Also, small firms are found to have 
higher cost of equity. 
Table 33: Effect of corporate governance on the cost of equity capital: OLS 
regressions of R on SCORE, ownership and other control variables (fixed 
effects) 
  Excluding BM Including BM 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 0.609*** 0.565*** 0.548*** 0.536*** 0.509*** 0.488*** 0.496*** 0.448*** 
 (58.332) (42.270) (16.558) (15.178) (30.136) (28.370) (18.825) (11.582) 
SCORE -0.00005* 0.00004 -0.00010*** -0.00009*** -0.00010*** -0.00005* -0.00013*** -0.00006***
 (-1.715) (0.710) (-4.223) (-5.751) (-7.530) (-1.812) (-8.885) (-6.308) 
INSIDE - -0.013 - -0.007** - -0.010 - -0.001 
 - (-1.619) - (-2.017) - (-1.641) - (-0.451) 
BLOCK - 0.015*** - 0.025*** - 0.011*** - 0.023*** 
 - (4.598) - (13.095) - (2.918) - (6.662) 
INST - 0.019*** - 0.007** - 0.019*** - 0.012*** 
 - (4.014) - (2.137) - (3.299) - (3.270) 
BETA 0.006*** 0.005** -0.001 -0.001 0.004* 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
 (3.135) (2.275) (-0.393) (-0.585) (1.725) (0.813) (-0.371) (0.249) 
ME -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.018*** 
 (-52.986) (-52.260) (-13.778) (-13.190) (-26.394) (-27.706) (-15.679) (-9.756) 
BM - - - - 1.634*** 1.687*** 0.878*** 0.745*** 
 - - - - (14.596) (15.114) (7.081) (5.743) 
FERR - - -0.032*** -0.035*** - - -0.006 -0.018* 
 - - (-2.968) (-5.236) - - (-0.660) (-1.904) 
MMT6 - - -0.018*** -0.018*** - - -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 - - (-12.486) (-21.377) - - (-17.270) (-37.910) 
Adjusted 
R2 0.680 0.684 0.708 0.712 0.688 0.691 0.710 0.715 
no. of obs. 547 547 546 546 547 547 546 546 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each variable are given in Appendix 4. 
Year dummies and firm fixed effects are included for all regressions, but not reported. * refers to 
significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and *** refers 
to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
In Table 33, I find that the market beta is positively related to R in the presence of 
the three risk factors. However, the relation becomes significantly negative when 
FERR and MMT6 are included into the regression equation. The effect of corporate 
governance on the cost of equity capital is found to be stronger, after controlling for 
FERR and MMT6. As expected, both the estimates on FERR and on MMT6 are 
significant and negative. 
In terms of ownership variables, increases in insider holdings are found to be 
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associated with a decrease in the cost of equity capital. This is consistent with the 
notion that insider ownership aligns the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders. In contrast, higher block and institutional ownership are found to be 
associated with higher cost of equity capital. Ashbaugh et al. (2004a) also report 
similar results for block ownership, and argue that concentrated owners do not 
necessarily provide additional monitoring of managers, but extract rents from 
minority shareholders. 
The coefficients for SCORE range from 0.5 to 1.0 basis point. These coefficients 
imply that a one-point increase in the corporate governance score will reduce the cost 
of equity capital by 0.5 to 1.0 basis point. For instance, in the year 2002 sample, when 
a firm improves its corporate governance from the bottom 25% (SCORE = 61) to the 
top 25% (SCORE = 73), its cost of equity can be reduced by six to twelve basis 
points. 
I modify equation (27) to investigate directly the effect of changes in corporate 












++++=+   (29) 
where Δ denotes annual change. The change in cost of equity is the difference 
between the future year’s R and contemporaneous values of R. All the other variables 
are similar to equation (27). Following Huang (2004), I employ both the level and the 
change in control variables, since their relationship with change in cost of equity is 
unclear. There are eight separate models corresponding to equation (28) and eight 
models for equation (29). Estimates of the regression results are presented in Tables 
34 and 35, respectively. 
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Table 34: Effect of corporate governance on the cost of equity capital: 
OLS regressions of ΔR on ΔSCORE, SCORE, ownership and level of 
other control variables 
  Excluding BM Including BM 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.047** -0.044** -0.015 -0.012 -0.022 -0.016 
 (-2.616) (-4.141) (-2.166) (-2.035) (-0.445) (-0.395) (-0.592) (-0.419) 
ΔSCORE -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0006** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0006** -0.0006*** 
 (-2.767) (-2.902) (-2.490) (-3.088) (-2.725) (-3.163) (-2.479) (-3.057) 
SCORE -0.0003 -0.0003* -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (-1.440) (-1.787) (-1.178) (-1.539) (-1.067) (-1.414) (-0.914) (-1.247) 
INSIDE - -0.002 - 0.0004 - -0.009 - -0.006 
 - (-0.491) - (0.051) - (-1.565) - (-0.618) 
BLOCK - 0.003 - 0.003 - 0.008 - 0.006 
 - (0.338) - (0.229) - (0.745) - (0.485) 
INST - -0.002 - -0.005 - -0.006 - -0.009 
 - (-0.185) - (-0.512) - (-0.903) - (-0.915) 
BETA -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.0003 0.0005 
 (-0.386) (-0.369) (0.385) (0.385) (-0.470) (-0.423) (0.083) (0.118) 
ME 0.003*** 0.003** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.001 
 (3.205) (2.275) (3.956) (2.231) (2.183) (1.290) (1.799) (1.001) 
BM - - - - -1.193** -1.223** -1.011** -1.036** 
 - - - - (-2.262) (-2.240) (-2.048) (-1.973) 
FERR - - 0.052 0.052 - - 0.015 0.016 
 - - (1.161) (1.118) - - (0.555) (0.539) 
MMT6 - - 0.015*** 0.015** - - 0.014 0.013 
 - - (2.703) (2.557) - - (1.631) (1.488) 
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.040 0.066 0.058 0.078 0.072 0.083 0.076 
no. of obs. 366 366 365 365 366 366 365 365 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Δ denotes annual change. Definitions of each variable 
are given in Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are included for all regressions, but not 
reported. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 
percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 35: Effect of corporate governance on the cost of equity capital: 
OLS regressions of ΔR on ΔSCORE, changes in ownership and other 
control variables 
  Excluding BM Including BM 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant -0.008 -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 
 (-0.394) (-0.485) (-0.391) (-0.499) (-0.413) (-0.506) (-0.413) (-0.529) 
ΔSCORE -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
 (-4.722) (-5.192) (-5.250) (-6.431) (-4.617) (-5.012) (-5.365) (-6.611) 
ΔINSIDE - -0.026*** - -0.028*** - -0.026*** - -0.028*** 
 - (-3.633) - (-5.725) - (-3.726) - (-5.399) 
ΔBLOCK - -0.031 - -0.035 - -0.031 - -0.035 
 - (-0.817) - (-0.830) - (-0.832) - (-0.821) 
ΔINST - -0.016 - -0.012 - -0.016 - -0.012 
 - (-0.816) - (-0.531) - (-0.826) - (-0.522) 
ΔBETA -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 (-0.761) (-0.536) (-1.153) (-0.665) (-0.796) (-0.521) (-1.557) (-0.862) 
ΔME -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005** 
 (-0.199) (-0.804) (-0.341) (-0.845) (-0.561) (-1.344) (-0.827) (-2.143) 
ΔBM - - - - -0.238 -0.269 -0.050 -0.066 
 - - - - (-0.753) (-1.054) (-0.075) (-0.094) 
ΔFERR - - -0.005 -0.006 - - -0.005 -0.006 
 - - (-0.169) (-0.190) - - (-0.163) (-0.179) 
ΔMMT6 - - 0.006 0.006 - - 0.006 0.006 
 - - (0.952) (0.862) - - (0.807) (0.744) 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.020 0.012 0.020 0.011 0.017 0.009 0.017 
no. of obs. 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Δ denotes annual change. Definitions of each variable 
are given in Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are included for all regressions, but not 
reported. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 
percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
The results from both equation (28) and equation (29) indicate that a change in 
corporate governance is negatively correlated with a change in the cost of equity 
capital. The estimates on ∆SCORE are statistically significant for all model 
specifications. In fact, the estimate on ∆SCORE is about seven basis points, implying 
that a one-point increase in corporate governance leads to a decrease in the cost of 
equity capital by about seven basis points. 
When I use the level in control variables, all the estimates for ownership variables 
are insignificant. The estimates on BETA and FERR are insignificant as well. The 
estimates on ME, BM and MMT6 are significant but with unexpected signs. When I 
use the change in control variables, all the estimates are insignificant. In addition, all 
the models have low R2, indicating that control variables seem to play a weak role in 
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explaining the changes in cost of equity capital. 
The governance level is also found to adversely affect the change in cost of equity 
capital, although the estimate on SCORE is not significant. An increase in insiders’ 
ownership is found to reduce the cost of capital, but the effects for blockholder and 
institutional ownership are statistically insignificant. 
(5) Effects of Corporate Governance on Market Beta 
In the previous part, I showed that improvements in corporate governance reduce 
a firm’s cost of equity after controlling BETA, ME, BM, FERR, MMT6 and 
ownership variables. This suggests that the corporate governance risk may not be 
fully captured by BETA. In other words, the governance variable has additional 
explanatory power in the CAPM. In order to further investigate the extent to which 
change in corporate governance is related to BETA, I run a regression with firm fixed 
effects as follows: 
itηINSTβBLOCKβINSIDEβSCOREβαBETA it4it3it2it1iit +++++=   (30) 
The estimates from the fixed effects model are presented in Table 36.15 I find that 
a change in corporate governance is significant and positively related to a change in 
BETA. This finding rejects the hypothesis that an improvement in corporate 
governance should reduce market risk. However, it could be explained if corporate 
governance risk is a separate risk component and R is an overall risk measure. On the 
one hand, improvement in corporate governance increases a firm’s market risk. On 
the other hand, improvement in corporate governance mitigates a firm’s agency risk. 
The aggregate effect is a lower overall risk and hence a lower cost of equity capital. 
Ashbaugh et al. (2004a) also find a significant negative correlation between their 
                                                 
15 The estimates from the pooled data analysis can be found in Appendix 14. 
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E_SCORE (which captures governance with higher E_SCOREs reflecting poorer 
governance) and BETA. They argue that entrenched management seeks to “avoid 
effort” by taking on less risky projects. This argument fits the “quiet life” model of 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), in that poorly-governed managers are found to 
prefer to avoid the difficult decisions and costly efforts associated with shutting down 
old plants or starting new plants. In Ashbauth et al. (2004), it is under-investment 
rather than over-investment that applies, and subsequently explains the lower BETA 
obtained. 
Table 36: Effect of corporate 
governance on market beta: OLS 
regressions of BETA on SCORE and 
ownership variables (fixed effects) 
Variable (1) (2) 
Constant 0.908*** 0.838*** 
 (40.263) (34.479) 
SCORE 0.001** 0.002*** 
 (2.523) (5.285) 
INSIDE - -0.026 
 - (-0.088) 
BLOCK - 0.317*** 
 - (9.770) 
INST - -0.139*** 
 - (-3.772) 
Adjusted R2 0.889 0.890 
no. of obs. 549 549 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Definitions of each variable are given in 
Appendix 4. Year dummies and firm fixed 
effects are included for all regressions, but not 
reported. * refers to significance at the 10 
percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 
percent level; and *** refers to significance at 
the 1 percent level. 
 
An alternative approach is to regress the change in future BETA on the change in 
the contemporaneous corporate governance scores. The change in BETA models are 






++++=+   (31) 
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itηΔINSTβΔBLOCKβΔINSIDEβΔSCOREβαΔBETA it4it3it2it1i1it +++++=+ (32) 
Table 37 presents the estimates for equations (31) and (32). Consistent with the 
fixed effects results in Table 36, an improvement in corporate governance is found to 
be associated with an increase in market risk. The estimates are statistically 
significant in the level of the control variables suggested by models (1) and (2) but not 
in the change of the control variables in models (3) and (4). All estimates on the 
control variables are not significant, with the low R2 reflecting the low explanatory 
power of these models. 
Table 37: Effect of corporate governance on market 
beta: OLS regressions of ΔBETA on ΔSCORE and 
ownership (Δownership) variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.149*** 0.139** 0.106* 0.070** 
 (4.112) (2.194) (1.911) (2.071) 
ΔSCORE 0.005* 0.005** 0.004 0.002 
 (1.872) (2.007) (1.503) (1.172) 
SCORE -0.001 -0.001 - - 
 (-1.120) (-0.562) - - 
INSIDE - 0.024 - - 
 - (0.174) - - 
BLOCK - 0.039 - - 
 - (0.561) - - 
INST - -0.029 - - 
 - (-0.330) - - 
ΔINSIDE - - - 0.096 
 - - - (0.801) 
ΔBLOCK - - - -0.012 
 - - - (-0.055) 
ΔINST - - - -0.048 
 - - - (-0.370) 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.002 0.014 0.005 
no. of obs. 400 400 400 374 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each 
variable are given in Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are 
included for all regressions, but not reported. * refers to 
significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 
percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
In summary, my empirical findings reveal that firms with improvement in 
corporate governance enjoy reductions in the cost of equity capital. However, 
improvement in corporate governance increases beta risk. Therefore, for my sample, 
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corporate governance appears as a separate risk from market beta. Improvement in 
corporate governance lowers the cost of equity capital by reducing corporate 
governance risk after controlling for market risk. 
 
Whether Corporate Governance Change Is able to Explain Returns to All Stocks in 
the U.K. Market 
In order to test whether corporate governance is a risk factor in addition to the 
four risk factors discussed earlier in Section 6.1, I examine whether these returns to 
the “corporate governance change portfolio” are significant in explaining the excess 
returns to all stocks in the U.K. market, after controlling for the four risk factors. This 
approach is similar to that used in Fama and French (1993), in which returns on stocks 
are regressed on three risk factors. Fama and French (1993) interpret the time-series 
regression slopes as risk-factor sensitivities for stocks. Similarly, if governance 
change is an additional risk factor beyond market beta, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum, we should expect a positive loading on the returns to the “improvement 
minus deterioration” portfolio, denoted CGCE. Specifically, I estimate the following 
model: 
tεMOMβHMLβSMBβ)R(RβCGCEβαRR t5t4t3ftmt2t1ftti ++++−++=−  (33) 
where, in addition to all other variables described earlier, ftit RR −  is the excess 
return of stock i at time t; and CGCE is the monthly return on the zero investment 
portfolio from buying governance-improving firms and selling 
governance-deteriorating firms. Equation (33) is estimated for each individual stock 
in the U.K. market. The coefficients reported in Table 38 are the average of the 
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estimates.16 The results for the coefficients on CGCE which are both negative, 
contradict to my hypothesis of positive loading on it. 
Table 38: Summation estimates of regression 
of excess return of each individual stock in the 
U.K. market on CGCE and four risk factors 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 
α 0.032*** -0.001 
 (24.174) (-0.789) 
CGCE -0.111*** -0.037 
 (-3.500) (-1.169) 
RMRF  0.970*** 
  (30.047) 
SMB  0.705*** 
  (20.474) 
HML  0.051 
  (1.386) 
MOM  -0.076*** 
  (-5.500) 
no. of regressions 766 766 
no. of obs. per regression 36 36 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. The regression is 
run for each individual stock in the U.K. market, with firms’ 
excess return as the dependent variable. CGCE is the 
monthly return of the zero investment from buying 
governance improvement firms and selling governance 
deterioration firms. The reported coefficients are the average 
of all the estimates. Portfolios are rebalanced in March 2001, 
March 2002 and March 2003, and held till March 2004. * 
refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to 
significance at the 5 percent level; and *** refers to 
significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
The two tests in examining the risk explanation for excess returns to corporate 
governance change firms provide contradicting results. The test on individual stock 
returns fails to support the risk explanation. However, the finding of the reduction of 
overall cost of equity capital after the improvement in corporate governance suggests 
that governance change is related to risk. 
 
                                                 
16 I also conduct a similar analysis in levels, results of which are presented in Appendix 15. 
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6.2.2 Evidence on the Mispricing Explanation for Excess Returns to 
Governance Change Firms 
Gompers et al. (2003) argue that since the market underestimates the additional 
agency costs for poor governance at the beginning of the holding period and corrects 
the mistakes subsequent to the realization of the agency costs, stock prices for poor 
governance firms decline during the holding period, which results in excess returns to 
a zero-investment portfolio. Core et al. (2006) further propose that two conditions 
should be satisfied before mispricing applies. First, there should be a positive 
relationship between operating performance and corporate governance. Second, the 
market is either negatively surprised by the poor operating performance of bad 
governance firms or positively surprised by the good operating performance of good 
governance firms, or both. For the first condition, I investigate: (1) whether 
improvement in corporate governance is associated with future improvement in a 
firm’s profitability as measured by ROA, EBITDA, EBIT, ordinary income, or net 
income; and (2) the link between operating performance and stock returns. 
Furthermore, I examine the second condition, that is, investors are surprised by the 
difference between expected operating performance and actual performance. Similar 
to Core et al. (2006), I conduct two tests: (1) an analysis of the relationship between 
analysts’ forecast errors and governance; and (2) an analysis of the relationship 
between earnings announcement returns and governance. 
 
Corporate Governance and Operating Performance 
In this section, I test Core et al.’s (2006) first condition of mispricing explanation 
for excess returns by exploring the relationship between corporate governance and 
operating performance. Market value is found to be higher in firms with better 
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governance possibly because of better operating performance, shown by higher 
profitability, better investments, and more dividends payment. Black et al. (2006a) 
argue that higher valuations may result from investors’ more favorable valuations of 
earnings (or dividends). 
Similar to Barber and Lyon (1996), I define ROA as the ratio of operating income 
before depreciation to total assets. ROA is used to measure operating performance. 
Operating income before depreciation (COMPUTSTAT data 14: Operating Income) 
is defined as sales less cost of goods sold, less selling, general, and administrative 
expenses. Total assets, on the other hand, is calculated as the average of book value at 
the beginning- and ending- period of total assets. Barber and Lyon (1996) evaluate 
accounting performance relative to an industry benchmark. In my study, however, I 
compute the industry-adjusted ROA by subtracting the median ROA of the 
corresponding 2-digit industry from the firm’s ROA. This adjustment is consistent 
with the approach in Gompers et al. (2003), Richardson and Tuna (2005), and Core et 
al. (2006), among others. Core et al. (2006) measure ROA as operating income 
divided by total assets at year-end. They use operating incomes both before and after 
depreciation. Similarly, I also use the ROA measures in Core et al. (2006) as a 
robustness check. The results are qualitatively the same for different ROA measures. 
To assess the effect of corporate governance (improvement in corporate 
governance) on firm performance, I regress the one year ahead ROA (FUTUREROA) 
on the contemporaneous corporate governance score and control variables. Consistent 
with Core et al. (2006), I include book-to-market ratio (BM) and firm size (ME) as 
control variables. In this case, BM is included to control for the different investment 
opportunities available. Different types of ownership are included as control variables 
as well. Since some studies such as Gompers et al. (2003) and Bauer et al. (2004) 
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include BM as the only control variable, I also run regressions with and without ME. 






+++++=+   (34) 
Black et al. (2006a) use firm characteristics variables as controls for both their 
Tobin’s Q and operating performance regressions. In equation (35) below, I replace 














  (35) 
where ROAit+1 is the following year’s industry-adjusted ROA. Equations (34) and (35) 
are estimated using firm fixed effects setup, and the results are reported in Table 40.17 
Model (1) is a regression on BM alone, while model (2) regresses ROA against BM 
and ME. Model (3) includes ownership variables as additional controls; whereas 
model (4) incorporates firm characteristics and ownership variables. Model (5) 
presents the full model, which includes firm characteristics, ownership, BM, and ME 
as control variables. 
From Table 39, I find that the estimates on the corporate governance score are 
positive in all the five models, but significant in only four. These results are broadly 
consistent with the hypothesis that an improvement in corporate governance is 
associated with future improvement in ROA. The coefficients on BM are significant 
and negative, indicating that growth firms are more profitable. Firm size is negatively 
related to future ROA. 
 
 
                                                 
17 I also estimate equations (34) and (35) using pooled data setup and report the results in Appendix 
16. 
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Table 39: Effect of corporate governance on FUTUREROA: OLS 
regressions of FUTUREROA on SCORE, BM, ME and/or 
ownership and other control variables (fixed effects) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant -0.050*** -0.109*** -0.093*** 0.216*** -0.120*** 
 (-6.326) (-6.560) (-4.291) (5.236) (-2.741) 
SCORE 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0002 0.0003** 
 (4.829) (5.388) (5.719) (1.094) (2.493) 
INSIDE - - -0.059*** -0.069*** -0.049*** 
 - - (-6.810) (-4.197) (-7.911) 
BLOCK - - 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 
 - - (3.240) (3.728) (5.137) 
INST - - -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.046*** 
 - - (-8.693) (-8.632) (-9.267) 
FSIZE - - - -0.035*** -0.019*** 
 - - - (-2.789) (-4.278) 
FSIZE2 - - - 0.001 0.0003 
 - - - (1.273) (0.734) 
K/S - - - -0.021*** -0.020*** 
 - - - (-3.039) (-3.313) 
(K/S)2 - - - 0.001** 0.001** 
 - - - (2.037) (2.480) 
Y/S - - - -0.007 -0.017*** 
 - - - (-0.871) (-2.724) 
RDUM - - - -0.003 -0.005 
 - - - (-0.596) (-1.199) 
R&D/K - - - 0.185*** 0.173*** 
 - - - (4.297) (3.715) 
I/K - - - 0.0009 -0.0002 
 - - - (1.598) (-0.192) 
EXT_FIN - - - 0.0003*** 0.0001* 
 - - - (3.121) (1.698) 
BM -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007*** - -0.004*** 
 (-8.809) (5.012) (-9.396) - (-3.458) 
ME - 0.003*** 0.003*** - 0.013*** 
 - (-11.195) (3.401) - (9.254) 
Adjusted R2 0.747 0.747 0.749 0.741 0.746 
no. of obs. 655 655 655 641 641 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each variable are given in 
Appendix 4. Year dummies and firm fixed effects are included for all regressions, but 
not reported. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance 
at the 5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
All performance indicators measure firm performance imprecisely. Brown and 
Caylor (2006) propose to examine several performance measures before drawing 
definitive conclusions. According to them, because measurement errors in 
performance indicators are not perfectly correlated, examining a group of 
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performance measures helps to mitigate the bias from a particular measure. Like 
Black et al. (2006a), I use other measures of operating performance to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and operating performance which include: 
(1) EBITDA (COMPUSTAT data 21 + data 15 + data 11: Income (Loss) Before 
Income Taxes & Appro + Interest and Related Expense + Depreciation and 
Amortization - Total);  (2) ordinary income (COMPUSTAT data 21: Income (Loss) 
Before Income Taxes & Appro); (3) EBIT (COMPUSTAT data 21 + data 15: Income 
(Loss) Before Income Taxes & Appro + Interest and Related Expense); (4) net 
income (COMPUSTAT data 32: Net Income); (5) sales (COMPUSTAT data 1: 
Sales/Turnover (net)); (6) capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT data 145: Additions to 
Fixed Assets); and (7) dividends (COMPUSTAT data 36: Dividends – 
Common/Ordinary). 
Here, EBITDA, ordinary income, EBIT, and net income are all profit measures of 
a company, scaled by different denominators to derive profitability variables. The five 
denominators used are sales, book value of total equity, book value of assets, market 
value of total equity, and market value of assets. Sales/assets and capital 
expenditure/sales are proxies for firm efficiency. Capital expenditure and dividend 
measures are employed to investigate whether a firm’s capital expenditure and 
dividend payout choices correlate with a firm’s governance. Similar to the profit 
measures, sales, capital expenditure, and dividends are scaled by the five size 
measures. The denominators are values obtained at the end of the period. The general 
inferences are unaffected when the end of period measures are replaced with the 
averages of beginning- and ending- period values. 
Although I conduct regression analyses using all the five models as shown in 
Table 39, I report only the estimates from model (2) below. Table 40 summarizes the 
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fixed effects estimates from model (2), reproduced here as equation (36):18 
itit3it2it1i1it ηMEβBMβSCOREβαERFORMOPERATINGP ++++=+  (36) 
The numerator of the dependent variable is one of the seven operating 
performance measures (EBITDA, EBIT, ordinary income, sales, capital expenditures, 
dividends and net income), while the denominator of the dependent variable is one of 
the five measures of firm size (sales, book value of total equity, book value of assets, 
market value of total equity, and market value of assets). All operating performance 
variables are industry-adjusted. The BM, ME and year dummies are included as 
control variables but their coefficients are not reported. 
Table 40 shows that the majority of the profitability measures have significant and 
positive relationships with the governance score. This supports the argument that 
improvement in corporate governance is associated with future improvement in 
operating performance as measured by EBITDA, EBIT, ordinary income, or net 
income. My findings differ from Black et al. (2006a), who fail to find evidence that 
corporate governance is associated with a firm’s profitability. 
With respect to profit measures that have the market value of equity and market 
value of assets in the denominator, Black et al. (2006a) report that negative estimates 
are obtained and interpret this as being due to the market valuing the same earnings 
more favorably for better-governed firms. This could be because higher valuations in 
their study come only from investors’ belief that better-governed firms are good, and 
who therefore place a higher value on the same unit of earnings. In contrast, my 
sample shows that estimates on profitability are consistently positive and significant. 
Together with the findings regarding the positive relation between FUTUREQ and the 
governance score, I argue that improvement in future operating performance may 
                                                 
18 The pooled data estimates from equation (36) are reported in Appendix 17. 
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partly explain the increase in future valuation. 
Table 40: Effect of corporate governance on future operating performance: 
OLS regressions of future operating performance on SCORE, BM, and ME 
(fixed effects) 
Numerator 







0.0003 0.0009*** 0.001*** - 0.0002*** -0.0001*** 0.0011***
(1.382) (3.718) (3.969) - (4.285) (-5.977) (4.151) Sales 
0.621 0.599 0.592 - 0.658 0.884 0.564 
-0.001*** 0.0008** 0.003*** -0.010* -0.002** -0.0007*** 0.002*** 
(-3.809) (2.224) (4.494) (-4.901) (-16.529) (-17.214) (3.396) Book Value of Total Equity 
0.653 0.554 0.501 0.686 0.515 0.792 0.466 
0.0002** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** -0.0003 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 0.0006***
(1.978) (8.537) (4.858) (-0.522) (-4.429) (-9.716) (5.244) Book Value of Assets 
0.605 0.582 0.585 0.884 0.581 0.870 0.518 
0.762** 0.494* 0.335* 1.908 -0.128 0.152 0.253 
(1.96) (1.724) (1.654) (1.483) (-0.593) (1.623) (1.557) Market Value of Total Equity 
0.249 0.249 0.430 0.249 0.250 0.249 0.249 
0.0005*** 0.0008*** 0.0004*** 0.004** -0.00005 0.00002 0.0005***
(6.100) (11.248) (4.163) (3.882) (-0.826) (0.812) (7.234) Market Value of Assets 
0.680 0.652 0.639 0.889 0.710 0.838 0.586 
Sample size varies from 591 to 657. The table presents the coefficients on SCORE for dependent 
variables with different measures of operating performance in the numerator (EBITDA, EBIT, ordinary 
income, sales, capital expenditures, dividends and net income), with denominators as shown. Control 
variables are BM, ME, and year dummies. The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each 
variable are given in Appendix 4. Firm fixed effects are included, but not reported. * refers to 
significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and *** refers to 
significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
With respect to capital expenditure, the results are mixed. The coefficient on 
capital expenditure/sales is positive and significant while the coefficients on capital 
expenditure/(book value of equity/assets) are negative and significant. The 
coefficients for capital expenditure/(market value of equity/assets) are, however, 
negative and insignificant. 
Regarding the dividend payout, Table 40 shows that governance-improving firms 
pay fewer dividends for a given level of profits. One possible explanation for the 
substitution effect between dividend payment and governance mechanisms might be 
that investors are willing to tolerate low payout ratio due to efficiency gains from 
improved corporate governance. The regression results for sales are, however, mixed. 
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To summarize, Core et al.’s (2006) first condition is satisfied with the finding that 
an improvement in corporate governance is associated with future improvement in a 
firm’s profitability as measured by ROA, EBITDA, EBIT, ordinary income, or net 
income. However, governance-improving firms pay lower dividends for a given level 
of profit. I interpret it as the substitution effect between dividend payout and corporate 
governance mechanisms incorporated in the corporate governance score. My study 
also shows that governance-improving firms have less capital expenditure when the 
book values of both equity and assets are in the denominator. 
 
Stock Returns and Operating Performance 
In previous sections, I provide evidence on positive associations between change 
in corporate governance and post-investment abnormal stock returns, as well as those 
between change in corporate governance and change in operating performance. Core 
et al. (2006) report similar relationships for corporate governance level measures. 
Based on such findings, they propose that: “…however, to show that operating cash 
flow differences caused by governance cause, in turn, future stock return differences, 
one must establish that the differential operating performance was unexpected by 
investors” (p.668). In their statement, Core et al. (2006) assume that operating 
performance is positively associated with future stock returns without formal 
empirical testing. In contrast, I investigate directly whether stock returns can be 
explained by operating performance, before moving on to test whether investors are 
surprised by superior operating performance. 
Following Chambers et al. (2002), I measure excess (risk adjusted) returns using 
the following procedures. Annual returns are computed for each observation 
beginning on the “investment date”, which is April 1, after the calculation of 
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corporate governance score. I also construct 25 value-weighted, annually rebalanced 
portfolios that vary according to both size and book-to-market (BE/ME) ratio as 
“control” portfolios. The 25 size-BE/ME portfolios are formed much like the six 
size-BE/ME portfolios discussed earlier in Section 6.1. In March of each year t+1, I 
sort all FTSE A ALL SHARES stocks by size and (independently) by book-to-market 
equity. For the size sort, ME is measured at the end of March of year t+1. For the 
book-to-market sort, ME is market equity at the end of December of year t, and BE is 
the book common equity for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t. I construct 25 
portfolios from the intersections of the size and BE/ME quintiles and calculate 
value-weighted monthly returns on the portfolios from April of t+1 to March of t + 2. 
I match each firm to its “control” portfolio by comparing both size and 
book-to-market ratio to benchmark portfolio cutoffs. The difference between the 
firm’s actual return for that year and the return on the firm’s relevant “control” 
portfolio is the individual annual excess return. The measured annual excess return for 









+ +−+=                                      (37) 
where ikR  is firm i’s raw return for month k, and pkR  is the month k return to the 
relevant size-BE/ME control portfolio. 
The direct effects of change in operating performance on the stock market 
performance are investigated with equations (38) and (39). The dependent variable is 
the annual excess return obtained from equation (37). In equation (38), change in 
score, the level of score and the level of contemporaneous ROA are included as 
explanatory variables, whereas, in equation (39) change in score and change in ROA 
are the independent variables. I also estimate models with either ROA or ΔROA as 
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the single independent variable assuming that impact of corporate governance on 
stock returns is through the following year’s improvement in operating performance. 
The estimates of equations (38) and (39) are shown in Table 41. 
it1it3it2it11it ROASCORESCOREER ε+β+β+Δβ+α= ++                    (38) 
it1it2it11it ROASCOREER ε+Δβ+Δβ+α= ++                              (39) 
Table 41: Regression of excess return on ROA (ΔROA) 
and SCORE (ΔSCORE) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 0.456** 0.138** 0.370* 0.221*** 0.201*** 
 (2.148) (2.173) (1.747) (4.248) (3.655) 
ΔSCORE 0.011**  0.011**  0.008* 
 (2.318)  (2.129)  (1.937) 
SCORE -0.005  -0.005   
 (-1.170)  (-1.165)   
ROA  0.928*** 0.933***   
  (2.744) (2.733)   
ΔROA    0.518 0.534 
    (1.257) (1.302) 
Adjusted R2  0.0535 0.0626 0.0312 0.0375 
no. of obs.   437 437 437 437 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each variable 
are given in Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are included for 
all regressions, but not reported. * refers to significance at the 10 
percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and *** 
refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
When ROA is included as the sole independent variable, it is significantly and 
positively associated with excess returns as expected. In contrast, ΔROA does not 
affect excess returns significantly. The inclusion of the level or change in corporate 
governance as the second explanatory variable provides an opportunity to capture 
sources of improvement in corporate governance that are unrelated to operating 
performance. Again, the results of the regressions show a significant positive 
association between the level of ROA and the excess returns but no significant 
association between change in ROA and the excess returns. More importantly, the 
coefficients on change in corporate governance score are significantly positive in all 
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model specifications. It suggests that while excess returns tend to be reward for good 
operating performance, there exists an independent governance improvement effect. 
 
Analysts’ Forecasts 
Under mispricing, better operating performance for governance-improving firms 
should not be expected in advance by investors. That is, if investors expect operating 
performance to be similar across firms with different governance changes, they would 
be surprised when governance-improving firms exhibit better operating performance 
and higher market value. As such, one should observe relatively pessimistic earnings 
forecasts (positive forecast errors) in periods of positive governance score change, 
and relatively optimistic forecasts (negative forecast errors) in periods of negative 
governance score change. 
I use analysts’ forecasts to proxy for investors’ earnings expectations. To 
investigate whether earnings realizations surprise investors, I examine one-year 
analysts’ forecast errors. Analysts’ forecast errors are defined as the difference 
between the average I/B/E/S forecast available at fiscal year end and actual earnings 
for the forecasted period, divided by share price at the end of the fiscal year. I 
compare the magnitude of forecast errors for governance-deteriorating (Q1) with that 
for governance-improving (Q5) groups. Table 42 documents the average one-year 
analysts’ forecast errors for individual years from 2001 to 2003 as well as the overall 
averages.19  
All the analysts’ forecast errors are negative, suggesting that realized earnings fall 
short of investors’ earnings expectations for both governance-improving and 
governance-deteriorating firms. Although the optimistic earnings forecasts are 
                                                 
19 The counter parts based on corporate governance level are reported in Appendix 18. 
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relatively more pronounced in magnitude for governance-improving firm than for 
governance-deteriorating firms in years 2000 and 2001, they are statistically 
insignificant. In year 2002, earnings forecasts become less optimistic for 
governance-improving firms, but the difference between the two governance change 
groups is still statistically insignificant. 
Table 42: Analysts’ forecast errors for 
governance-improving and governance-deteriorating 
firms 
Variable Q1(Low ΔSCORE) Q5 (High ΔSCORE) Q5-Q1 Diff. 
-0.013  -0.055  -0.041  AFE_2000 
  (1.321) 
-0.012  -0.015  -0.003  AFE_2001 
  (0.406) 
-0.177  -0.014  0.163  AFE_2002 
  (0.949) 
-0.068  -0.028  0.040  
AFE_average 
    (0.630) 
The table reports average values and (in parentheses) t-statistics for 
one-year analysts’ forecast errors, for governance-deteriorating (Q1) 
and governance-improving (Q5) groups. Analysts’ forecast errors are 
measured as the difference between the average I/B/E/S forecast 
available at fiscal year end and actual earnings for the forecasted period, 
divided by share price at the end of the fiscal year. * refers to 
significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 
percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Simple documentation of the magnitude of analysts’ forecast errors for 
governance-improving and governance-deteriorating firms may provide some 
evidence on whether the earnings realizations surprise the investors. A stronger test 
needs to control other factors in addition to corporate governance change. Similar to 
Core et al. (2006), I use firm size, measured as the logarithm of the market value of 
equity (denoted logMVE) and book-to-market equity (denoted logBME) as controls. 
According to Core et al. (2006), these variables are correlated with profitability, and 
also correlated with shareholders’ rights. I estimate equation (40) below: 
tεlogBMEαlogMVEαΔSCOREααAFE t3t2t101t ++++=+   (40) 
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where AFEt+1, the analysts’ forecast error is the difference between the mean I/B/E/S 
consensus forecast of annual earnings per share (measured eight months before the 
year t+1 earnings are forecasted) and the actual year t+1 annual earnings per share, 
divided by share price at the end of year t. 
Table 43: Differences in one-year analysts’ forecast errors between 
governance-improving and governance-deteriorating firms 
Panel A: Full Sample   













Time-Series Mean -0.002 
Time-Series Standard Deviation 0.001 
t-statistics -2.446 
3 
Panel B: Restricted Sample   













Time-Series Mean -0.029 
Time-Series Standard Deviation 0.029 
t-statistics -1.757 
3 
Panel A presents the coefficient on △SOCRE in the regression of one-year analysts forecast 
errors on △SOCRE, log(market value of equity), and log(book-to-market equity) (coefficients 
on control variables are not reported). Analysts’ forecast error is defined as I/B/E/S actual 
earnings per share minus I/B/E/S forecasted earnings per share, and is deflated by share price. 
Panel B presents the coefficient on CGC_D indicator variable in the regression of one-year 
analysts forecast errors on CGC_D, log(market value of equity), and log(book-to-market equity) 
(coefficients on control variables are not reported). CGC_D is a dummy variable that take the 
value of one if the firm is in the quintile with the highest corporate governance change, and 
zero if the firm is in the quintile with the lowest corporate governance change. The sample in 
Panel B is restricted to firms in the top and bottom quintiles of △SOCRE. T-statistics are in 
parentheses. Results are based on regressions by year. Then the time-series mean of coefficients, 
standard deviation and t-statistics for the average of the coefficients are calculated. * refers to 
significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and *** 
refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
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I follow Core et al. (2006) to run the regressions by year to avoid cross-sectional 
dependence and serial correlation. Following Core et al. (2006), I also estimate the 
regressions using only firms in the top and bottom governance change quintiles, 
because the study on excess return is based on these two extreme portfolios. In these 
regressions, the sample is restricted to these two extreme portfolios. Equation (40) is 
revised as follows: 
tεlogBMEαlogMVEαCGC_DααAFE t3t2t101t ++++=+  (41) 
where CGC_D is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm is in the 
highest governance change quintile, and zero if the firm is in the lowest governance 
change quintile. If the coefficients on ∆SCORE and CGC_D are significantly positive, 
it would be interpreted as evidence that analysts are surprised by the different 
operating performances of governance-improving and governance-deteriorating firms. 
The estimates of equations (40) and (41) are reported in Table 43.20 The mean 
annual coefficients on both ∆SCORE and CGC_D are insignificant but negative, 
contrary to the predicted sign. Core et al. (2006) also report unexpected results for 
their governance index and suggest that analysts are aware of the negative effects of 
weak investor rights on operating performance. Similarly, my findings suggest that 
analysts anticipate the implications of improvement in governance for performance 
and are therefore not surprised by the stronger operating performance of 
governance-improving firms. Core et al. (2006) also acknowledge that earnings 
management by bad governance firms may be a possible reason for this. Bauer et al. 
(2004) also suggest that “…Accounting numbers are biased measures of firm 
performance. A negative correlation between earnings and corporate governance 
possibly implies that badly governed companies report less conservative earnings 
                                                 
20 Results based on levels can be found in Appendix 19. 
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estimates” (p.102). In other words, accounting earnings are likely to be overstated for 
governance-deteriorating firms. If analysts do not take account of the earning 
overstatement associated with bad governance practice, then analysts’ forecast error is 
likely to be positive for governance-deteriorating firms, and hence result in a negative 
relationship between governance change and analysts’ forecast error. Overall, the 
results regarding analysts’ forecast error indicate that analysts are not surprised by the 
better operating performance of governance-improving firms. This finding is 
inconsistent with the mispricing explanation. 
 
Earnings Announcement Returns 
In this section, I examine whether the market is surprised by the superior 
operating performance of governance-improving firms at the earnings announcement 
date. If the market learns about the performance of these groups of firms at the time 
earnings are announced, we expect that returns around the earnings announcement 
date will be greater (lower) for governance-improving (governance-deteriorating) 
firms. That being said, if earnings announcements are the sole information events 
from which the market learns about the differences in corporate governance 
performance, all of the annualized return differences will tend to occur on the 
announcement date. If, however, earnings announcements are one of several 
information events for the market to learn the importance of governance, the 
announcement day return is expected to be higher (lower) than the average daily 
return for the governance-improving (governance-deteriorating) firms. 
U.K. firms are not required to report their quarterly earnings. The majority of U.K. 
firms, in fact, report interim six-monthly earnings in addition to the annual report. 
While I am able to obtain the annual report publication date from the I/B/E/S, the 
number of available firms covered by I/B/E/S is small. Moreover I/B/E/S only 
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provides data on interim earnings announcement date since year 2003. To augment 
my data set, I obtain the publication date of the interim six-monthly earnings based on 
information from http://www.northcote.co.uk/company_links/alpha.asp. The 
publication date of the annual report or interim report is defined as the announcement 
day and referred to as day 0. Returns are then computed over various time windows: 
namely, (-1,1), (-3,1), (-5,1), (-10,1) and (-20,1). For instance, (-1,1) is the three-day 
cumulative return from the day prior to the announcement day to the day after the 
announcement day. 
Table 44: Returns around earnings announcements for CG change low, 
CG change middle, and CG change high groups 
Window CG change low 30% CG change middle 40% CG change high 30%
Panel A: Raw Returns 
0.007** 0.008** 0.010*** (-1,1) 
(2.474) (2.252) (2.969) 
0.003 0.009** 0.014** (-2,1) 
(0.772) (2.420) (2.296) 
-0.002 0.011* 0.014** (-5,1) 
(-0.356) (1.801) (2.382) 
0.002 0.010 0.019* (-10,1) 
(0.222) (0.963) (1.943) 
0.015 0.013 0.021 (-20,1) 
(1.026) (0.876) (1.523) 
Panel B: Abnormal Returns 
0.0001 0.001 -0.001 (-1,1) 
(0.050) (0.007) (-0.303) 
0.0002 0.001 0.0003 (-2,1) 
(-0.052) (0.010) (-0.076) 
0.0005 0.002 -0.001 (-5,1) 
(0.091) (0.013) (-0.102) 
0.002 0.005 0.004 (-10,1) 
(0.172) (0.021) (0.461) 
0.010 0.011 0.010 (-20,1) 
(0.648) (0.033) (0.755) 
Panel A shows the raw return for each corporate governance change group over various event 
windows around the earnings announcement. Panel B shows the abnormal return for each 
corporate governance change group over various event windows around the earnings 
announcement. The abnormal return is calculated with the three-factor model of Fama and 
French (1993) for daily returns estimated from day t = -270 to day t = -21 in the same period.  
T-values are computed using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method and are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
I examine both raw returns and abnormal returns around earnings announcements. 
The announcement dates included are from April 2000 to March 2004 in order to 
 160
match the period of investing of the governance portfolios. The four years are divided 
evenly into eight 6-monthly periods, with the first period commencing in April 2000. 
For all the earnings announcements within the given period, I equally weigh each 
return within the same governance group. I then calculate the overall average of the 
equally-weighted average return over the entire period. The t-statistics of the mean 
returns are calculated using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. I obtain the 
results for the different governance change groups in Table 44 using standard event 
study methodology with the benchmark return based on the Fama-French three-factor 
model.21 
Panel A in Table 44 shows the raw returns over various event windows with 
respect to different corporate governance change groups. Results from the three-day 
window (-1,1) show that the raw returns of both firms with a deteriorated governance 
and with an improved governance are significant and positive. The return difference 
between a governance-improving group and a governance-deteriorating group is, in 
fact, equal to 0.3%. The cumulated difference in raw return from year 2001 to year 
2003 is 26.1% between the governance improving group and the governance 
deteriorating group. This is a difference of 0.035% per day, when calculated on a 
daily basis. Therefore, the three-day raw return for the governance improving group 
over the governance deteriorating groups should be greater than 0.10%, provided 
investors have misunderstood the influence of governance change on operating 
performance and correct their mistakes at the time of earnings announcement. Since 
0.3% is larger than 0.10%, the hypothesis is supported here. 
Panel B presents the results for abnormal return computed by deducting the 
expected return from the raw return. After adjusting for risk, all the returns become 
                                                 
21 Results based on governance levels are reported in Appendix 20. 
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insignificant. The signs of the abnormal returns are surprisingly negative (positive) 
for governance-improving (governance-deteriorating) firms. Overall, the available 
evidence on abnormal returns does not support the hypothesis that the market 
perceives the news about earnings on the announcement date to be significantly better 
for governance-improving firms, after adjusting for risk. 
6.3 Summary 
Whether the positive relation between a firm’s performance and governance 
change is understood by the market is investigated in Section 6.1. My results show 
that post-investment returns are positively related to governance change rather than 
the level of governance. An investment strategy that goes long on an “improvement 
portfolio” and shorts a “deterioration portfolio” is found to earn an average monthly 
return of 72 basis points, or about 8.6% per year. Moreover, after adjusting for risk 
factors with Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, the abnormal return is significantly 
positive for the “improvement portfolio minus deterioration portfolio”, but negative 
for the “good governance portfolio minus bad governance portfolio”. 
However, it is still unclear whether excess returns accruing to corporate 
governance change firms can be explained by risk or mispricing. I regard the cost of 
equity capital as an overall risk measure, and hypothesize that improvement in 
corporate governance reduces a firm’s cost of equity by exposing the firm to lower 
market risk. Although I find a negative relation between the change in corporate 
governance and the cost of equity capital, this relation is not observed in the level of 
corporate governance. Instead of reducing market risk, improvement in corporate 
governance is found to lead to an increase in market risk. Therefore, in my study, 
corporate governance is analyzed as a separate risk to market beta. Improvement in 
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corporate governance lowers the cost of equity capital by reducing corporate 
governance risk after controlling for market risk. However, when excess returns of 
individual stocks in the U.K. market are regressed on the return of governance change 
factor portfolio, the estimate is negative, implying that corporate governance change 
is not a risk factor in the explanation of the variation in stock returns. 
In support of the cash flow explanation, I find that improvement in corporate 
governance is associated with future improvement in a firm’s operating performance. 
Specifically, ROA, EBITDA, EBIT, ordinary income and net income are positively 
associated with change in corporate governance. However, governance-improving 
firms pay fewer dividends for a given level of profit which I interpret as the 
substitution effect between dividend payment and corporate governance. 
However, my further investigations indicate that analysts seem to understand the 
implications of governance change for operating performance. This finding is 
inconsistent with the mispricing hypothesis that investors misunderstand the 
implications of governance for performance, and they are surprised about superior 
(inferior) operating performance for governance-improving (governance-deteriorating) 
firms. Even though the announcement day raw return is higher (lower) than the 
average daily return for governance-improving (governance-deteriorating) firms, my 
findings for the abnormal return on announcement day show the contrary. Such 
inconsistency may be due to an insufficient risk adjustment for the raw return. Based 
on the results on abnormal return, it seems that the market is not surprised by the 




7.1 Summary of Research Findings 
In this thesis, I examine three corporate governance related issues, namely, the 
determinants of corporate governance, the relationship between corporate governance 
and a firm’s performance, and the impact of corporate governance on stock returns. I 
use a scorecard developed by S&P to assess the corporate governance of U.K.-listed 
companies and changes in corporate governance of these companies over time. 
With respect to the determinants of corporate governance, I find that governance 
change is driven by change in firm characteristics. As expected, an improvement in 
investment opportunities, an increase in external financing needs, R&D spending by 
firms, and an increase in free cash flow are associated with an improvement in 
corporate governance. 
One of the most important findings of this study is that it is the change in 
governance rather than the governance level that determines performance. 
Governance-improving firms are found to have higher future Tobin’s Q. In addition, a 
trading strategy based on the change in corporate governance yields an average 
monthly return of 72 basis points, or about 8.6% per year. 
A more interesting question is how corporate governance enhances firm value. 
Higher market value should be associated with more efficient operations, less free 
cash flow problems and, in turn, improved operating performance. As expected, I find 
that improvement in corporate governance is associated with future improvement in a 
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firm’s profitability as measured by ROA, EBITDA, EBIT, ordinary income, or net 
income. Moreover, I find that improvements in corporate governance prevent 
managers from stockpiling large reserves and as such improve the value of excess 
cash holdings.  
Alternatively, the positive association may reflect the effect of corporate 
governance on the cost of equity capital. My empirical findings suggest that 
improvement in corporate governance lowers a firm’s cost of equity capital as well. 
7.2 Contributions and Implications 
My thesis builds upon recent advances in finance and accounting literature on the 
role of corporate governance on a firm’s performance (e.g. Gompers et al, 2003; 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Hail and Leuz, 2006; Core et al., 2004). In this thesis, 
I adopt an aggregate measure of corporate governance that uses data from a corporate 
governance scorecard. The corporate governance score is, in fact, an arguably better 
measure of governance as compared to individual aspects of governance structure, as 
the aggregate score not only incorporates the impact of multiple governance elements, 
but also takes into account various tradeoffs among the individual elements. 
In this study, I focus on changes in governance rather than the levels of 
governance, unlike earlier studies in this area that tend to focus on cross-sectional 
investigations. This allows me to examine the influence of time-varying governance 
score on performance and valuation. Moreover, using panel data enables an analysis 
of fixed effects and differences in governance to be conducted, and it directly 
examines whether changes in corporate governance influence a firm’s performance. 
Unlike previous studies which have focused on the impact of governance on one 
particular outcome, my study also examines other important relationships which 
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include: (1) the direct effect on a firm’s valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q; (2) the 
impact on cash holdings; and (3) the impact on the cost of capital. 
Developments viewed in isolation by earlier studies are considered together in this 
study. I explicitly investigate the influence of governance and governance change on 
free cash flow and the cost of capital. My empirical findings suggest that 
improvement in corporate governance not only improves the value of excess cash 
holdings but also lowers a firm’s cost of equity capital. 
There is an extensive literature which shows that firm governance is determined 
endogenously by monitoring requirements. My thesis extends this literature by giving 
a glimpse into the process by which this occurs. It shows the importance of 
accounting for a firm’s ability to self-adjust its governance. Otherwise, it could result 
in misleading measurements of the consequences of governance on firm performance 
and eventually in misguided policy changes. Since my focus is on the change in 
governance, my study is less affected by endogeneity problems as compared to prior 
literature which focuses on the level of governance. 
My findings on stock returns corroborate existing studies in the literature (e.g. 
Gompers et al., 2003) that the market does not fully incorporate the effects of 
corporate governance into the current stock price. As mentioned earlier, since my 
analysis is based on the change in corporate governance for a firm over time, it 
provides useful information to investors in forming portfolios based on change in 
governance instead of on governance level, to obtain abnormal returns. Furthermore, I 
extend the study of Core et al. (2004) by explicitly testing various hypotheses related 
to mispricing and risk. However, the findings in my study do not provide a definitive 
answer. 
As my findings suggest that firms improving their corporate governance over time 
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perform better, the change in governance is more important than the level of 
governance in determining a firm’s market valuation. This finding is useful to listed 
firms as the firms may improve corporate governance over time to increase their 
operating performance, reduce free cash flow problems, lower cost of equity capital 
and, in turn, increase firm value. This will be especially important for firms with 
relatively low rankings at the initial stage. 
My study also implies that the information obtained from longitudinal corporate 
governance disclosures matters more than that gained from cross-sectional absolute 
governance rankings in evaluating a firm’s performance. By carefully choosing the 
governance-improving firms and governance-deteriorating firms, investors may have 
greater opportunities to earn higher portfolio returns. 
These findings also have implications for large shareholders and institutional 
investors. As my results reveal that a governance-improving firm is associated with a 
lower cost of equity capital and higher valuation, large investors may be able to 
achieve a higher valuation for their assets by removing certain governance 
deficiencies, such as absence from board meetings, opacity of top executives’ 
remuneration, etc. 
7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
In this section, some limitations of the study are discussed. First, since the 
corporate governance score is equally weighted, it may not accurately reflect the 
relative importance of the individual proxies. However, equal weighting has the 
advantage of being transparent and easily reproducible. Moreover, my conclusions 
regarding the relationship between corporate governance and firm value are not 
affected when I standardize the categories, suggesting that the findings are not solely 
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driven by the design of the scorecard. 
Second, while my study focuses on disclosure, I do not assess the quality of the 
information provided or identify any disclosure that may be incorrect or fraudulent. 
Third, for consistent and objective comparison, this study focuses only on annual 
report disclosures and does not include the different types of company disclosures that 
may prevail. Future research may enlarge the scope of the information sets used to 
conduct the analysis. 
Fourth, my study focuses exclusively on the link between corporate governance 
and a firm’s cost of equity capital. In future research, it may be interesting to explore 
whether improvement in corporate governance is able to reduce a firm’s cost of debt. 
As a result, future investigation in combination with this research may provide a 
clearer picture with regards to the firm’s overall (or weighted) cost of capital. 
The fifth shortcoming of the present study is related to how the cost of equity 
capital is computed. In empirical accounting literature, the cost of capital is 
notoriously difficult to measure. Prior literature has, however, shown that realized 
return is a poor proxy for cost of equity capital. To this end, similar to Hail and Leuz 
(2006), I have calculated the cost of equity as the average of internal rate of returns 
based on four valuation models. My validation test which correlates the calculated 
cost of equity to general risk factors, indicates that my proxy of the cost of equity is 
an appropriate measure. Additionally, I also add analysts’ forecast errors and past 
returns as controls to mitigate the measurement error from forecasted variables, which 
also show that my results are sufficiently robust. 
I admit that my approach may not fully solve the endogeneity problem. The 
question of whether or not there exists a fundamental relation between market 
valuation and corporate governance remains unresolved. A well developed analysis of 
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the effect of corporate governance on market valuation should possibly be addressed 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Key provisions relating to companies in the U.K. Code (1998) 
 
A.  DIRECTORS 
The Board 
1. Every listed company should be headed by an effective board which should lead 
and control the company. 
Chairman and CEO 
2. There are two key tasks at the top of every public company - the running of the 
board and the executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. 
There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company 
which will ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one individual 
has unfettered powers of decision. 
Board Balance 
3. The board should include a balance of executive and non-executive directors 
(including independent non-executives) such that no individual or small group 
of individuals can dominate the board’s decision taking. 
Supply of Information 
4. The board should be supplied in a timely manner with information in a form and 
of a quality appropriate to enable it to discharge its duties. 
Appointments to the Board 
5. There should be a formal and transparent procedure for the appointment of new 
directors to the board. 
Re-election 
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6. All directors should be required to submit themselves for re-election at regular 
intervals and at least every three years. 
B.  DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION 
The Level and Make-up of Remuneration 
1.  Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract and retain the directors 
needed to run the company successfully, but companies should avoid paying 
more than is necessary for this purpose. A proportion of executive directors’ 
remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and 
individual performance. 
Procedure 
2.  Companies should establish a formal and transparent procedure for developing 
policy on executive remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of 
individual directors. No director should be involved in deciding his or her own 
remuneration. 
Disclosure 
3.  The company’s annual report should contain a statement of remuneration policy 
and details of the remuneration of each director. 
C.  RELATIONS WITH SHAREHOLDERS 
Dialogue with Institutional Shareholders 
1. Companies should be ready, where practicable, to enter into a dialogue with 
institutional shareholders based on the mutual understanding of objectives. 
Constructive Use of the AGM 
2.  Boards should use the AGM to communicate with private investors and 
encourage their participation. 
D.  ACCOUNTABILITY AND AUDIT 
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Financial Reporting 
1. The board should present a balanced and understandable assessment of the 
company’s position and prospects. 
Internal Control 
2. The board should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard 
shareholders’ investment and the company’s assets. 
Audit Committee and Auditors 
3.  The board should establish formal and transparent arrangements for considering 
how they should apply the financial reporting and internal control principles and 
for maintaining an appropriate relationship with the company’s auditors. 
Source: the Combined Code (1998). 
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Appendix 2: Description of the construction of the corporate governance score 
 
The scorecard is an Excel file with two worksheets, one named “data”, and the 
other named “score”. I need to extract governance-related information from a firm’s 
annual reports to answer the 119 questions in the “data” worksheet. Ninety-three of 
the questions are binary questions and one point is given for each best practice 
complied with and zero otherwise; or if the company did not disclose whether it had 
complied with such best practices. The remaining questions were answered with 
specific integers such as “number of members in the remuneration committee” and 
“number of independent members in the remuneration committee”. 
The 136 corporate governance elements are presented in the “score” worksheet. 
The scorecard includes a formula that links the two worksheets together. For instance, 
if a company has six members in the remuneration committee and four of them are 
independent, I will record “6” and “4” as answers to these two questions in the “data” 
worksheet. Corresponding to this question, there is a corporate governance element, 
namely, “the majority of the remuneration committee is independent” in the “score” 
worksheet. The built-in formula will automatically compute the percentage of 
independent members in the remuneration committee (4/6) and compare the 
calculated value with 0.5. Since it is greater than 0.5, the company earns one point for 
this element. It earns zero otherwise. 
As for a few of the questions, the answer corresponds with more than one score 
element. There are altogether 136 best practice elements for the scorecard. Four out of 
the 136 elements can score up to a maximum of two points instead of one. Therefore, 
the maximum possible score for one company with 136 score elements is 140. The 
total score is the summation of the points for each element. Generally, such a measure 
assigns an equal weighting to each disclosed element with the exception of the four 
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elements which can each attain a maximum score of two. Thus each of these four 
elements carries a slightly higher weighting.
A3- 1
Appendix 3: Industry composition – by divisions and major groups 












Mining  8  1.2% 56.58 56.50  2.11  1.50  
10: Metal Mining   8  1.2% 56.58 56.50  2.11  1.50  
Construction  24  3.6% 59.17 57.50  3.71  2.00  
15: Building Construction General Contractors 
And Operative Builders  20  3.0% 60.95 59.50  3.07  2.50  
16: Heavy Construction Other Than Building 
Construction Contractors  4  0.6% 50.25 46.00  6.67  2.00  
Manufacturing  271  41.2% 61.56 61.50  3.43  2.00  
20: Food And Kindred Products  35  5.3% 59.53 62.00  2.44  2.00  
21: Tobacco Products  8  1.2% 61.43 60.00  3.83  2.53  
22: Textile Mill Products  1  0.2% 73.00 73.00  n.a. n.a. 
26: Paper And Allied Products  5  0.8% 58.60 60.00  3.67  4.00  
27: Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries  34  5.2% 57.87 58.50  2.11  2.00  
28: Chemicals And Allied Products  52  7.9% 61.57 62.00  5.32  2.00  
29: Petroleum Refining And Related Industries  8  1.2% 52.81 52.63  4.93  4.75  
30: Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products 1  0.2% 71.00 71.00  n.a. n.a. 
32: Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products  19  2.9% 62.58 64.00  3.79  3.50  
33: Primary Metal Industries  14  2.1% 63.86 60.50  5.40  2.50  
34: Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery 
And Transportation Equipment  7  1.1% 60.22 64.00  2.71  4.55  
35: Industrial And Commercial Machinery And 
Computer Equipment  18  2.7% 60.52 59.50  2.58  1.00  
36: Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment 
And Components, Except Computer Equipment  33  5.0% 66.23 61.50  3.24  3.00  
37: Transportation Equipment  17  2.6% 62.83 61.00  3.85  3.00  
38: Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling 
Instruments; Photographic, Medical And Optical 
Goods; Watches And Clocks  
19  2.9% 64.88 67.00  0.55  0.50  
Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas, And Sanitary Services   125  19.0% 62.50 62.00  3.12  2.03  
40: Railroad Transportation  3  0.5% 66.67 66.00  2.00  2.00  
41: Local And Suburban Transit And Interurban 
Highway Passenger Transportation  15  2.3% 58.00 61.00  5.13  3.00  
42: Motor Freight Transportation And 
Warehousing  2  0.3% 59.50 59.50  1.00  1.00  
44: Water Transportation  8  1.2% 63.25 61.50  5.33  5.50  
45: Transportation By Air  14  2.1% 65.89 69.00  0.70  1.00  
47: Transportation Services  6  0.9% 51.33 51.50  2.25  3.00  
48: Communications  32  4.9% 63.16 61.00  3.63  3.00  
49: Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services  45  6.8% 63.70 63.00  2.80  2.00  
Wholesale Trade  27  4.1% 61.78 59.50  1.96  1.00  
50: Wholesale Trade-durable Goods  14  2.1% 65.40 66.17  -0.03  0.00  
51: Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods  13  2.0% 57.88 57.50  4.17  2.00  
Retail Trade  70  10.6% 64.14 65.00  3.27  3.00  
52: Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, 
And Mobile Home Dealers  7  1.1% 68.14 69.00  1.60  2.00  
53: General Merchandise Stores  10  1.5% 69.16 69.00  3.84  4.00  
54: Food Stores  17  2.6% 59.71 61.00  3.64  2.00  
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56: Apparel And Accessory Stores  4  0.6% 61.75 62.50  1.33  3.00  
57: Home Furniture, Furnishings, And Equipment 
Stores  4  0.6% 71.50 70.50  2.33  3.00  
58: Eating And Drinking Places  8  1.2% 63.75 62.00  2.50  2.50  
59: Miscellaneous Retail  20  3.0% 63.17 63.00  4.26  5.00  
Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate   18  2.7% 57.57 56.85  4.26  4.00  
62: Security And Commodity Brokers, Dealers, 
Exchanges, And Services  2  0.3% 71.00 71.00  5.75  5.75  
64: Insurance Agents, Brokers, And Service  4  0.6% 44.75 44.00  3.00  3.00  
67: Holding And Other Investment Offices  12  1.8% 59.60 57.50  4.36  4.00  
Services  110  16.7% 61.74 61.00  3.31  2.00  
70: Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, And Other 
Lodging Places  10  1.5% 63.86 62.80  3.95  3.00  
72: Personal Services  3  0.5% 56.33 56.00  1.50  1.50  
73: Business Services  55  8.4% 60.10 58.00  3.84  2.50  
75: Automotive Repair, Services, And Parking  4  0.6% 54.00 53.00  2.67  4.00  
78: Motion Pictures  4  0.6% 60.40 60.50  4.87  7.60  
79: Amusement And Recreation Services  4  0.6% 73.50 73.50  1.00  0.00  
80: Health Services  3  0.5% 63.67 64.00  0.50  0.50  
87: Engineering, Accounting, Research, 
Management, And Related Services  23  3.5% 63.57 63.00  3.00  1.00  
89: Miscellaneous Services  4  0.6% 68.37 68.14  0.36  0.00  
Public Administration   5  0.8% 60.60 60.00  2.80  2.00  
99: Nonclassifiable Establishments  5  0.8% 60.60 60.00  2.80  2.00  
SCORE refers to the corporate governance scorecard, while ΔSCORE refers to change of corporate 
governance over the previous year. 
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Appendix 4: Summary of variables 
 
Panel A: Endogenous Variables 
 
SCORE: corporate governance index obtained from the corporate governance 
disclosure scorecard. 
∆SCORE: SCOREt – SCOREt-1. 
INSIDE: percentage of beneficial shares held by executive directors and 
non-executive directors.  
BLOCK: percentage of shares held by shareholders who have more than 5% of shares 
of the firm. 
INST: percentage of shares held by institutions. 
D/V: D/V=
V
CASH-PFDSTDLTD ++  
where 
V = total liabilities+ preferred capital+ market value of equity 
LTD = Book value of long-term debt 
STD = Book value of short-term debt 
PFD = preferred capital 
CASH = cash and marketable securities 
CASH: the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets minus cash and 
marketable securities. 
Q: sum of market value of ordinary shares issued, the total book value of debt and the 
book value of preference shares, divided by book value of assets. 
FUTUREQ: Tobin’s Q in the following year. 
∆Q: FUTUREQ minus Q. 
 
Panel B: Control Variables 
FSIZE: ln(sales). 
K/S: Property, Plant and Equipment over sales. 
Y/S: operating income/sales. 
RDUM: a dummy variable equal to unity if R&D data are available, and zero 
otherwise. 
R&D/K: R&D expenditure to Property, Plant and Equipment. 
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I/K: capital expenditure/Property, Plant and Equipment. 
EXT_FIN: the difference between the firm’s actual growth rate and the sustainable 
growth rate. I estimate a firm’s actual growth rate as the geometric average of annual 
growth rate in total assets for the current and previous years, and the sustainable 
growth rate as the geometric average of ROE/(1-ROE) over the same period. ROE is 
defined as net income over book value of equity. 
EXCESSCASH: the residuals generated from regressions of CASH on predictors of 
cash holdings. 
REALSIZE: natural log of assets, deflated using the CPI (Consumer Price Index).  
INV_OPP: investment opportunities: geometric average of annual percentage sales 
growth both in the past and current years. 
CASHFLOW: cash flow ratio: earnings before interest and taxes, but before 
depreciation and amortization, less interest, taxes and common dividends, divided by 
net assets. Net assets are assets net of cash. 
WC: net working capital: Current assets net of cash minus current liabilities divided 
by net assets. 
SIGMA: the firm’s standard deviation of the cash flow ratio (CASHFLOW) from year 
1994 to year 2002. 
DIV_D: set to one if the firm paid a dividend in the year, and set to 0 if it did not. 
REG: 1 for a firm in a regulated industry, viz. public utility, railroad (i.e., primary 
2-digit SIC code=40, 48, 49, 60, 61 or 63), 0 otherwise. 
R&D/S: R&D expenditure over sales. 
CPEX: capital expenditure divided by net assets. 
ADR: a dummy variable equal to unity if a firm trade ADRs on a major U.S. 
exchange (NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ), zero otherwise. 
OUTDIRE: average number of directorships held by non-executive directors in 
unaffiliated firms. 
TENURE: average number of years directors have stayed on the board. 
NOD: total number of directors. 
RISK: the standard deviation of idiosyncratic stock price risk, calculated as the stand 
error of the residuals from a CAPM model estimated using daily data for the period 
covered by the annual sample. 
RDA: research and development expenditures/total assets. 
RDAI: average RDA for the 2-digit SIC industry of the firm.  
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NINSTI: average number of institutional owners for the 2-digit SIC industry of the 
firm. 




V = total liabilities+ preferred capital+ market value of equity. 
OCF = sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general and administrative expense 
 + depreciation. 
COLLATERAL: collateral value of assets: inventory /total assets. 
TAXSHIELD: non-debt tax shield: depreciation/earnings before depreciation. 
ΔFSIZE: FSIZEt – FSIZEt-1. 
ΔD/V: D/Vt – D/Vt-1. 
ΔRDA: RDAt – RDAt-1. 
ΔRISK: RISKt – RISKt-1. 
AGE: the number of years that the firm has been incorporated. 
NEWCEO: a dummy variable equal to unity if the firm changes its CEO within the 
year, and zero otherwise. 
Q(-1) and Q(-2): the Tobin’s Q value in the past two years.  
ROA(-1) and ROA(-2): the industry adjusted return on assets in the past two years. 
RETURN(-1) and RETURN(-2) the annual stock return net of the return for the 
median firm in the corresponding equity capitalization quintile in the past two years. 
 
Panel C: Control Variables for Cost of Equity Capital 
ME: firm size. Natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the fourth month 
after the end of the firm’s fiscal year. 
BM: book value of equity at the end of fiscal year divided by market value of equity 
at the fourth month after the end of the firm’s fiscal year. 
BETA: the firm’s market-model beta coefficient based on 60 consecutive monthly 
returns ended at the fourth month after the end of the firm’s fiscal year. 
FERR: forecasts error. the actual earnings minus the mean I/B/E/S consensus forecast 
of annual earnings per share, measured eight months before the end of the firm’s 
fiscal year, scaled by share price at the fourth month after the end of the firm’s fiscal 
year t. 
MM6: the compounded return over the previous six months. 
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Panel D: Operating Performance Measures 
ROA: operating income divided by the average of beginning-and-ending period book 
value of total assets. 
OPERATINGINCOME: operating income (COMPUSTAT data 14: Operating 
Income). 
OI: ordinary income (COMPUSTAT data 21: Income (Loss) Before Income Taxes & 
Appro). 
EBIT: EBIT (COMPUSTAT data 21 + data 15: Income (Loss) Before Income Taxes & 
Appro + Interest and Related Expense). 
EBITDA: EBITDA (COMPUSTAT data 21 + data 15 + data 11: Income (Loss) 
Before Income Taxes & Appro + Interest and Related Expense + Depreciation and 
Amortization - Total). 
NI: net income (COMPUSTAT data 32: Net Income). 
SALES: sales (COMPUSTAT data 1: Sales/Turnover (Net)). 
CAPITALEXP: capital expenditure (COMPUSTAT data 145: Additions to Fixed 
Assets). 
DIVIDENDS: dividends (COMPUSTAT data 36: Dividends). 
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Appendix 5: Determinants of corporate 
governance: OLS regressions of SCORE on 
ownership and/or firm characteristics variables 
(pooled data) 
Variable Ownership only Characteristics only Combined  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 53.867*** 24.607*** 34.657*** 
 (51.868) (11.734) (12.603) 
INSIDE -17.500*** - -11.148*** 
 (-8.078) - (-6.997) 
BLOCK -7.063*** - -9.526*** 
 (-3.759) - (-4.859) 
INST 0.551 - 4.761*** 
 (0.287) - (3.763) 
FSIZE - 5.417*** 3.349*** 
 - (8.804) (5.515) 
FSIZE2 - -0.283*** -0.163*** 
 - (-5.288) (-3.217) 
K/S - 1.110*** 1.093*** 
 - (5.489) (4.689) 
(K/S)2 - -0.040*** -0.043*** 
 - (-3.859) (-3.336) 
Y/S - -1.596 -2.723 
 - (-0.948) (-1.362) 
RDUM - 2.007*** 1.549** 
 - (3.065) (2.321) 
R&D/K - 0.124 -0.614 
 - (0.088) (-0.412) 
I/K - -0.678 -0.293 
 - (-0.501) (-0.219) 
EXT_FIN - 0.197 0.201 
 - (1.579) (1.553) 
no. of obs 658 645 645 
Adj. R2 0.2238 0.2320 0.2706 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each 
variable are given in Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies 
are included for all regressions, but not reported. * refers to 
significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at 




Appendix 6: Determinants of firm value: OLS 
regressions of FUTUREQ on SCORE, ownership 
and/or firm characteristics variables (pooled 
data) 
Variable Ownership only Characteristics only Combined  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 3.777*** 5.753*** 7.424*** 
 (8.554) (4.540) (4.870) 
SCORE -0.018** -0.005 -0.007 
 (-2.124) (-0.950) (-1.286) 
INSIDE 0.340 - -1.414*** 
 (0.831) - (-3.052) 
BLOCK -0.190 - 0.303 
 (-0.232) - (0.670) 
INST -1.791*** - -2.134*** 
 (-2.887) - (-5.215) 
FSIZE - -0.840** -0.963*** 
 - (-2.540) (-2.711) 
FSIZE2 - 0.051** 0.054** 
 - (2.581) (2.553) 
K/S - -0.511*** -0.581*** 
 - (-5.626) (-6.681) 
(K/S)2 - 0.024*** 0.026*** 
 - (4.879) (5.630) 
Y/S - 1.773*** 1.713*** 
 - (3.471) (3.722) 
RDUM - 0.192* 0.220** 
 - (1.652) (2.084) 
R&D/K - 0.281 0.093 
 - (0.774) (0.287) 
I/K - -0.034 -0.114 
 - (-0.319) (-0.839) 
EXT_FIN - 0.021 0.023 
 - (1.467) (1.569) 
no. of obs 639 626 626 
Adj. R2 0.0470 0.1726 0.2010 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each 
variable are given in Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies 
are included for all regressions, but not reported. * refers to 
significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at 
the 5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 
percent level. 
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Appendix 7: Incidence of individual elements of corporate governance 
    1999 2000 2001 2002 
  Board Matters         
A1 Is the frequency of board meetings disclosed? 80.3% 81.7% 81.7% 86.8%
A2 Did the board meet more than 4 times in the year? 73.0% 76.0% 78.3% 83.3%
A3 Did the board meet more than 6 times in the year? 57.7% 58.9% 60.0% 61.5%
A4 Did the board meet more than 8 times in the year? 37.2% 36.6% 37.7% 36.2%
A5 Did the board meet 12 times or more in the year? 16.1% 12.6% 10.9% 8.6% 
A6 Is the aggregate board attendance disclosed? 1.5% 3.4% 3.4% 10.3%
A7 Are directors attending over 60% of the board meetings? 1.5% 3.4% 3.4% 10.3%
A8 Are directors attending over 80% of the board meetings? 1.5% 3.4% 3.4% 10.3%
A9 Are directors attending 100% of the board meetings? 0.0% 0.6% 1.1% 1.7% 
A10 Do independent directors constitute more than 1/3 of the board? 81.0% 88.0% 89.1% 93.7%
A11 Do independent directors constitute more than 1/2 of the board? 25.5% 34.9% 35.4% 37.9%
A12 Do independent directors constitute more than 2/3 of the board? 3.6% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 
A13 Is attendance of individual directors at board meetings disclosed? 0.0% 0.6% 1.1% 5.2% 
A14 Does the company’s M&A allow for telephonic or videoconference meetings? 0.7% 1.7% 1.1% 2.9% 
A15 Is there disclosure of company’s guidelines of matters that require approval by the board? 81.0% 84.0% 86.3% 88.5%
A16 Do the guidelines disclose the type of material transactions that must be approved by the board? 43.1% 47.4% 48.6% 50.6%
A17 Does the company have a training program for all of its directors? 32.1% 33.1% 36.0% 44.8%
A18 Are the details of training provided to directors disclosed? (like number of directors sent for training, where did they receive the training etc) 0.7% 0.6% 1.1% 2.9% 
A19 Is there an orientation program for all new directors? 33.6% 36.6% 41.7% 49.4%
A20 Does the orientation program cover the company’s business and governance practices? 12.4% 15.4% 17.1% 21.8%
A21 Does the company provide ongoing training on new laws, regulations and changing commercial risks? 16.8% 17.1% 17.7% 25.3%
A22 Is the complete list of board members disclosed? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
A23 If answer to #15 is yes, is detailed information on each director disclosed? 97.8% 99.4% 99.4% 99.4%
A24 If answer to #15 is yes, does it include details of previous employment? 97.8% 98.9% 99.4% 99.4%
A25 If answer to #15 is yes, are educational qualifications of directors disclosed? 25.5% 25.1% 24.0% 25.9%
A26 If answer to #15 is yes, are other directorships of directors disclosed? 98.5% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
A27 Is each director is classed as independent or not by name? 95.6% 97.1% 96.6% 97.7%
A28 Has the board reviewed the size of the board? 4.4% 5.7% 6.3% 9.8% 
A29 Has disclosure been made of the factors and criteria in determining the size of the board? 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 
A30 
Are the chairman and CEO positions held by 
same(S)/related(R)/unrelated(U) persons? - Score 2 if U, 1 if R and 0 
for S or ND 
89.1% 90.9% 90.3% 92.0%
A31 Are the chairman’s responsibilities with respect to board proceedings disclosed? 6.6% 8.0% 6.9% 10.9%
A32 
If answer to #24 is yes, do they include matters such as scheduling 
board meetings, preparation of agenda for board meetings, control over 
information flows between management and the board, and compliance 
with company’s guidelines on corporate governance? 
4.4% 2.9% 2.9% 5.2% 
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A33 Are all directors required to seek nomination and re-election at regular intervals (at least once every 3 years)? 53.3% 71.4% 75.4% 78.2%
A34 Are directors’ service contracts for periods not more than 3 years? 97.1% 96.6% 97.1% 97.7%
A35 Does the board have separate and independent access to company’s senior management? 19.0% 18.3% 18.3% 23.6%
A36 Is the board provided with supporting background or explanatory information for matters brought before the board? 78.1% 80.0% 80.0% 85.6%
A37 Does the board receive explanation of variances between projections (budgets) and results? 71.5% 64.0% 58.3% 56.9%
A38 Does the board have separate and independent access to the company secretary? 63.5% 65.1% 68.0% 70.7%
A39 Is the role of the company secretary defined? 24.8% 25.7% 25.1% 33.9%
A40 
If answer to #32 is yes, does it include responsibility for ensuring that 
board procedures are followed and compliance of applicable rules and 
regulations? 
22.6% 23.4% 24.0% 31.6%
A41 Does the company secretary attend all board meetings? 2.2% 1.7% 2.9% 2.9% 
A42 Does the company have an agreed procedure for directors to take independent professional advice? 72.3% 71.4% 75.4% 80.5%
A43 Does the management provide the board with monthly management accounts? 54.7% 57.7% 54.3% 53.4%
 Nomination Matters     
B1 Does the company have a nominating committee? 92.7% 93.7% 94.9% 96.0%
B2 Is the list of members of the nominating committee disclosed? 89.1% 90.3% 91.4% 93.7%
B3 Is the majority of nominating committee independent? 75.9% 77.7% 77.1% 83.3%
B4 Are all members of the nominating committee independent? 13.1% 17.7% 19.4% 25.9%
B5 Is the chairman of the nominating committee independent? 53.3% 58.3% 61.7% 67.8%
B6 Does the nominating committee make recommendations on all board appointments? 81.8% 82.3% 84.6% 86.2%
B7 Are the nominating committee’s terms of reference in writing? 38.7% 42.9% 46.3% 53.4%
B8 If answer to #43 is yes, do these describe responsibilities of the nominating committee’s members? 10.2% 10.3% 10.9% 15.5%
B9 Does the nominating committee review, at least annually, whether or not a director is independent? 2.2% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 
B10 Does the nominating committee review adequacy of time spent by directors, who have multiple directorships, on affairs of each company? 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 
B11 Is disclosure made of directors’ particulars where their names are submitted for election/re-election? 91.2% 92.6% 93.7% 93.1%
B12 Is disclosure made of individual member's attendance at the nomination committee meetings: 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 2.9% 
B13 Is the frequency of NC meetings disclosed? 8.0% 8.0% 12.6% 17.2%
B14 Did the NC meet more than 2 times in the year? 0.7% 2.3% 2.3% 5.2% 
B15 Did the NC meet more than 4 times in the year? 0.0% 1.1% 0.6% 1.7% 
B16 Was the attendance at NC meetings more than 60%? 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 2.9% 
B17 Was the attendance at NC meetings more than 80%? 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 2.3% 
B18 Was the attendance at NC meetings 100%? 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 2.3% 
B19 Is appraisal of board performance conducted? 3.6% 3.4% 4.0% 8.6% 
B20 Has the nominating committee established criteria for evaluation of performance of the board?  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 
B21 Is disclosure made of the process of board evaluation? (e.g. conducted by external party, conducted by NC, by shareholders etc.) 1.5% 1.7% 2.3% 5.2% 
B22 
Is criteria for evaluating board performance disclosed?  e.g. 
Company’s share price performance over past years; Return on assets; 
Return on equity; Return on investment; Economic value added; 
Profitability on capital employed 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 
B23 Is individual performance of board members evaluated? 6.6% 6.9% 6.3% 6.3% 
B24 If the answer to #56 is yes, is criteria for individual director performance evaluation disclosed? 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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B25 Is disclosure made of the process of director evaluation? (e.g. conducted by external party, conducted by NC, by shareholders etc.) 3.6% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 
 Remuneration Matters     
C1 Does the company have a remuneration committee? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
C2 Is the list of remuneration committee members disclosed? 100.0% 99.4% 99.4% 99.4%
C3 Is the majority of RC independent? 92.7% 94.3% 93.7% 97.1%
C4 Are all members of the RC independent? 81.8% 81.1% 81.7% 85.1%
C5 Is the remuneration committee chaired by an independent non-executive director? 89.8% 92.6% 93.1% 93.1%
C6 Is disclosure made of individual member's attendance at the remuneration committee meetings 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 4.6% 
C7 Is the frequency of RC meetings disclosed? 30.7% 37.7% 38.9% 53.4%
C8 Did the RC meet more than 2 times in the year? 16.8% 20.6% 23.4% 39.1%
C9 Did the RC meet more than 4 times in the year? 5.8% 5.1% 6.9% 14.9%
C10 Was the attendance at the RC meetings more than 60%? 0.0% 0.6% 1.7% 5.7% 
C11 Was the attendance at the RC meetings more than 80%? 0.0% 0.6% 1.7% 5.2% 
C12 Was the attendance at the RC meetings 100%? 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 2.3% 
C13 Is at least one remuneration committee member knowledgeable about executive compensation? 1.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 
C14 Does the remuneration committee recommend to the board a framework of remuneration for the board and key executives? 69.3% 66.9% 70.3% 71.3%
C15 Does the remuneration committee determine specific remuneration packages for executive directors and the CEO? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
C16 Are the remuneration committee’s recommendations submitted for endorsement by the entire board? 13.1% 14.3% 18.3% 37.4%
C17 Does the remuneration committee’s review include all aspects of remuneration (such as salaries, fees, allowances, bonuses and options)? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
C18 
Is disclosure made of the remuneration committee’s processes (e.g. 
external compensation specialists hired) to ascertain industry practices 
and salary levels for pay and employment conditions? 
77.4% 78.9% 82.9% 90.8%
C19 Is executive director compensation linked to industry, company and/or individual performance? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
C20 Is the Percentage of performance-related elements of executive directors’ remuneration > 50%? 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
C21 Is compensation of non-executive directors linked to their level of contribution and responsibilities, and time spent and effort? 35.8% 35.4% 37.1% 44.8%
C22 Were industry experts consulted on the remuneration of non-executive directors? 13.9% 12.0% 12.0% 19.5%
C23 Has the board recommended all components of non-executive director compensation for approval at the annual general meetings? 5.8% 7.4% 12.6% 42.5%
C24 Do service contracts for directors contain onerous removal clauses? (Score 1 of No and 0 if Yes) 99.3% 99.4% 99.4% 99.4%
C25 Did the remuneration committee consider the appropriateness of compensation commitments for early termination of directors? 65.7% 61.1% 58.9% 81.0%
C26 Are directors prevented from deciding on their own remuneration? 49.6% 54.3% 59.4% 67.2%
C27 
Does director remuneration include long term incentives? E.g. bonuses 
payable after 12 months and/or share option with a vesting period > 12 
months 
98.5% 98.9% 100.0% 100.0%
C28 
Is disclosure made to shareholders of remuneration of executive 
directors? (E if in exact amount & B if in bands of $250K) - Score 2 if 
E, 1 if B and 0 if ND) 
99.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
C29 
Is disclosure made to shareholders of remuneration of non-executive 
directors? (E if in exact amount & B if in bands of $250K) - Score 2 if 
E, 1 if B and 0 if ND) 
99.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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C30 
Is disclosure made to shareholders of remuneration of top 5 executives 
who are not directors? (E if in exact amount & B if in bands of $250K) - 
Score 2 if E, 1 if B and 0 if ND) 
1.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 
C31 Is disclosure made of components of remuneration analyzed by salaries, variable bonuses, options and long-term incentives? 99.3% 99.4% 100.0% 100.0%
C32 Is full disclosure made of remuneration of each director by name? 99.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
C33 
Is disclosure made of remuneration to an employee who is an immediate 
family member of a director or the CEO, and whose own remuneration 
exceeds $150,000? If there are no such an employees is this disclosed? 
25.5% 30.3% 28.6% 31.6%
C34 
If the company has any shares/options for employees/directors, are the 
details of these disclosed (shares issued to employees or options 
granted)? If it does not have such schemes is this fact disclosed? 
98.5% 100.0% 100.0% 99.4%
 Audit Matters     
D1 Is the list of audit committee members disclosed 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
D2 Is the majority of audit committee independent? 91.2% 93.7% 94.3% 97.7%
D3 Is the entire audit committee independent? 69.3% 73.1% 74.3% 74.7%
D4 Is the chairman of the audit committee independent? 91.2% 96.0% 94.9% 97.7%
D5 Is disclosure made of the basis of selection of audit committee members? 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 
D6 
Do at least 2 members of the audit committee have accounting 
experience or related financial management expertise or experience? 
(this could either be an accounting or financial qualification or previous 
work experience in financial or investment positions) 
52.6% 55.4% 54.9% 61.5%
D7 Is disclosure made of individual AC members attendance at AC meetings? 0.0% 1.1% 1.1% 6.3% 
D8 Is the frequency of audit committee disclosed? 63.5% 66.3% 68.0% 77.0%
D9 Did the audit committee meet more than 2 times in the year? 37.2% 37.7% 40.6% 56.3%
D10 Did the audit committee meet more than 4 times in the year? 0.0% 1.1% 1.1% 3.4% 
D11 Did the audit committee meet more than 6 times in the year? 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 
D12 Did the audit committee meet more than 8 times in the year? 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 
D13 Was the attendance at AC meetings more than 60%? 0.7% 0.6% 1.7% 6.9% 
D14 Was the attendance at AC meetings more than 80%? 0.7% 0.6% 1.1% 6.9% 
D15 Was the attendance at AC meetings 100%? 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 3.4% 
D16 Does the audit committee have its terms of reference in writing? 59.1% 64.0% 66.3% 73.0%
D17 Does the audit committee have authority to investigate any matter within its terms of reference? 38.0% 40.6% 39.4% 45.4%
D18 Does the audit committee have access to and cooperation of management? 42.3% 48.0% 48.6% 56.3%
D19 Does the audit committee meet with external auditors in the absence of company management? 40.1% 42.3% 45.7% 53.4%
D20 Does the audit committee review scope, results and effectiveness of audits? 52.6% 60.6% 61.7% 69.0%
D21 Does the audit committee meet with internal auditors at least annually? 43.8% 45.1% 44.6% 56.3%
D22 Does the audit committee meet with external auditors at least annually? 67.2% 68.6% 70.3% 76.4%
D23 Does the audit committee review independence of external auditors annually? 27.0% 27.4% 34.3% 60.3%
D24 Is an annual review conducted of company’s internal controls and risk management? 8.8% 51.4% 98.9% 99.4%
D25 Does the annual report include a statement by the board on adequacy of internal controls? 6.6% 49.1% 91.4% 94.8%
D26 Does the internal auditor report primarily to the chairman of the audit committee? 4.4% 5.7% 5.1% 7.5% 
D27 Does the internal auditor meet standards set by recognized professional bodies (e.g. Institute of Internal Auditors)? 5.1% 5.1% 4.6% 4.0% 
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D28 Does the audit committee review adequacy of internal auditor’s resources? 7.3% 12.6% 14.9% 21.8%
D29 Does the audit committee annually review adequacy of internal audit function? 48.9% 53.7% 57.1% 60.3%
 Communication     
E1 Does the board provide shareholders with quarterly reports on the business and prospects even if it is not mandatory? 10.9% 10.9% 13.1% 14.9%
E2 Are the chairmen of all board committees existing present at the AGM to answer shareholders’ questions? 54.7% 57.7% 58.3% 62.1%
E3 Are external auditors present at annual general meetings to assist responses to shareholders? 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
E4 Are separate resolutions proposed at the AGM for each distinct issue? i.e. no resolutions are bundled together 99.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
E5 Does the company have its annual reports on its website? If the company does not have a website please score zero. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Max Possible Score = 140 (As Q30 & Q96-98 can score max 2 each). 
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Appendix 8: List of elements fully complied, complied by more than 90% and 
complied by less than 10% of the companies 
Fully Complied Complied by More than 90%  Complied by Less than 10% 
complete disclosure of board 
members;  
disclosure of detailed information on each 
director; 
100% attendance of board meetings by 
directors;  
appointment of a remuneration 
committee; 
disclosure of detailed information of each 
director’s previous employment; 
disclosure of the attendance of individual 
directors at board meetings;  
remuneration committee determines 
specific remuneration packages for 
executive       directors and the 
CEO;  
disclosure of other directorships of directors; more than 2/3 of the board are independent directors; 
remuneration committee reviews all 
aspects of remuneration; 
disclosure of the independence of each 
director; 
a company’s M&A allow for telephonic 
or videoconference meetings;  
the executive director’s 
compensation is linked to industry, 
company and/or individual 
performance; 
directors’ service contracts are not for more 
than three years;  
disclosure of details of training provided 
to directors;  
disclosure of audit committee 
members; existence of a nomination committee; review of the size of the board;  
the publication of the company’s 
annual reports on its website. 
disclosure of the nomination committee 
members; 
disclosure of the factors and criteria in 
determining board size;  
- disclosure of directors’ particulars; 
chairman’s responsibility includes matters 
such as scheduling board meetings, 
preparation of board meeting agenda, 
control over information flows between 
management and the board, and 
compliance with company’s guidelines on 
corporate governance; 
- disclosure of the remuneration committee members;  
board meetings are attended by the 
company secretary; 
- independent chairman for the remuneration committee; 
nominating committee annually reviews a 
director’s independence;  
- onerous removal clauses are not contained in directors’ service contracts; 
nominating committee reviews the 
adequacy of time spent by directors; 
- the majority of the remuneration committee is independent;  
disclosure of individual member’s 
attendance at nomination committee 
meetings; 
- long-term incentives are included in a director’s remuneration; 
the nomination committee meets more 
than two or more than four times in the 
year;  
- disclosure of the remuneration of executive directors;  
attendance at nomination committee 
meetings is more than 60% (80%; 100%); 
- disclosure of the remuneration of non-executive directors;  appraisal of the board’s performance;  
- 
disclosure of the components of remuneration 
analyzed by salaries, variable     bonuses, 
options and long-term incentives;  
criteria for evaluation of the board’s 
performance is established;  
- full disclosure of the remuneration of each director;  
disclosure of the process of board 
evaluation;  
A8- 2
- disclosure of details of any shares/options for employees/directors; 
disclosure of the criteria for evaluating 
board performance; 
- independence of the majority of the audit committee; 
evaluation of the individual performance 
of board members;  
- independence of the chairman of the audit committee; 
disclosure of the criteria for individual 
director performance; 
- separate resolutions are proposed at the AGM for each distinct issue. 
disclosure of the process of director 
evaluation;  
- - 
disclosure of an individual member’s 
attendance at the remuneration committee 
meetings; 
- - attendance at the remuneration committee meetings is more than 60% (80%; 100%); 
- - 
at leasat one remuneration committee 
member being knowledgeable about 
executive compensation;  
- - 
percentage of the performance-related 
elements of executive directors’ 
remuneration is greater than 50%;  
- - 
disclosure to shareholders of the 
remuneration of the top 5 executives who 
are not directors;  
- - disclosure of the basis of selection of audit committee members;  
- - 
disclosure of an individual member’s 
attendance at the audit committee 
meetings;  
- - 
audit committee meets more than four, 
more than six, and more than eight times 
in the year;  
- - attendance at audit committee meetings is more than 60% (80%; 100%);  
- - internal auditor reports primarily to the chairman of the audit committee;  
- - internal auditor meets standards set by recognized professional bodies; 
- - 
external auditors are present at annual 
general meetings to respond to 
shareholders’ concerns. 
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Appendix 9: Coefficient estimates from 2SLS 
regressions of the control mechanisms (pooled data) 
Panel A Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables SCORE INSIDE BLOCK 
CONSTANT 48.734*** 0.287*** 0.809*** 
 (21.840) (11.560) (8.003) 
SCORE - -0.002*** -0.013*** 
 - (-3.963) (-7.361) 
INSIDE -31.855*** - -0.565*** 
 (-3.379) - (-15.639) 
BLOCK -34.819*** -0.106*** - 
 (-4.385) (-5.380) - 
INST 25.123*** -0.105*** 0.298** 
 (3.528) (-7.520) (2.417) 
D/V 1.957* -0.057*** 0.382*** 
 (1.934) (-5.168) (4.419) 
CASH -1.315 -0.069*** 0.010 
 (-1.220) (-6.697) (0.174) 
REG 0.987 -0.031*** 0.004 
 (1.480) (-5.670) (0.231) 
FSIZE 0.087 -0.016*** -0.010 
 (0.265) (-8.639) (-1.287) 
ADR 2.026*** - - 
 (11.493) - - 
OUTDIRE 0.299* - - 
 (1.834) - - 
TENURE - 0.006*** - 
 - (11.357) - 
NOD - -0.002*** - 
 - (-4.449) - 
RISK - 0.873*** 1.078*** 
 - (4.110) (4.188) 
RDAI - - 0.469*** 
   -  - (15.321) 
Panel B Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables INST D/V CASH 
CONSTANT 0.341*** -0.422*** 0.315 
 (7.817) (-4.424) (1.359) 
SCORE 0.003*** 0.003 0.004 
 (4.579) (1.371) (0.850) 
INSIDE -0.138*** 0.213 0.372 
 (-3.317) (1.234) (1.538) 
BLOCK 0.396*** 0.797*** -0.047 
 (4.249) (14.433) (-0.247) 
INST - 0.262*** 0.135** 
 - (5.988) (2.237) 
D/V 0.044 - 0.174 
 (1.108) - (0.496) 
CASH -0.050 -0.347*** - 
 (-1.139) (-11.795) - 
REG -0.067*** 0.057*** -0.051* 
 (-9.097) (3.972) (-1.898) 
FSIZE -0.029*** 0.013*** -0.025*** 
 (-17.251) (4.397) (-4.979) 
ADR -0.003 - - 
 (-0.295) - - 
NINSTI -0.000** - - 
 (-2.413) - - 
CR - -0.004 - 
 - (-0.300) - 
COLLATERAL - -0.051*** - 
 - (-2.977) - 
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TAXSHIELD - -0.001 - 
 - (-1.643) - 
CASHFLOW - - 0.295 
 - - (1.634) 
WC - - -0.184*** 
 - - (-5.650) 
SIGMA - - -0.0002 
 - - (-0.063) 
DIV_D - - -0.237*** 
 - - (-3.198) 
RDA - - 2.213*** 
 - - (3.250) 
CPEX - - 0.016*** 
 - - (5.088) 
Adjusted R2 0.748 0.507 0.232 
no. of obs. 630 630 630 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each 
variable are given in Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are 
included for all regressions, but not reported. * refers to significance 
at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 percent level; 
and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Appendix 10: Coefficient estimates from OLS and 2SLS 
regressions of Q or FUTUREQ on control mechanisms (pooled 
data) 
  OLS Estimates 2SLS Estimates OLS Estimates 2SLS Estimates 
Independent 
Variables Q Q FUTUREQ FUTUREQ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT 4495525*** 6.637*** 2.818*** 4.841*** 
 (17.004) (3.916) (18.547) (5.046) 
SCORE -0.011*** 0.021 -0.004* -0.004 
 (-5.708) (1.073) (-1.910) (-0.685) 
INSIDE -0.082 -9.193*** -0.285*** -3.658*** 
 (-0.249) (-3.624) (-2.613) (-3.066) 
BLOCK 1.056*** 7.046*** 0.268** 0.686*** 
 (3.478) (3.437) (2.137) (4.739) 
INST -3.190*** -12.671*** -1.262*** -5.239*** 
 (-5.622) (-5.595) (-5.103) (-6.629) 
D/V 0.248 -12.660*** 0.072 -6.099*** 
 (1.522) (-7.306) (0.484) (-5.015) 
CASH 2.888*** 4.400** 0.653*** 1.407*** 
 (5.916) (2.503) (8.327) (2.832) 
RDA 11.456*** -11.063*** 8.566*** -1.230 
 (5.195) (-6.721) (4.232) (-1.394) 
FSIZE -0.158*** -0.384*** -0.073*** -0.184*** 
 (-7.024) (-4.812) (-9.431) (-3.663) 
Adjusted R2 0.764 0.407 0.853 0.661 
no. of obs. 636 630 635 625 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each variable are given in 
Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are included for all regressions, but not 
reported. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at 
the 5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Appendix 11: Four-factor model 
(“good governance portfolio” minus 
“bad governance portfolio”) 











Adjusted R2 0.044 
no. of obs. 48 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. The 
dependent variable is the zero investment portfolio 
return from buying a “good governance portfolio” 
and selling a “bad governance portfolio”. 
Portfolios are rebalanced in March 2001, March 
2002 and March 2003, and held till March 2004. * 
refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** 
refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and 
*** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Appendix 12: Estimation of the implied cost of equity capital 
 
A.1 Overview and Model-specific Assumptions 
The variables used in the estimation of the cost of equity capital are defined as 
follows: 
tP : market price of a firm’s stock four months after the end of the firm’s fiscal year t. 
tbv : book value per share at the end of the firm’s fiscal year t. 
τ+tbv : expected future book value per share at date t+ι, where 
τ+τ+−τ+τ+ −+= tt1tt dˆxˆbvbv . 
LTG: the I/B/E/S forecasted long-term earnings growth (LTG). 
ltg : expected long-term earnings growth rate. It is proxied by LTG. If LTG is missing, 







++ −= . 










pg : expected long-term earnings growth rate. This variable is estimated as the 
(annualized) median of one-year-ahead realized monthly inflation rates. 
τ+txˆ : expected future earnings per share for period (t+ ι-1, t+ ι) using explicit I/B/E/S 
analyst forecasts ( 1txˆ + , 2txˆ + , 3txˆ + , 4txˆ + , and 5txˆ + ). When explicit earnings per share 
forecasts for the periods t+3 to t+5 are missing, I compute it using the following 
formula: )g1(xˆxˆ lt1tt +⋅= −τ+τ+ . 
τ+tFROE : expected return on equity (ROE) for period (t+ ι-1, t+ ι), computed as 
1tt bv/xˆ −τ+τ+  for the first three years. Beyond the third year, τ+tFROE  is calculated 
by linearly fading 3tFROE +  to the industry target ROE measured by a five-year 
average ROE for the 2-digit SIC industry. 
POUT: the future dividend payout ratio. It is proxied by the historical three-year 
average payout ratio of a firm. When the firm-specific payout ratio is missing, I 
substitute it with a three-year average payout ratio for the corresponding 2-digit SIC 
industry. 
τ+tdˆ : expected future net dividends per share for period (t+ ι-1, t+ ι). It is computed 
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as the dividend payout ratio (POUT) times the earnings per share forecast ( τ+txˆ ). 
PEGOJ,GLSCT R,RR,R : implied cost of equity capital estimates calculated as the 
internal rate of return, solving the following valuation equations, respectively. 
 


















This is a special case of the residual income valuation model. Where 
1tCTt bvRxˆ −τ+τ+ ⋅−  is the expected abnormal income (residual income) at t+ ι, or 
forecasted accounting earnings less a charge for the cost of equity. This equation is 
converted from the discounted dividends model by assuming the clean surplus 
relation, i.e., )bvbv(xˆdˆ 1tttt −τ+τ+τ+τ+ −−= . This model assumes that abnormal 
earnings grow at a constant rate g after T = 5. I use the (annualized) median of 
one-year-ahead realized monthly inflation rates to proxy pg . 
 
















































This is a special case of the residual income valuation model. Where 
1tGLSt bvRxˆ −τ+τ+ ⋅−  is the expected abnormal income (residual income) at t+ ι, or 
forecast accounting earnings less a charge for the cost of equity. 1tGLSt bvRxˆ −τ+τ+ ⋅−  
further can be rewritten as 1tGLSt bv)RFROE( −τ+τ+ ⋅− . Where τ+tFROE  is the 
forecasted ROE for period t+ ι. It is computed as 1tt bv/xˆ −τ+τ+  for the first three years. 
Beyond the third year, τ+tFROE  is calculated by linearly fading 3tFROE +  to the 
equilibrium return on equity measured by a five-year average ROE for the 
corresponding 2-digit SIC industry.  I forecast earnings up to 12 future years 
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applying the clean surplus relation, i.e., τ+τ+−τ+τ+ −+= tt1tt dˆxˆbvbv . Where τ+tdˆ  
equals dividend payout ratio (POUT) times the earnings per share forecast τ+txˆ .  
 












−⋅−−+= +++++  
This is a special case of the abnormal earnings growth valuation model. Solving 






















++ −= . Here stg  is the original solution for the Ohlso and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2000) model. This model does not use the forecasted long-term 
growth rate. Instead, to keep this information, Gode and MOhanram (2003) estimate 









++ . I take the same approach 
as that of Gode and MOhanram (2003). 
For the model to have a numerical solution, it requires that 0xˆxˆ 1t2t >> ++ . The 
perpetual earnings growth rate, pg , is proxied by the (annualized) median of 
one-year-ahead realized monthly inflation rates. 
 









This is a special case of the abnormal earnings growth valuation model. Solving 









⋅⋅+⋅⋅−+= ++++  
Where 1tdˆ +  equals dividend payout ratio (POUT) times the earnings per share 
forecast 1txˆ + . The implicit assumption of this model is that growth in abnormal 
earnings persists in perpetuity after the initial period. For the model to have a 
numerical solution, it requires that 0xˆxˆ 1t2t >> ++ . 
 
A.2 General Assumptions and Data Requirements 
 I require firms to have current stock price data ( tP ), book value per share ( tbv ), 
dividends payout ratio (POUT), and return on equity (ROE) in Datastream. 
Furthermore, I require firms to have earnings per share forecasts for two periods 
ahead ( 1txˆ + , and 2txˆ + ), and either forecasted earnings per share for period t+3 ( 3txˆ + ) 
or forecasted long-term earnings growth rate (LTG) from I/B/E/S.  The expected 








++ −= . When explicit earnings per share forecasts for the periods 
t+3 to t+5 are missing, I compute them using the following formula: 
)g1(xˆxˆ lt1tt +⋅= −τ+τ+ . Emulating Hail and Leuz (2006), I use only positive earnings 
forecasts and growth rates. All estimates are mean analyst consensus forecasts. 
 To ensure that financial data is publicly available and priced, and at the same time 
that the effects of corporate governance on the cost of equity capital can be tested, 
stock prices and analyst forecasts are measured four months after the end of the firm’s 
fiscal year t. 
Net dividends ( τ+tdˆ ) equals the dividend payout ratio (POUT) times the earnings 
per share forecast ( τ+txˆ ). The future dividend payout ratio (POUT) is proxied by the 
historical three-year average payout ratio of a firm. When the firm-specific payout 
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ratio is missing, I substitute it with a three-year average payout ratio for the 
corresponding 2-digit SIC industry. The expected long-term earnings growth rate ( pg ) 
is estimated as the (annualized) median of one-year-ahead realized monthly inflation 
rates. 
Since the models of Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) and Claus and 
Thomas (2001) do not have a closed form solution, I employ an iterative procedure to 
derive the internal rate of return. This numerical approximation equates current stock 
price ( tP ) to the right-hand side of the respective equity valuation model. I stop 
iterating when the imputed price falls within a 0.001 difference of its actual value. 
Like Chen et al. (2005), I restrict the estimated cost of equity capital within 0 and 0.6, 
and set it to “not available” otherwise. 
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Appendix 13: Effect of corporate governance on the cost of equity 
capital: OLS regressions of R on SCORE, ownership and other 
control variables (pooled data) 
  Excluding BM Including BM 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 0.231*** 0.237*** 0.226*** 0.227*** 0.203*** 0.207*** 0.213*** 0.215*** 
 (10.415) (8.444) (10.046) (8.142) (8.612) (7.385) (10.170) (8.443) 
SCORE 0.0004** 0.0003* 0.0003*** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0002 0.0003*** 0.0002** 
 (2.327) (1.67) (2.783) (2.140) (2.039) (1.452) (2.648) (2.025) 
INSIDE - -0.035*** - -0.033*** - -0.028** - -0.030*** 
 - (-3.107) - (-6.651) - (-2.547) - (-5.535) 
BLOCK - 0.013 - 0.011 - 0.008 - 0.009 
 - (1.553) - (1.631) - (0.990) - (1.270) 
INST - -0.004 - 0.001 - 0.0005 - 0.003 
 - (-0.772) - (0.184) - (0.089) - (0.437) 
BETA 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (5.119) (5.459) (3.180) (3.462) (5.566) (5.964) (3.540) (3.806) 
ME -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (-10.942) (-8.206) (-10.022) (-7.242) (-13.855) (-9.467) (-13.835) (-9.037) 
BM - - - - 1.366*** 1.302*** 0.686** 0.611** 
 - - - - (5.187) (4.525) (2.490) (2.224) 
FERR - - -0.122*** -0.120*** - - -0.102*** -0.103*** 
 - - (-17.447) (-13.645) - - (-10.626) (-10.797) 
MMT6 - - -0.023*** -0.023*** - - -0.021*** -0.022*** 
 - - (-4.749) (-5.172) - - (-4.971) (-5.394) 
Adjusted R2 0.214 0.221 0.308 0.315 0.250 0.253 0.315 0.320 
no. of obs. 547 547 546 546 547 547 546 546 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each variable are given in 
Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are included for all regressions, but not 
reported. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 
5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
A14- 1
Appendix 14: Effect of corporate 
governance on market beta: OLS 
regressions of BETA on SCORE and 
ownership variables (pooled data) 
Variable (1) (2) 
Constant 0.568*** 0.299*** 
 (9.301) (2.756) 
SCORE 0.009*** 0.012*** 
 (5.492) (6.025) 
INSIDE - 0.764*** 
 - (5.801) 
BLOCK - -0.105 
 - (-0.822) 
INST - 0.468*** 
 - (2.679) 
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.156 
no. of obs. 549 549 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Definitions of each variable are given in 
Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are 
included for all regressions, but not reported. * 
refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** 
refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and 
*** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Appendix 15: Summation estimates of 
regression of excess return of each individual 
stock in the U.K. market on CGE and four 
risk factors 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 
α -0.022*** -0.005** 
 (-10.170) (-2.311) 
CGE 0.276*** -0.101***
 (9.583) (-3.100) 
RMRF  1.006*** 
  (36.166) 
SMB  0.710*** 
  (25.359) 
HML  -0.040 
  (-1.444) 
MOM  -0.074***
  (-6.099) 
no. of regressions 766 766 
no. of obs. per regression 48 48 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. The regression is 
run for each individual stock in the U.K. market, with 
firms’ excess return as the dependent variable. CGE is the 
monthly excess return of the zero investment from buying 
good governance firms and selling bad governance firms. 
The reported coefficients are the average of all the 
estimates. Portfolios are rebalanced in March 2001, March 
2002 and March 2003, and held till March 2004. * refers 
to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to 
significance at the 5 percent level; and *** refers to 
significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Appendix 16: Effect of corporate governance on 
FUTUREROA: OLS regressions of FUTUREROA on 
SCORE, BM, ME and/or ownership and other control 
variables (pooled data) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 0.019 -0.084* -0.145*** 0.184*** -0.050* 
 (0.507) (-1.738) (-2.831) (7.269) (-1.703) 
SCORE 0.0005** 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0004* 0.0005** 
 (2.455) (2.045) (2.195) (1.768) (2.260) 
INSIDE - - 0.038** -0.031 -0.028 
 - - (2.318) (-1.349) (-1.498) 
BLOCK - - -0.016 -0.002 0.003 
 - - (-1.418) (-0.165) (0.216) 
INST - - 0.066*** -0.006 0.011 
 - - (3.715) (-0.367) (0.690) 
FSIZE - - - -0.014 -0.001 
 - - - (-1.338) (-0.111) 
FSIZE2 - - - 0.0006 -0.0006 
 - - - (0.803) (-0.778) 
K/S - - - -0.024*** -0.019*** 
 - - - (-6.741) (-6.320) 
(K/S)2 - - - 0.001*** 0.0008*** 
 - - - (6.165) (4.706) 
Y/S - - - 0.126*** 0.106*** 
 - - - (5.782) (4.593) 
RDUM - - - 0.032*** 0.030*** 
 - - - (7.794) (7.848) 
R&D/K - - - -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 - - - (-3.292) (-3.415) 
I/K - - - -0.006*** -0.007** 
 - - - (-3.552) (-2.034) 
EXT_FIN - - - 0.0001 -0.0003 
 - - - (0.329) (-1.005) 
BM -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017*** - -0.010*** 
 (-5.878) (-5.918) (-5.958) - (-3.803) 
ME - 0.005*** 0.007*** - 0.007*** 
 - (7.871) (6.649) - (6.735) 
Adjusted R2 0.114 0.124 0.129 0.212 0.233 
no. of obs. 655 655 655 641 641 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of each variable are given 
in Appendix 4. Year and industry dummies are included for all regressions, but 
not reported. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to 
significance at the 5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 
percent level. 
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Appendix 17: Effect of corporate governance on future operating performance: 
OLS regressions of future operating performance on SCORE, BM, and ME 
(pooled data) 
Numerator 







-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** - -0.0002 0.00004 -0.001*** 
(-6.129) (-4.141) (-4.123) - (-1.199) (0.251) (-3.197) Sales 
0.050 0.070 0.082 - 0.007 0.205 0.062 
0.005*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.035*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001 
(5.888) (7.576) (2.268) (3.131) (3.358) (2.106) (0.888) 
Book Value 
of Total 
Equity 0.146 0.151 0.134 0.099 0.039 0.223 0.104 
0.0004* 0.0004*** 0.0002 0.00003 -0.00002 0.0001 -0.0002 
(1.759) (2.956) (1.032) (0.042) (-0.112) (0.44) (-1.292) Book Value of Assets 
0.064 0.071 0.079 0.047 -0.002  0.147 0.056 
-0.317 -0.227 -0.151 -3.782 -0.308 -0.148 -0.154 
(-0.929) (-1.012) (-0.973) (-1.482) (-0.865) (-1.416) (-1.248) 
Market Value 
of Total 
Equity -0.010  -0.010 -0.010  -0.010  -0.010 -0.010  -0.010  
0.00004 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.005*** 0.0003*** -0.0003 -0.0002 
(0.135) (-1.232) (-1.236) (3.167) (3.531) (-1.174) (-1.038) Market Value of Assets 
0.157 0.152 0.147 0.083 0.055 0.205 0.109 
Sample size varies from 597 to 657. The table presents the coefficients on SCORE for dependent 
variables with different measures of operating performance in the numerator (EBITDA, EBIT, 
ordinary income, sales, capital expenditures, dividends and net income), with denominators as shown. 
Control variables are BM, ME, year and industry dummies. The values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Definitions of each variable are given in Appendix 4. * refers to significance at the 10 percent level; 
** refers to significance at the 5 percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Appendix 18: Analysts’ forecast errors for good 
governance and bad governance firms 
Variable Q1 (Low SCORE) Q5 (High SCORE) Q5-Q1 Diff. 
-0.009  -0.007  0.002  AFE_1999 
  (0.303) 
-0.012  -0.018  -0.006  AFE_2000 
  (0.814) 
-0.017  -0.016  0.001  AFE_2001 
  (0.098) 
-0.006  -0.009  -0.003  AFE_2002 
  (0.325) 
-0.011  -0.013  -0.002  
AFE_average 
    (0.869) 
The table reports average values and (in parentheses) t-statistics 
for one-year analysts’ forecast errors, for bad governance (Q1) and 
good governance (Q5) groups. Analysts’ forecast errors are 
measured as the difference between the average I/B/E/S forecast 
available at fiscal year end and actual earnings for the forecasted 
period, divided by share price at the end of the fiscal year. * refers 
to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at 




Appendix 19: Differences in one-year analysts’ forecast 
errors between good governance and bad governance firms 
Panel A: Full Sample   



















Time-Series Mean -0.00005 
Time-Series Std. 0.0001 
t-statistics -0.789 
4 
Panel B: Restricted Sample   



















Time-Series Mean 0.001 
Time-Series Std. 0.005 
t-statistics 0.441 
4 
Panel A presents the coefficient on SOCRE in the regression of one-year analysts 
forecast errors on SOCRE, log(market value of equity), and log(book-to-market 
equity) (coefficients on control variables are not reported). Analysts’ forecast 
error is defined as I/B/E/S actual earnings per share minus I/B/E/S forecasted 
earnings per share, and is deflated by share price. Panel B presents the 
coefficient on CG_D indicator variable in the regression of one-year analysts 
forecast errors on CG_D, log(market value of equity), and log(book-to-market 
equity) (coefficients on control variables are not reported). CG_D is a dummy 
variable that take the value of one if the firm is in the quintile with the highest 
corporate governance score, and zero if the firm is in the quintile with the lowest 
corporate governance score. The sample in Panel B is restricted to firms in the 
top and bottom quintiles of SOCRE. T-statistics are in parentheses. Results are 
based on regressions by year. Then the time-series mean of coefficients, standard 
deviation and t-statistics for the average of the coefficients are calculated. * 
refers to significance at the 10 percent level; ** refers to significance at the 5 
percent level; and *** refers to significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Appendix 20: Returns around earnings announcements for CG low, CG middle, 
and CG high groups 
Window CG low 30% CG middle 40% CG high 30% 
Panel A: Raw Returns    
0.003 0.006* 0.009** 
(-1,1) 
(1.258) (1.859) (2.046) 
0.005* 0.005 0.008 
(-2,1) 
(1.795) (1.086) (1.367) 
0.006 0.003 0.012** 
(-5,1) 
(1.382) (0.568) (2.165) 
0.011 -0.003 0.016* 
(-10,1) 
(1.296) (-0.370) (1.878) 
0.019 0.001 0.021*** 
(-20,1) 
(1.511) (0.136) (2.651) 
Panel B: Abnormal Returns    
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
(-1,1) 
(-1.042) (-0.899) (-0.529) 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(-2,1) 
(-0.500) (-0.676) (-0.531) 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
(-5,1) 
(-0.245) (-0.704) (-0.289) 
0.001 -0.003 0.002 
(-10,1) 
(0.109) (-0.575) (0.364) 
0.004 0.001 0.010 
(-20,1) 
(0.505) (-0.051) (1.209) 
Panel A shows the raw return for each corporate governance group over various event windows 
around the earnings announcement. Panel B shows the abnormal return for each corporate governance 
group over various event windows around the earnings announcement. The abnormal return is 
calculated based on the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) for daily returns estimated 
from day t = -270 to day t = -21 in the same period. T-values are computed with the Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) method and are reported in parentheses. 
 
